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ABSTRACT
I address an issue largely ignored by political science: the role of litigation pro-
cedure in influencing policy outcomes. The specific aim of my dissertation is to
explain the phenomenon of diminishing civil trials and the concomitant policy
effects caused by this diminution.
I begin with the following research puzzle: United States federal civil case fil-
ings have increased steadily over time to reach the highest levels ever seen. Fed-
eral civil case filings have increased over 400% between 1964-2014. Yet, despite the
increased number of case filings, the percentage of cases reaching trial is 1/12th
what it was in 1964. Presently, only 1% of all cases filed reach trial. The puzzle is
why have the number of trials diminished even though case filings have increased?
And, does the diminution of trials have a substantive impact on national policies?
My dissertation theorizes that the decrease in trials has resulted from a mod-
ification in litigation incentives created by changes to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, namely, the summary judgment process. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued a trilogy of decisions which dramatically altered the usage of sum-
mary judgment, and in so doing, the economic incentives for litigants to go to trial.
To address the aforementioned questions, I utilize a multi-level research de-
sign. First, in a macro-level study of aggregate data, I utilize advanced time series
methods and find structural breaks in the data consistent with these changes to
the summary judgment process. Additionally, continuing the macro-level analy-
sis, I examine the consequences of this procedural change by analyzing the effects
of the change to summary judgment on federal employment discrimination cases.
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I find diminishing employment discrimination trials cause increased disparity in
income ratios betweenmen andwomen, as well as African-Americans andwhites.
The findings suggest that changes to legal procedure by the federal judiciary have
hurt legislative endeavors to promote income equality, despite Congress’ efforts
to incentivize civil rights litigation. Finally, I perform a micro-level analysis eval-
uating case-level data. Through creation of a unique dataset, I evaluate the causes
of motions for summary judgment and the determinants of judicial grants of such
motions. The data suggest that several factors, including litigant resources and the
type of case brought (such as civil rights cases), impact a court’s decision to dis-
miss claims using this procedural device. My results suggest policymakers must
rethink their efforts at legislating equality through private statutory enforcement.
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1. INTRODUCTION
If we go to the federal district courthouses what might we see? Oil paintings of
jurists past. Marbel pillars rising high before us. Courtrooms, draped with ornate
murals and etchings. The occasional stained-glass depiction of a notable historical
event. The courtrooms that exist, and that I have practiced in, truly command a
respect that borders on the solemn.
What you will not see in those courtrooms: trials.
Despite the fact thatAmerican society reflects a litigiousness, anddespite record
numbers of case filings in the federal system, absent from the federal trial courts
are actual trials. Data from the Administrative Office for the United States Courts
indicate that federal civil case filings have increased over 400% between 1964-2014.
Yet, despite the increased number of case filings, the percentage of cases reaching
trial is now 1/12th what it was in 1964. Presently, only 1% of all federal civil cases
filed reach trial. The general question is, why? The larger thematic question con-
sists of: Is there a rush to justice?
Let me explain what I mean by a rush to justice. The rush to justice is not nec-
essarily centered on time dependence or temporality. Instead, it is the concept
that litigation has been forced from a paradigm in which parties accumulated ev-
idence and expended resources toward a buildup for trial by jury and moved to a
paradigm in which parties are singularly focused on presenting a case to a judge.
Rather than letting a case develop until ripe for consumption by a jury, the case
has been reoriented for evaluation by a judge who evaluates whether such claims
may even be presented at a trial. This is the rush in the rush to justice. It is the sys-
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tematic movement away from the jury to the judge; a manipulation away from the
role that a trial plays in our society to a paper evaluation of merits by the unelected
federal trial court judge.
In the chapters that follow, I discuss potential causes for this move away from
trials and conclude that alterations to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the
United States SupremeCourt has incentivized away the desire for litigants to reach
trial, and has worked to make it easier for federal district judges to prevent cases
from ever reaching the trial stage. This development in modern American litiga-
tion has significant consquences for public policy, particularly in the area of civil
rights. In performing this assessment, I will detail with specificity how the pro-
cedural device known as summary judgment has been manipulated to cause the
diminution of federal civil trials.
For now, I will briefly detail the following structure of the study. In Chapter 2,
I address the theoretical foundations for why trials have a role in our democratic
system of government. In this discussion I will detail the various roles that trials
perform in general, and jury trials in particular. I also provide a brief history of
the American experience with the trial system to explain how trials have come to
hold the place they occupy in the present American legal system.
Chapter 3 includes a brief statistical detail of the federal civil system, including
statistics on federal civil trials. The chapter’s discussion then pivots to previous
scholars’ accounts of the diminution in trials and themajor theories in the literature
for the causes of this phenomenon.
Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the role of civil procedure. In this section of
the study I present the historical background on the development of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and a particular discussion on the summary judgment
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procedural device. I continue the analysis with formulation of a unified theory
of how alterations to legal procedure can account for a remaking of litigants’ in-
centivization structures for litigation and why alterations to summary judgment
standards have induced litigants to avoid trial or be dealt a signficant blow.
Chapter 5 builds upon the theoretical foundations of the previous chapter and
presents a multi-level research design. I first evaluate, using advanced time series
modeling techniques, macro-level aggregate data on civil trials and conclude that
the SupremeCourt’s alterations to the summary judgment standard can be consid-
ered a cause of the diminution in federal civil trials. I then present a micro-level
analysis of the causes for determinations to file motions for summary judgment
and the determinants of whether a summary judgment motion will be granted.
Themicro-level analysis utilizes a uniquedataset constructed from individual docket
and document reviews from the federal case docketing system known as PACER.
This dataset includes heretofore un-measured variables to test competing theories
of summary judgment motion practice. Finally, Chapter 5 contains an analysis of
the implications for lack of trials in an issue-specific domain, that of employment
discrimination. The results here suggest that the diminution in trials has conse-
quence not only for this particular type of case, but also the attendant public policy
concerns of income inequality.
In Chapter 6, I discuss the ramifications for the present study. In particular, I
expound on the impact and consequences of the diminution in federal civil trials.
Here, I focus attention to the subterranean nature of legal procedure, and how its
modification has importance for the larger question of private statutory enforce-
ment regimes and use of priviate litigants for mobilization of public policies.
I turn now to the theoretical foundations for usage of trials.
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2. POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY OF CIVIL TRIALS
2.1 Introduction
What is the harm to our civil justice system if cases no longer go to trial? It
is the perception of some that trials are inefficient, that jurors are comprised of
laypersons who are ignorant and incapable of sophisticated reasoning, and the
judicial system’s energies are better spent steering cases (in the civil system) to-
ward non-adjudicatory resolution (such as summary judgment and settlement).
If not having trials means a renouncing of these malificent properties, then using
summary judgment (and dismissing cases early) is a noble component of legal pro-
cedure. This position, however, ignores the critical role that trials in general, and
jury trials in particular, play in our democratic system.
Chapters 3-5 will discuss the diminution of trials in the federal civil system as
well as the policy consequences for this reduction in trials. In this chapter, however,
I focus on the theoretical foundations forwhy trials—in particular jury trials—have
a role in our democratic system of government. I will also provide a brief history
of the American experience with the trial system to explain how trials have come
to hold the place they occupy in the present American legal system.
2.2 Why Trials Are Important
Explaining why trials are important requires multifaceted evaluation of the
roles that jury trials play in our legal system. I borrow here from the useful tax-
onomy of trial “roles” proposed by Ellen Sward (2001). Sward maintains that jury
trials serve: (1) a political role, (2) a dispute-settling role, and (3) a law-making
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role.1 Each of these roles provides a theoretical pillar uponwhich jury trials stand,
and which together, provide utility for the jury trial as mechanism implicit within
a concept of good democratic governance.
2.2.1 The Political Role of Jury Trials
Democratic theory suggests that the key component of democracy is participa-
tion by the citizenry in the governance of a society. In Democracy and Its Critics,
Robert Dahl (1989), states that “democracy” requires opportunity for the citizenry
to understand civic issues and the capacity for the citizenry to control the decision-
making agenda. Democracy also requires other attributes, such as the ability to
vote in elections. But, the aforementioned requirements of participation, exposure
to civic matters, and control over the decision-making agenda align neatly with
the role of the jury in a trial.
Historically, “juries” have long been considered a component of the citizenry’s
participation in the democratic process. We can look back to the days of ancient
Greece when juries would decide questions of policy or pronouncements of judg-
ment. Indeed, the Greek polity rendered Socrates’ fate by jury (Held 1987). And
the Greek democratic experience included the use of the “Assembly.” As Held
(1987, 21) notes, “TheAssemblymet over 40 times a year andhad a quorumof 6,000
citizens.” Much like a jury, unanimity in decision was often sought for a solid pro-
nouncement of judgment on matters. More modern political philosophers have
further suggested participation in the form of “jury-like” service. Rousseau (1762)
lauded the effects of participatory democracy. I do not suggest here that modern
civil trial juries function in the same manner as the Athenian democracy of the
1Sward actually identifies a fourth role, the socializing role of jury trials. I believe this “role”
is effectively subsumed by the political role, and therefore have reconstituted Sward’s suggested
classification scheme for the purposes of my discussion here.
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past. What I do suggest, though, is that participation and involvement of citizens
in the administration of their government has long been considered a benchmark
of democratic theory, and themodern incarnation of that involvement can take the
form of the civil jury (as opposed to an unelected Article III judge).
In the American experience, there has been a resurgence of sorts in the calls
for participation of citizens in democratic governance. In America’s earliest days,
the civil jury was considered a political enterprise with beneficial attributes for
democracy as a whole. Tocqueville was particularly keen to this discernment. In
Democracy in America, Tocqueville devotes nearly an entire chapter to the impact
juries have in maintaining the American democratic experience. As he notes, the
jury is not only judicial in nature, but also “a political institution” (Tocqueville,
1863, 358). Tocqueville was particularly focused on the impact of the civil jury. As
he states: “When. . . the jury acts also on civil causes, its application is constantly
visible; it affects all the interests of the community; everyone co-operates in its
work: it thus penetrates into all the usages of life, it fashions the human mind
to its peculiar forms, and is gradually associated with the idea of justice itself.”
For Tocqueville, the civil jury in particular operated to expand citizens’ interests
beyond just their own and to their community at large. He notes (364):
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the
spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with
the habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institu-
tions. . . It teaches men to practise equity; every man learns to judge his
neighbor as he would himself be judged. . . It invests each citizens with
a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they are
bound to discharge towards society, and the part which they take in its
government.
For Tocqueville, the civil jury operated to effect individual citizens in such a
way as to induce feelings for, and dedication to, their community. The notion
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that the civil jury can operate to produce effective citizenship and civicness is not
without its critics. Contrary to Rousseau, one need look no further than Thomas
Hobbes and his Leviathan, or even to John Locke (in his Second Treatise of Govern-
ment), for philosophical positions that are notoriously skeptical of democratic par-
ticipation by the uneducated or unsophisticated masses, and thus run contrary to
Tocqueville’s exhaltations. Whatever may be these criticisms, however, the reality
is that we do have civil juries in the United States. But does this jury system fall
short of Tocqueville’s observations? It turns out, there is much work suggesting
that juries do, in fact, appreciably contribute to the democratic system as a mech-
anism for citizen participation.
More-recent scholarship suggests that past criticisms of the jury system are
unfounded. As Sward (2001, 57) notes, “The general thrust of the criticism is
that earlier studies of political behavior did not do justice to the quality of cit-
izens participation—that citizens do a much better job, and have more respect
for democratic institutions, than appeared from those early studies.” Page and
Shapiro (1993) note that the mass public appears to have a rather capable sense of
determining what is not only in their individual interest, but also in the national
collective interest. Additionally, the more citizens are involved in juries, the more
they can become educated about the problems and difficulties that not only occur
in the legal system, but more generally within their community (Pateman 1970).
In short, scholars have noted the potential for civic engagement that stems from
the use of juries (Diamond 1993; Amar 1995; Dzur 2012; Fukurai & Krooth 2010;
Vidmar & Hans 2007).
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The notion that juries can serve as a mechanism to inducing increased civic-
mindedness is not only a pale theory of civic republicans2 or communitarians3,
but also empirically demonstrated. Sward (2001, 61) notes the mechanisms that lie
at the heart of this process:
Jurors have a common goal of reaching the right decision in the case be-
fore them, and they must deliberate face-to-face until that unanimous
(consensus) decision is reached. None of our other widespread gov-
ernmental institutions has these characteristics. Only the jury among
our governmental institutions requries diverse people to come together
and deliberate to a unanimous decision.
Empirical investigations into these processes provide support for this conclu-
sion. Consolini’s (1992) dissertationworkdemonstrated serving on juries increased
jurors’ political self-confidence and knowledge about the judicial branch. Addi-
tionally, post-trial surveys show service on juries alters jurors’ views about the
courts and legal process: most jurors are satisfied with their experience and hold
more positive views about courts (Diamond 1993; Gastil et al. 2010). Gastil’s works
have demonstrated a link between jury service and voting rates (Gastil et al. 2002;
Gastil et al. 2008; Gastil et al. 2010). In particular, jurors who served on juries that
reached an agreement in a verdict showed increased voting rates after their jury
service.
Jury service provides, as Hans et al. (2014, 699) note, a “civic spark.” Indeed,
Hans et al. (2014) in their own review of Gastil’s data of 522 different civil juries
and 3,378 individual jurors find that individuals who serve even on civil juries
(as opposed to criminal trials) show an increase in the likelihood that they will
2Amodern example would be Benjamin Barber (Strong Democracy (2003)) or Cass Sunstein (Be-
yond the Republican Revival (1988)).
3Amodern example would be Amitai Etzioni (The Spirit of the Community (1993); The New Com-
munitarian Thinking (editor) (1995))
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cast a ballot in future elections. The effect is most pronounced when unanimity is
required for a verdict. As Hans et al. (2014, 713) stated: The findings are consistent
with what jurors might see on television in that, “The jurors move from strangers
to comrades through their shared experience even before the jury room deliberation
begins.” This result is consistent with Sward’s (2001, 63) socializing role of the jury.
She contends that:
Jury duty requires diverse people to work together for a common end.
It requires that we respect each other’s perspectives. It requires that
we try to understand lives that are quite different from our own. And
it does all this not in the rarefied atmospheres of speculation or en-
tertainment, but in real cases involving real people. Even apart from
political participation and deliberation, then, jury duty can help us to
understand and get along with each other.
Simply put, the empirical evidence does suggest that participation in juries not
only provides an important element for citizen-governance, but also that the ex-
perience of serving on a jury is of such a profound impact as to consist of spillover
effects for other positive features for democracy, including voting. Tocqueville’s
observations appear to hold nearly 200 years later.
2.2.2 The Dispute-Settling Role of Jury Trials
The second role of the jury is the dispute-settling role it plays. Within this role,
the jury serves to provide public benefits in the form of policy choices, resolve
factual disputes, and establish liability with policy consequences. I will discuss
each of these components of the jury’s value, beginning with the public benefits
that the jury provides.
It is easy to forget the forest for the treeswhen academically evaluating a partic-
ular subject. We can easily lose “first principles” by focusing on rather minute and
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specific contentions between factions engaged in the scholarly dialogue. Accord-
ingly, I want to draw the reader out a bit and consider a rather large, but sometimes
non-obvious, public benefit of the jury system: civil dispute resolution.
When I say “civil” dispute resolution, I refer not to the fact that juries can serve
to resolve disputes in civil (as opposed to criminal) cases. Instead, I refer to the
fact that as a dispute resolution mechanism, juries are a part of the legal process
that seeks to provide redress for injuries without resort to violence or breach of
peace. It may seem too base or banal a point to make, but the reality is that many
nations across the globe ostensibly have a civil justice system, and yet see civil and
political violence at alarming rates. As Sward (2001, 29) notes, the civil jury system
“benefits those citizens who find themselves involved in a dispute that they can-
not resolvewithout authoritative help. But it also benefits those citizenswho never
make use of the adjudicatory services of the state, becausewithout an authoritative
resolution of such disputes, the disputants may well engage in self-help, resulting
in a breach of the peace.” In other words, there are public benefits to be derived
from the maintenance and appreciation for a civil justice system that encourages
the use of civil juries. And, as noted in the previous section, there is a “civic-ness”
that appears to follow individuals beyond their jury service into their future af-
fairs, including their participation in the democratic system as voters. If serving
on juries instills a maintenance of civil order, not only for the parties involved in
the litigation, but also for those who leave the jury box and have political disagree-
ments, then it is fair to say on a normative level that trials (and their concomitant
use of juries) are a public good.
A related concern with trials and juries is in the area of resource-disparity.
Sward (2001) contends that juries can serve as an “equalizer.” When two large
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corporations, for instance, do battle in the courtroom, it is often the case that there
is a parity in resources. The same can often be said for disputes in the civil system
between two individuals. But, there are two examples where the jury can provide
an equilizing effect: (1) when individuals are against the government in civil cases
and (2) when individuals are against deeper-pocketed corporations in a civil case.
In these scenarios, one party is disproportionately disadvantaged by the lack of
resources to contend its position. It is not difficult to consider the large resources
available to the government should it wish to push a particular argument in court;
the same can be said for a large corporation. Yet the private litigant, the individ-
ual, does not have the resources to “lawyer up,” and thereby lacks at the outset
an equal footing, particularly at the pre-trial stage of litigation. But at the point
of a jury trial, many of these elements disappear, at least as far as the jury knows.
For instance, a corporate defendant may very well be represented by a large law
firm with thousands of attorneys, have devoted innumerable (billable) hours to
discovery, and have out-investigated the facts of the case several times over than
an individual represented by a solo-practitioner. However, in the presence of the
jury, this resource disparity is not on display in an overt sense. The jury typically
hears from the lead attorney in opening and closing arguments, a single lawyer
will typically conduct examination and cross-examination of evidence during the
trial, and closing argument is typically conducted by a single attorney (indeed, it is
often not to one’s advantage to have several attorneys stepping in to conduct such
closings in piecemeal fashion, if the trial judge would even allow it). In short, the
essence of the case is distilled into the factual determinations necessary for the jury
to render its verdict and the resource discrepancies (which are never lost on the at-
torneys and even the parties to a case) do not pierce the jury box. This contention
is not to suggest that these factors do not matter at all at the trial stage; they can.
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If a judge asks for a trial brief, the large firm can assign a newly-minted lawyer
(or three) to stay up all night with a crisp written argument prepared by 8:00 a.m.
the next morning, while the solo-practitioner must decide whether to expend time
drafting the brief and not prepping for the next day’s witnesses (to say nothing of
the other, personal demands on their time). But to the jury, these matters are held
somewhat in check and the jury can have an equilizing effect. This fact leads Sward
(2001, 31) to conclude that the “jury can mediate th[e]se inequalities” (see also Car-
bonneau, 1989, 208-09). The same can be said for the advantage “repeat players”
have in the litigation process. The government, and often large corporate entities,
are repeat players in litigation, which gives them an advantage at understanding
their probabilities of success and the mechanics necessary for advantageous reso-
lution of their claims or defenses.4 Carbonneau (1989, 208-09) suggests the repeat
player advantage can be mollified by the jury trial system.
Another benefit that appears to exist for usage of the civil jury concerns the
deliberative capacity of juries to decide cases imbued with “tragic choices.” This
argument, espoused by Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978), results from the larger idea
that juries can produce “greater common sense to decisionmaking, since the judg-
ment of twelve persons is very probably superior to the judgment of an individ-
ual” (Priest 1993). This argument that juries reach superior decisions is the very
argument proposed by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel in perhaps the most well-
known book ever written on juries, The American Jury. As Priest (1993, 107) notes,
according to this view, “a civil jury is most appropriate for issues requiring the
application of complex societal values by a group of citizens who, in dispersing,
deflect possible antagonism.”
4In the context of litigation strategy and “repeat players,” see Galanter’s (1974) seminal article
“Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change.”
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The case of “tragic choices” follows this line of reasoning: A “tragic choice” is
“a selection, sometimes compelled in a complex society, from among a set of alter-
natives, all of which are difficult or impossible according to some widely accepted
moral vision” (Priest, 1993, 107). A typical example used is that of assignment
of kidney dialysis machines: to assign the machine to one patient means another
will do without (leading to death). Because the jury is “decentralized” and “rep-
resentative,” while at the same time “discontinuous” and “aresponsible,” the jury
can render decisions in these “tragic choice” situations in an effective manner. The
jury is decentralized and representative because it is populatedwith laypeople ran-
domly drawn from the population. It is discontinuous because it serves to make
a decision and then ends. It is aresponsible in that it is tied to no constituency
directly, as a political actor might be. Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978, 17-19, 186-89,
57-64) suggest these factors together render the jury as a particularly good, and
important, agent in society’s decision of complex and difficult matters. As they
note:
The jury’s representativeness and lack of responsibility. . . [are] the source
of the characteristic andpowerfulway inwhich the jury operates: Juries
apply societal standards without ever telling us what these standards
are, or even that they exist. This is especially important in those situa-
tions inwhich the statement of standardswould be terribly destructive.
It should be noted that the situations envisioned with “tragic choices” are not
the everyday occurrence, at least in the modern era of litigation. A slip-and-fall
at the grocery store case might not rise to the level of a “tragic choice.” Thus, it is
certainly the case that juries are not always called upon to decide crucial matters of
resource allocation between parties or contending interests every day. But, there
are ocasions where this could be the case. Disputes over patent expirations for
drugs andwhether they should receive “generic” production, liability for failure to
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correct safety issues with production automobiles, and even the constitutionality
of funding mechanisms for schools could present difficult choices to a community
for which overtly political actors are ill-prepared or even incapable of rendering an
efficient decision. While Calebresi and Bobbitt’s conclusion regarding the jury in
these respects is perhaps controversial, it is another argument about the efficacy of
the jury, in particular its ability to make important decisions on complex societal
policies.5
The final concern for the jury in their dispute-settling role is a rather clear ex-
tension of our discussion heretofore, namely, are juries any good at making these de-
cisions? It is one thing to theoretically contend that juries provide improved deci-
sion, or that they are uniquely able to convey a pull towards civic engagement. It is
quite another to suggest that the decisions they render are in any way “accurate”
or “good.” And it is here where there is a strong argument against juries proffered
by some. For instance, why should we expect laypeople with no formal training in
the law to comprehend cases that can sometimes involve rather complex consider-
ations? And, why should we trust them to resource allocation when the anecdotal
evidence suggests they award ridiculously high damages in some cases that do not
comport with actual notions of injuries suffered?6 Simply put, would it not make
sense for a judge, who has the formal training of the law, to decide these matters
and do away with the conceptualization of a jury?
It turns out, the situation is not as dire as many think. According to Sward
(2001, 35), the empirical evidence that “juries cannot handle complex cases ismixed.”
And, it seems that, for the most part, juries actually do a good job apportioning re-
5A related issue to the “tragic choice” is the regulatory function of the jury. I discuss this func-
tion infra in this chapter.
6See, e.g., Huber 1990.
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sponsibility and damages in civil cases (Merritt & Barry 1999; Lempert 1981; Lem-
pert 1993; Cecil, Hans & Wiggins 1991). As Lempert (1993, 182) notes, “the jury
often appears to do surprisingly well in the face of complexity, particularly insofar
as complexity is defined by length of trial and the introduction of massive arrays
of evidence.”
But what of the alternative, that is judges deciding cases rather than juries. It
turns out, judges and juries agree at rather high levels. A study of federal judges
found that 96.8% of federal judges agreed with jury verdicts all the time or nearly
all the time (Curriden 2000). In the American Jury, the researchers evaluated more
than four thousand civil trials and found that judge and jury agreed on the ques-
tion of liability in 78% of civil cases (Kalven & Zeisel 1966).7 A study of four hun-
dred state and federal trial judgeswho tried negligence cases in the state of Georgia
showed that 97% of the judges reported that they agreed with the jury at least 79%
of the time (Sentell 1991a; 1991b).8 A 1998 study of Arizona civil cases found an
84% judge-jury agreement rate (Hannaford et al. 1998). A study conducted by
Louis Harris Associates found that 69% of state judges and 80% of federal judges
do not believe that “the feelings jurors have about the parties often cause them to
make inappropriate decisions” (Harris Study 1989). Indeed, the Harris Study re-
sults indicate that more than 75% of both federal and state judges agree that for
routine civil cases, the right to trial by jury is an “essential safeguard” that should
be retained. The polling evidence leads Bogus to conclude, “judges appear to be
saying that juries are at least as capable as they at deciding cases” (Bogus, 2001,
96).
7A parallel study conducted by Kalven and Zeisel found in criminal trials the rate was exactly
the same: 78%.
8This “79% of the time” figure is reflected in the findings because the survey questionnaire
informed the judges of the findings from The American Jury.
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Of course, that judges and juries agree is certainly evidence that they can at
least perform as well as judges view themselves as determiners of “truth.” This is a
step in the right direction if the jury is to be considered as supplying an effective
role as a dispute-settler of value, as Sward (2001) proposes. But what can we say
of the objective capacity for jurors to properly ascertain facts? Again, the evidence
strongly suggests juries are also competent in this domain.
In Inside the Jury (1983), Hastie et al. conducted a number of experimental ju-
ries utilizing as close to possible the mechanics of a real trial. Members of the
experiment were recruited from jury pools in three Massachussetts counties. Ju-
rors were shuttled through a mock voir dire process9, watched a video of a trial
conducted by the researchers (though based entirely on a real case and fact pat-
tern), and were videotaped in the mock trial process, including in the deliberation
process. Post-deliberation surveys were conducted to ascertain, inter alia, the par-
ticipants’ feelings about the process and ability to recall factual matters. In total,
the process approximated the juror experience as closely as possible to maximize
external validity. The results were fascinating and largely served to reinforce the
fact that jurors tend to be good decision-makers. With particular regards to the
juries’ factfinding responsibilities (something that is taken away in the summary
judgment process), the authors conclude (1983, 230):
In their task of factfinding, juries perform efficiently and accurately.
The reconstruction of the testimony and the construction of plausible
narrative schemes to order, complete, and condense the trial evidence
occurwith thoroughness andprecision. These accomplishments in jury
deliberation are especially impressive when compared to the perfor-
mance of even the most competent individual jurors. The view of the
evidence produced by deliberation processes is invariably more com-
plete and more accurate than the typical individual juror’s rendition
of the same material. This conclusion is supported by postdeliberation
9This is the stage where potential jurors are excluded for potential biases and conflicts.
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measurement of jurors’ memory for trial evidence. Not only do erro-
neous statements about evidence occur roughly half as frequently as er-
rors on the law, but evidence errors are also more likely to be corrected
during deliberation. . .Because jury performance of the factfinding task
is so remarkably competent, few innovations are needed to improve
performance.
The results from Inside the Jury address several of the concerns for the usage
of juries. Not only were juries able to properly ascertain facts, and indeed recall
them after the trial had concluded, theywere also able towork collectively to better
ascertain the “truth,” something that theory had suggested might be the case. In
sum, the evidence is quite strong that juries actually serve an important dispute-
settling role through the processing of even complex amounts of information.
One final point is worth making on the jury’s facility for rendering decisions
that collectively agree with those of judges. Is it possible that the judge-jury agree-
ment that we see is out of line with other realms of social decision-making? For
instance, that judge’s and juries agree with one another at rates between, say, 78%
and 96% of the time, is that still low for other human endeavors? There is actually
some evidence that suggests, no, in fact, these rates are actually quite high even
for other attempts at reconciling distinct decision-agreement rates.
In her early work, Shari Diamond (1983) looked at agreement rates for other
decision-makers engaged in complex human judgments. She found that that for
National Science Foundation (NSF) andNational Academy of Science (NAS) grant
proposals, these organizations had a 75% agreement on grant funding. For prac-
ticing physicians (between 21-23 of them), the agreement was (scarily) worse: with
three patient-actors who presented symptoms, medical professionals agreed 67%,
77%, and 70% of the time (for each respective patient). For psychiatrists, of 153
patients interviewed twice, one by each of two psychiatrists (with a total of four
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experienced psychiatrists put to test), the pair-wise agreement existed in 70% of
the cases presented. In short, the evidence suggests that juries’ capacity to ad-
dress and resolve a dispute (consistent with what the judge might find) performs
as well as, if not better than, other difficult judgment decisions rendered by hu-
mans in other complex matters. Accordingly, the dispute-settling role of the jury
finds much support in the available scholarly literature.
2.2.3 The Law-Making Role of the Jury
We typically think of the jury as deciding questions of fact, while the court (or
judge) decides questions of law. And, for the most part, this separation of duties is
how trials are handled. It is taken in modern American litigation as a maxim: the
jury’s duty does not encompass the law.10
This dichotomy between judge and jury, however, is not quite accurate. Lurk-
ing behind the pronouncement of the dichotomy is the concept of jury nullification.
Jury nullification occurs when a jury abrogates or refuses to follow the court’s in-
struction of the law. In short, jury nullification is the jury’s act to take the law into
their own hands. Given that it is often difficult to know why a jury has decided
what it decided, it can be a threat that operates in the balance of a trial. To say the
least, “Jury nullification is a highly controversial phenomenon” (Sward, 2001, 41).
The arguments in favor of the phenomenon center on the notion that nullification
permits juries to individualize justice and to “temper justice with mercy” (Sward,
10This has come to be largely through practice, and even in the face of explicit constitutional as-
signment of the law-finding task to the jury. As an example, the Indiana state constitution states
that in criminal trials, the jury shall have the right to determine “the law and the facts” (emphasis
added). The Indiana Supreme Court, however, has taken a different view, such that, “Notwith-
standing Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution, a jury has no more right to ignore the
law than it has to ignore the facts in a case” (Bivens v. State, 642N.E.2d 928, 946 (Ind. 1994)). Though
a single example, the result is consistent with themodern treatment of the law-facts dichotomy and
the parties who will decide each.
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2001, 41). Or, as Judge Learned Hand once stated, it “introduces a slack into the
enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethi-
cal conventions” (U.S. ex rel. McCann v. Adams).11 Despite the fact that strict efforts
have been put in place to curb the usage of jury nullification, there are those that
argue vociferously for its permitted use (see, e.g, Abramson 1994). And while jury
nullification—once existing for both civil and criminal cases in the early years of
the American existence—has fallen out of usage, it still occurs, even if infrequently.
A relatively recent example is the acquittal of Dr. Jack Kevorkian of the common
law crime of assisted suicide by a Michigan jury in 1996.
Noting that the jury can effectuate legal policy changes through jury nullifica-
tion is not to suggest it is always a good or fruitful activity. Very clearly it can
run amok, and the experience of Southern juries acquitting whites who commit-
ted racist crimes against African-Americans can (and should) be in the forefront of
one’s mind when considering the issue. Clearly, jury nullification in those situa-
tions would be inappropriate. My discussion of this issue is not necessarily to take
a position as to whether the jury, as decider of law (through nullification) is always
a “good” or always a “bad.” Rather, it is to point out that the jury can serve several
roles, including one as the law-maker, and in that process can serve larger societal
interests in the right situations. A situation in which jury nullification has served
to facilitate what many think to be a positive policy advancement is in an arena
far less enthralling than the issue of civil rights and Jim Crow policies, namely, car
accidents.
At first blush, discussion of vehicular accidents and damages would seem to
a rather bland topic. And, of course, it can be. But these types of claims are ac-
11126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
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tually quite important. The United States is laden with vehicles. Those vehicles
require insurance. And, as a result, collectively the costs of operating those vehi-
cles is pooled and distributed amongst society writ large through premiums paid
to insurance companies. In short, big money is at stake in maintaining this system.
And, even bigger money is at stake when the rules of liability are modified.
The story of jury nullification here begins with comparative negligence law.
In general, this theory of tort recovery permits the fact-finder (a jury) to weigh
the relative fault of each actor involved in the case. In other words, the jury can
consider who is “more at fault,” the person who sideswiped someone’s vehicle,
or, the person who made (for instance) an inappropriate left-turn that placed their
vehicle in the position of getting sideswiped.12 In “reaction to a perceived pro-
plaintiff bias on the part of jurors, common law courts in the nineteenth century
had developed the doctrine of contributory negligence” (Sward, 2001, 43; see also
James 1953). Prosser &Keeton’s authoritative treatise on torts defines contributory
negligence in the following manner:
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, con-
tributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protec-
tion...[A]lthough the defendant has violated his duty, has been negli-
gent, and would otherwise be liable, the plaintiff is denied recovery
because his own conduct disentitles him to maintain the action. In the
eyes of the law both parties are at fault; and the defense is one of the
plaintiff’s disability, rather than the defendant’s innocence.13
In other words, contributory negligence essentially says that if the person in-
jured is found to have contributed to their injury through their own negligence,
then no recovery is possible for their injuries, even if the defendant was negligent,
12For a discussion of comparative negligence and its historical development, see Yeazell (1990)
(“The New Jury and Ancient Jury Conflict.”)
1311 Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 65, p. 451-52 (5th Ed. 1984)
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and even if the defendant was more negligent than the plaintiff. In my automobile
example above, if the person sideswiped was even 1% at fault (and, therefore, the
other person who hit them 99% at fault), they could not recover for their injuries.
Simply put, this legal doctrine is strong medicine against individuals recovering
for injuries suffered.
Over time, judges attempted to enforce tort cases that involved contributory
negligence by taking away from the jury claims that the judge determined could
be settled “as a matter of law” (i.e., contributory negligence existed). However,
those cases that made it to trial often found juries unwilling to abide this rather
draconian fixture of the bygone days of tort law. Thus, juries would appear to ap-
portion fault, in a comparative sense, and factor damages accordingly. In other
words, juries in these civil cases engaged in jury nullification. Quite clearly these
juries should (as a matter of law) find no recovery for these plaintiffs. But they
did. And they did, presumably, because of some community norm of “fairness.”
Yeazell (1990, 113) explains that, “[f]or many years juries simply declined to find
contributory negligence when the strictest interpretation of the law might have
suggested its presence. ” Sward (2001, 44) notes, “This rebellion by juries eventu-
ally contributed to formal changes in the law in most states, so that some form of
comparative negligence is now the rule among states rather than the exception.”14
The effect of the liability shift in this example had a huge impact for insurance
purposes. In the past, individuals harmed typically could not recover, their insur-
ance premiums would go up (since they had damage to their vehicle that had to
14In the comparative negligence scheme, liability is apportioned out, and damages effectively
prorated on that basis. In some states, a modified-comparative fault scheme is used whereby a
plaintiff must show they are at least less than 50% at fault; once that threshold is met, then dam-
ages are apportioned. Regardless, whatever form it takes, comparative fault standards are far more
favorable to a plaintiff’s recovery than the former contributory negligence standard.
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be fixed if above their deductible), and the defendant’s insurance company would
not have to pay. It is not hard to see why, for instance, insurance companies would
favor the contributory negligence standard over the comparative fault standard.
And it is also easy to see why such insurance companies would lobby and pro-
mote the usage of this standard in courts over the comparative fault standard. Yet,
it is here where the jury served a law-making function. Through jury nullification,
juries across the country insisted that their community values did not embrace the
contributory negligence standards of big business and the insurance companies.
In short, we see in this example the very real capacity for juries to act as law-makers
through their nullification efforts.
The final law-making function of the jury I will discuss is the regulatory role
of the jury. If we assume (safely) that juries will typically not engage in jury nul-
lification, then can a jury have law-making authority on another dimension of its
power? In otherwords, if juries simply serve as factfinders, can they still effectively
“make policy” in such a manner as to steer policy in the aggregate? The answer
would appear to be, yes, they can through what Marc Galanter refers to as their
“regulatory” capacity.
Assuming the dichotomy exists in which judges decide questions of law, and
juries decide questions of fact, is there room for juries to function as establishing
precedent of some sort? In the strictest sense of the word, the answer is clearly
“no.” Trials between specific litigants are confined to those parties and generally
the disputes that are resolved at trial bind only these individuals.15 But, there
15There is an exception to this situation called collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel occurs when
one party to litigation argues that thematter has already been adjudicated and thus the issue cannot
be again judicially determined. Typically, arguments of collateral estoppel occur when one party
seeks to use an already-decided issue against the other party (i.e., these two parties were already
litigants in amatter, an issuewas decided, and henceforth that decision should apply between these
two parties). However, collateral estoppel can be used against a third party if that third party is in
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is a wrinkle. Many times juries, in deciding their questions of fact, are actually
resolving questions of law. These situations are often times referred to as mixed
questions of law-and-fact. A simple example will illustrate the point.
Suppose an individual (Plaintiff) is walking along a sidewalk in front of some-
one’s home. In front of the home is a piece of property placed partially on the
walkway (let’s say, a broken dishwasher). The Plaintiff does not notice the dish-
washer (perhaps it is dark), and bumps into it, causing an injury. The Plaintiff
then sues the homeowner (Defendant) for negligence (a simple tort).16 If the case
were to proceed to trial by jury, one of the jury’s determinations will be whether
the homeowner (and the passerby) acted “reasonably” in their conduct. Here, the
jury will need to decide the facts (what actually happened), but in rendering a
verdict will also determine whether the conduct was reasonable or not, thereby
deciding the question of law (whether negligence occurred, on any party’s part).
Here, the jury has decided a mixed question of law-and-fact, and ostensibly they
set a form of precedent. This is the essence of the common law system. “Common
law precedent consists of neither fact nor law alone, but both in disparate combi-
nations” (Sward, 2001, 47; see also Fuller 1979). What are we to make, then, in such
a situation? Has the jury established “precedent?”
In a sense, the jury has established precedent. Not only has it determined what
is “reasonable,” and thus what is actionable in the present case, but it also has
privity with one of the parties in the initial litigation. Privity, a concept from contract law, exists if
there is a close or mutual relationship between one of the original parties. A party that inherits or
takes over property (and successive debts, for instance) might be bound by collateral estoppel to
the previous finding. Such a situation is truly an exception; most of the time, litigants in trial are
the only ones who are bound by a particular decision, and no larger precedent is typically set, in
the formal sense of the word.
16Let us avoid complicating the fact pattern with the public sidewalk. Perhaps the government
is liable for failing to clear the walkway, or, perhaps the nearby streetlight was inoperable due to
the public works department’s failure to properly fix a broken light. We will confine our example
here to just the two private parties for simplification purposes.
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sent a signal to others as to what type of behavior will be tolerated under the law,
and what behavior will be actionable. It is this particular behavior of the jury that
Galanter (1993) considers to be the regulatory function of the jury. For Galanter,
the jury performs two essential tasks:
To decide whether civil juries are a good thing, one has to ask what
juries are supposed to do. I would answer that basically they do two
things. Distributively, they decide cases. Collectively, they generate a
body of knowledge that fuels the American system of “litigotiation.”
Galanter (1993, 61) considers “litigotiation” to be a system of “contesting claims
in the vicinity of courts, where recourse to the full process of adjudication is an
infrequent occurrence but at every stage an important option.” In other words, ju-
ries (1993, 61), in the aggregate “provide signals or markers by which legal actors
form estimates of what other juries will do and on that basis make decisions and
formulate policies about claims, offers, settlements, and trials, and even about pre-
claim investments in safety, disclosure, and so forth.” Accordingly, trials provide
a “lay-of-the-land,” a reference point for litigants to determine their fate (see also
Jacobsohn 1977). From this decision node other decisions are made through back-
wards induction. The amount a party thinks a jury is likely to award, for instance,
affects (reverse chronologically), the amount of time that party thinks is appropri-
ate for discovery, the amount and type of resources necessary to defend the claim,
what settlement value might be worthwhile (either in offer, or in acceptance), and
etc. The point is, the jury trial serves as points of data to be incorporated into a
decision-maker’s conceptualization of how to behave. And it is in this sense that
the jury functions in a quasi law-making role.
This consideration of the jury as a law-maker is not to suggest it is the only
reference point a party will make. Who one’s judge is, what is the likely effect
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of an appeal, etc., are considerations. But the jury, and its capacity to act as an
expositor of the “law” in a particular case will serve as an expositor for other cases.
As Daniels and Martin (1995, 62) note, “verdicts are important not just because of
the results for the parties involved in the suit, but also because of themessages they
send to others.” Indeed, as one insurance executive noted, “decided cases are only
the tip of the iceberg; they directly affect thousands of other cases that get settled
before going to trial, not to mention acting as a stimulant for even more lawsuits”
(McCormick 1986).17 H. Laurence Ross, in his seminal study of insurance claims
adjustment, found that the basis of settlements seems:
[O]n both sides to be an estimate of the likely recovery of the claimant
before a jury. Although the attorneys go about it more rationally, both
sides come to this estimate by comparing a given case in its many di-
mensions against other, similar, cases that have gone to trial.18
In other words, the jury trial serves a regulatory function, deciding the social
costs/benefits to be attributed to individuals’ (or other entities’) behavior which
carry through the legal system, thereby altering society’s behavior. This
regulatory function, then, serves as a quasi-precedent, establishing standards of
conduct through which individuals will chart future behavior.
2.3 The History of American Civil Trials
Having understood why trials are important in a democratic theory sense, as
well as the several roles that a jury can perform, it is necessary to examine how
17Of course, it is only a stimulant if there is an increase in liability standards (for instance, the
change to a comparative fault standard from contributory negligence). The opposite could occur;
juries rule against plaintiffs and make it harder to prove certain types of claims. The insurance
executive here, JamesMcCormick, was advocating for tort reform, to put the “stimulant” comment
in perspective.
18Ross is clear that “jury value” and “settlement value” are not the same thing. As he notes, “The
jury value is initially discounted by the savings in cost to the claimant by not proceeding to trial”
(Ross, 1980, 115).
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this particular choice of adjudicatory vehicle has found its way into the modern
American litigation state. The following historical sketch is necessarily brief. There
are volumes of work on the historical roots of trials in general, and jury trials in
particular. The historical question alonewould occupy an entire field of study, and
would be well-beyond the scope of my present inquiry. Accordingly, I present just
the basic thumbnail of the historical evolution of trials, particularly as it relates
to the American experience. This information will provide a minimum working
knowledge of howwe got to the point we are with civil trials and lead into the next
chapter’s discussion of the present state of trials, in both a statistical and theoretical
sense.
It is generally agreed that the modern conception of a “jury” began following
the Norman Conquest in 1066. “The two centuries after the Conquest saw, among
other things, the establishment of the king’s common law courts, the growth of
the jury, the origins of equity, the definition of the rights of English people in the
Magna Carta, and the beginnings of Parliament” (Sward, 2001, 68). Prior to the in-
stitution of juries, disputes were adjudicated in a legal sense through three mech-
anisms: (1) trial by battle, (2) trial by compurgation, and (3) trial by ordeal.
Trial by battle is, as it sounds, the use of violence to resolve a dispute. Trial
by battle typically required the parties “to engage in a duel of some sort, often a
fight to the death” (Sward, 2001, 71). Killing another person, or fearing one’s own
demise, often struck individuals as an unpromising scenario. The good news for
disputants, however, was they could hire “champions” to fight for them. These
individuals were not exactly known for their charm and were, in a word, quite
“unsavory” (Sward, 2001, 71; see also Thayer 1898). Trial by battle was ultimately
not outlawed until 1819 (Thayer, 1898, 45).
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Trial by compurgation consisted of a group of compurgators, or “oath-helpers,”
who were acquainted with the individual who held the burden of proof. These
compurgators would swear to their faith that the statements by the litigant were
truthful. An oath would be recited by these individuals, and if theymade an error,
it was taken that the individual litigant was untruthful and should lose (Sward,
2001, 72). This method of “trial” survived until 1833 (Thayer, 1898, 34).
The final method utilized in England post-Norman Conquest was trial by or-
deal. This method, as the name might suggest, also involved unusual tactics. As
Hans and Vidmar (1986, 24-25) explain:
The ordeal took a number of forms. The ordeal of the hot iron required
the accused person to carry a red-hot pound of iron in his or her hand
for a certain distance, usually nine feet. An alternative test was the or-
deal of hotwater. The accusedwas required to dip one hand in a pitcher
of boiling water and pluck out a stone hanging by a string. In both or-
deals, the injured hand was bound up in bandages. If after three days
the hand had not become infected, the person was judged to be inno-
cent. In another variant called “going to the water,” accused persons
were bound with a rope and thrown into a body of water; if they sunk
to a prescribed depth they were pulled out and declared innocent, but
if they floated they were judged guilty.
These ordeals, and other interesting exercises in “truth discernments” (for
instance, forcing a person to eat a piece of food to see if they choke) were utilized
until only 1215 when the Church, in the Lateran Council, forbade clergy from
participating in these events (Sward, 2001, 71).
Variants of what came to be the civil jury, however, began to percolate even
while these other forms of “trial” were in existence. For instance, the famous
Domesday Book, which acted as a census and property record of sorts for post-
Norman Conquest England, was compiled by requiring nobles to appear before
an “assize court” and state under oath the names of manors in their area, the own-
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ers of those manors, and related property considerations for valuation (Hans &
Widmar, 1986, 25). Within about a century, these same assizes (with some modi-
fications) were used to settle litigants’ disputes and adjudge taxations (Plucknett,
1956, 111-12). In short, the movement toward the modern civil trial did not occur
overnight. In fact, the movement to juries can be seen as a consolidation of power
by theNorman kings over England. The creation of new “writs” (requests for court
orders) were given to the adjudicatory province of the King’s courts, and over time
these courts became the dominant form of dispute resolution in England (Green
1907).
Historians point to evidence that jury trials, which resembled themodern form,
began to appear around the end of the fifteenth century (Sward, 2001, 75; Pluck-
nett, 1956, 129-30). The size of the jury (fixed at twelve) was settled somewhere
around the middle of the fourteenth century (Sward, 2001, 77).19 And by the early
eighteenth century, empaneled jurors were prohibited from using their personal
knowledge of the facts of a case and were required to confine themselves to the
evidence introduced (Mitnick, 1988, 207).
It is under this background that the English colonists to America brought the
civil jury. From the start, civil juries played a significant role in the colonists’ lives
and were used as vehicles to announce colonists’ dissatisfaction with English rev-
enue collection efforts through jury nullification of enforcement actions (Wolfram
1973; Nelson 1975). After the failure of the Articles of Confederation, however,
19The reasons for the twelve-person jury are not fully known. Sward (2001, 76-77) collects the var-
ious theories: (1) twelvewitnesseswere utilized as a quantumof proof in some cases, so this carried
over to the jury; (2) it was inherited from Scandinavian countries through Scandinavian colonies;
(3) mystical reasons (twelve tribes of Israel, twelve patriarchs, twelve officers of Solomon, twelve
Apostles). Sward suggests the actual reason is unknown. For the United States Supreme Court’s
discussion of the matter, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding the Sixth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution does not require empaneling twelve jurors in a criminal case).
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and the ensuing Constitutional Convention, the question of the civil jury actually
became a point of contention between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists.
The Federalist position, espoused by Hamilton in Federalist No. 83was that any
suggestion that the use of a civil jury would not be protected by the new Consti-
tution was not the case. The reality, however, was that only right to a jury trial
in criminal cases was contained in the Constitution draft.20 Hamilton downplayed
this omission by noting in Federalist No. 83 that:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree
in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by
jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the
former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent
it as the very palladium of free government.
For the Federalists, failure to include a civil jury trial right did not necessarily
mean the right did not exist; it was simply unnecessary to include. Anti-Federalists
would have nothing of this argument. Thomas Jefferson explained that he “con-
sider[ed] trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a
government can be held to the principles of its constitution” (Jefferson 1789). As
Landsman (1993, 38) notes, the Anti-Federalists, “who were challenging the ap-
propriateness of the Constitution as a whole, treated the absence of a civil jury
guarantee as sufficient grounds to oppose the adoption of the document.” The
Anti-Federalists looked to William Blackstone’s statement (Landsman, 1993, 38-
39):
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons
and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be en-
tirely entrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those gen-
erally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the
state, their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will have
20Codified in Article III § 2.
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frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dig-
nity: it is not to be expected from human nature, that the few should be
always attentive to the interests and good of the many.21
Ultimately, the Constitution passed and was ratified without an explicit pro-
vision for the civil jury. However, as a part of the compromise in which Anti-
Federalists voted for ratification in return for a Bill of Rights, the civil jury found
new life. The Seventh Amendment, ratified in 1791, contained the following pro-
vision:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
With this provision, the right to a jury trial in civil cases found constitutional
protection. Over time, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Sev-
enth Amendment using an “historical test.” Under this standard, the question is
whether there was a right to a jury trial as that right existed in common law Eng-
land (i.e., 1791). As a relatively recent Supreme Court case stated:
[W]e ask, first, whether we are dealingwith a cause of action that either
was tried at law at the time of the Founding or is at least analogous to
one that was. If the action in question belongs in the law category, we
then ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in
order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed
in 1791.22
The test itself draws a distinction between claims sounding in “law” and those in
“equity,” which is consistent with the practice of the English courts at common
law. Claims sounding in “law” typically involve declarations of rights with
21Quoting William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 379.
22Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
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redressable injuries; those in “equity” typically request a particular remedial
form of relief (a request for transfer of property, the court to order a litigant to
perform some task, etc.). Though a full discussion of this matter is beyond the
scope of the present inquiry, a complication with this matter is that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the distinction between law and equity when
they were instituted in 1938. The Court proclaims, however, that this merger of
law and equity does not terribly complicate its decisions in Seventh Amendment
cases (See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 565 (1990) (“Since the merger of the systems of law and equity. . . this Court
has carefully preserved the right to trial by jury where legal rights are at stake.”).
It appears that as a practical matter, there is rare disagreement on the usage of
this particular test and is “rarely questioned in the court” (Sward, 2001, 95 n.178;
see alsoWolfram 1973). That said, scholars of the Constitution have increased
their opposition to the Court’s read on the Seventh Amendment, contending that
it ill-suits the modern era of litigation (Krauss 1999; Redish 1975; Schwartz 1996;
Moses 2000). Notwithstanding these concerns, the Court seems unlikely to
change course any time soon on the “historical test” discussed above.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the foundational features of the civil trial, both
in theoretical and historical terms. As detailed, a jury trial performs several func-
tions, including political, dispute-settling, and law-making roles. It is within these
roles we see the civil jury’s ties to democratic theory and the connection between
jury trials and the regulatory effect it can have on society. Additionally, a brief his-
torical sketch of jury trials provides enough background to understand how we
have arrived at the present point of modern day civil trials. In the next chapter I
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detail the current state of civil trials in the federal courts system with attention to
the statistical features and trends from the 20th Century to the present millenium.
I will also discuss the current explanations for why civil trials are no longer uti-
lized, their limitations in explaining the diminution of civil trials, and foreshadow
a discussion of my theoretical contention that better explains the large decline in
federal civil trials.
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3. PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS FOR DIMINISHING TRIALS
3.1 Introduction
The appearance of the civil justice system is one often painted in terms of liti-
giousness. See, e.g., Schachner 1995. The typical picture painted in the movies and
television is that of courtrooms stuffed with litigants, armed with attorneys, and
filled with drama. In reality, however, PerryMason and BenMatlock would spend
almost none of their time in their respective courtrooms. The empirics suggests
that yes, in fact, cases are filed at relatively high rates. Indeed, United States fed-
eral civil case filings have steadily increased to reach the highest levels ever seen.
Data from the Administrative Office for the United States Courts indicate that fed-
eral civil case filings have increased over 400% between 1964-2014. Yet, despite
the increased number of case filings, the percentage of cases reaching trial is now
1/12th what it was in 1964. Presently, only 1% of all federal civil cases filed reach
trial. These contradictory trends suggest a puzzle: why have the number of trials
diminished despite record case filings? And, does that diminution of trials have a
substantive impact on national policies?
The present chapter details the current state of the literature explaining why
we no longer have civil trials. We will see different arguments made for why civil
cases no longer go to trial. Ultimately, I conclude that the present explanations
proffered by the scholarly community fail to provide a unified theory and neglect,
in particular, the role that pre-trial procedure can have on reducing the number
of trials. In the next chapter I will detail my theory for a better way to evaluate
the research puzzle posited above. Before addressing past explanations for the
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diminution in trials, it is necessary to conduct a brief statistical snapshot of the
present state of federal civil trials in the United States.
3.2 Statistical Snapshot of Federal Civil Cases
I have repeatedly referenced the fact that few cases make it to the trial stage
in the federal civil system. But how few is few? To answer that question, we need
partially to speak in relativities. Clearly, there is a relationship between the number
of cases filed in the federal civil system and the trial output. Figure 3.1 indicates
the number of federal civil cases filed between 1964 and 2014.1 Very clearly, we can
see that the total number of cases filed over time has increased dramatically in the
fifty years of data. In contemporary times, the total number of federal civil cases
filed sits at approximately 300,000. This number, in historical terms, is quite large.
Of particular note, we can clearly see the period from the mid-1970s to the early
1980s where the federal courts experienced, what some have called, the “litigation
explosion.” The rapid rise in cases filed contributed to the popular sentiment that
the United States was a country of lawsuits, and, for this epoch, the data bear that
sentiment out. But, there is also another component to that story, and it is this:
the federal courts have not see a dramatic increase in the total number of federal
civil cases filed in the last twenty years. Public sentiment nothwithstanding, the
federal courts have oscillated between just over 250,000 civil cases filed per year to
no more than approximately 290,000 civil cases during the last two decades or so.
Accordingly, while it is fair to speak of the “litigation explosion,” it is not fair to
say the increase in cases filed carry through past the 1990s and into present times
at anywhere near the level many suspect.
1All data are from the Administrative Office for the United States Courts.
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Figure 3.1: Total Federal Civil Cases Filed: 1964-2014
Returning to the initial question: how many cases go to trial in the federal sys-
tem? The answer is, in raw numbers, not that many. Figure 3.2 details the total
number of federal civil cases that reached the trial stage. As we can see from the
graph, the total number of trials has seen a sharp decrease in raw numbers over
time. In 1984, the federal courts system saw the greatest number of civil trials in
the dataset; just over 12,000 total trials. This number coincides with the apex of
the “litigation explosion” for cases filed. It makes sense, then, that as the federal
courts system received the greatest number of cases filed, it also had the greatest
output in the form of trials. Heretofore, the data reveal nothing of surprise. This
observation changes as we move forward in time.
Within amere few years of the “litigation explosion” peak, there began a drastic
reduction in the total number of cases reaching the trial stage, despite a continued
increase in the total number of cases filed. In fact, by the mid-1990s, the total num-
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ber of cases that reached trial were at the same levels as those in the mid-1960s. In
short, there has been an increase in federal civil case filings of over 400% between
1964-2014, but the total number of cases that reach trial is 1/12th what it was in
1964. There is a complete inflection point in the data.
One note that should bemade on the data for the total federal cases that reached
trial concerns the rather large spike in the data near 2007. In this year, the total
number of trials spiked to nearly 10,000; almost three times the level in the year
before (and indeed, the year after). This large increase, however, is more of a quirk
in the coding scheme utilized by the Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts. In
2007 in the Middle District of Louisiana, the district court resolved thousands of
claims simultaneously that involved litigation related to an oil refinery explosion.
In short, therewere not 10,000 individual trials, therewas a large trial that resolved
many claims. The Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts considered this event
“trials,” rather than a “trial,” and therefore the raw data suggest amassive increase
in total trials for the country. This result is an illusion; it is an artifact of the federal
court administrator’s coding scheme.
That the total number of trials has decreased suggests “something” occurred
to cause such a sweeping change. However, it is also necessary to evaluate the
percentage of cases that made it to trial of all cases terminated in a given year.
Perhaps it is the case that the raw numbers do not accurately reflect the proportion
of cases that do end in a trial. Figure 3.3 details the percentage of cases that were
terminated at the trial stage.
The results are clear: not only have we seen a diminution in the total number
of cases that make it to trial in the federal civil system, we also see a decrease in
the percent of cases that go to trial overall. Indeed, the present numbers indicate
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Figure 3.2: Total Federal Civil Cases Reaching Trial
Figure 3.3: Percent of Federal Civil Cases Reaching Trial
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that only about 1% of all civil cases are terminated through a trial. This number
is exceedingly small, and follows a continued trend over the duration of the time
series.2 In the last few years, the number appears to have bottomed out at the near-
1% level; perhaps we have reached a floor. Regardless, the data very clear indicate
that federal civil cases simply do not reach the trial stage. The question is, why?
3.3 Explanations for the Diminution in Trials
The question of what has happened to cause this massive decrease in trials is
one that scholars have tried to address. Marc Galanter, who has long studied this
question and is perhaps the nation’s foremost authority on the subject, provides
several “clusters” of answers scholars have provided in an attempt at addressing
this question. Galanter (2005) identifies these clusters as:
1. Changes to demand for trials.
2. Changes in available resources.
3. Changes in the character of the litigation process.
4. Changes in judicial ideology and practice.
5. Changes in the strategies and tactics of litigants.
6. Changes in the usage of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
Professor Galanter ultimately stakes a claim that “the long-term decline [in tri-
als] reflects resource constraints in that the supply of courts is not designed to
provide trials in all cases” (2005, 1263). For him, “the long-term decline of trials
[is] the result of a conjunction of a restricted supply of judicial resources with the
generation of signals and threats thatmanage to stretch the small supply of adjudi-
cation to meet increased demand” (2005, 1264). In this view, the issue of resource
2The spike in Figure 3.3 for 2007 is, again, the effects of oil refinery cases from theMiddleDistrict
of Louisiana.
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demands constrain the courts and forces litigants to truly think of alternative forms
of dispute resolution (for instance, settlement, or, ADR).
Diamond and Bina (2004) approach the issue slightly differently, but in the
same vein. These scholars suggest a “supply-side” explanation as the reason cases
do not make it to trial. In particular, the authors suggest that scarcity of judicial re-
sources contributes to the low trial rate. Because individual litigantsmust consider
the costs of extended delay in prosecution of their claims, alternative resolutions
could appear more favorable. Notably, the authors evaluate whether the federal
criminal dockets play a role in the lack of trials due to the fact that Article III judges
who preside in federal civil cases also have a federal criminal docket. To them, fo-
cusmust be given to the judicial workloads of judges, which, if taken as aweighted
measure3, have increased over time (2004, 647).
While Diamond and Bina’s “supply-side” explanation has intuitivemerit, there
are problems with its conclusion when one looks more deeply at the data. First, as
their own data suggest, the median time from filing a case to ultimate disposition
from 1982-2002 did increase, but not much: one month (Diamond & Bina, 2004,
653). A onemonth increase in this measure surely cannot account for the dramatic
decrease in trials. Additionally, as even the authors point out, were we to look at
themedian time fromfiling to trial in civil cases, while there is an increase (of about
seven months), that measure fails to account for the distortion to this measure
caused by a massive influx of new cases.4 In other words, a judge could have
a docket mostly comprised of young cases; conversely, they could have a large
3Alternative formulations of caseload measurement have been proposed, however, to account
for the litigation realities that some contend are better measures of workload. See, e.g., Habel &
Scott (2014)
4See alsoClermont&Eisenberg (2002, 130) presenting data that the time to termination of federal
civil cases resolved at trial has not generally increased from the period 1970-2000.
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number of older cases. As the authors note, “the percentage of pending cases that
are over three years old depends on the mix of cases in the queue” (2004, 653). The
result leads the authors to ultimately suggest that these measures “do not offer an
accurate picture of supply” (2004, 652).
Galanter further contends that Diamond and Bina’s explanation cannot serve
to explain the decline in trials. As Galanter (2005, 1264) notes:
Not all cases present equal demands on court resources; court admin-
istrators weight case types to produce estimation of “weighted filings”
that reflect judicial workloads more accurately than do the raw num-
bers of filings. Observers who emphasize the role of resource con-
straints in the decline of civil trials present data indicating thatweighted
filings in the federal district courts in 2001 were about 30% greater than
in 1985. But in 2002 there were major additions to the resources avail-
able in 1985: about 18%more federal judges were sitting, accompanied
by an augmented roster of magistrates, and expenditures on the judi-
ciary (in constant dollars) were more than three times as high. But in
2002, the courts conducted only 4569 civil trials, a bit more than a third
of the 12,529 conducted in 1985.
As Galanter (2005, 1264) explains, factors such as resource constraints, increased
cost and complexity, improved signaling, and more lawyers “do not account for
the sudden and dramatic decrease in trials in the last twenty years [1985-2005].”5
Simply put, the argument proposed by supply-siders cannot explain the recent
dramatic decline in the number of cases that go to trial.
If “supply-side” explanations cannot account for the decrease in trials, what
can? The reality is that many cases actually settle and never reach the trial stage.
As Eisenberg & Lanvers (2009, 112) note, “settlement is the modal civil case out-
come.” Issacharoff and Witt (2004, 1618) contend that, “[A]s patterns of liability
5See also Galanter (2004, 519): “Even given an increase in mandatory noncivil matters and pos-
tulating increased complexity of cases, it seems doubtful that lack of court resources is a major
constraint on the number of trials.”
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and damages stabilize, trials seem to become increasingly exceptional as claims are
handled through routinized negotiations between established representatives” (see
also Langbein, 2012, 564-66 discussing generally settlement dynamics on the lack
of civil trials). In Ross’ seminal study of automobile insurance claims, he reports a
settlement rate of 95.8% (Ross 1980). Eisenberg & Lanvers peg the number much
lower. In their study of two federal district courts from 2001-2002, the aggregate
settlement rate between these two districts sat at about 67%. This is a large num-
ber, but nowhere near the 95% settlement rate proposed by Ross. In reality, the fact
that two-thirds of cases settle is a substantial number, however, and if those cases
are settling rather than proceeding to trial, then that could be a large explanation
of the diminution in federal civil trials. But there’s a catch (or, two). First, Eisen-
berg & Lanvers suggest that, when compared to previous attempts to identify the
settlement rate, “[t]he pool of results spanning more than 20 years of cases pro-
vides no evidence of a materially increasing settlement rate over time” (2009, 146).
Accordingly, if, as Galanter suggests, we must look for explanations for the rapid
decrease in trials from the late-1980s to present, settlement does not appear to be a
likely culprit as the answer. Secondly, to say that the settlement rate is high (or, as-
suming it to be the case, has increased) does not address the fundamental question
of why cases are settling. Merely identify the litigation route through which cases
pass does not tell us anything about why that particular course has been charted.
One would think, borrowing from the law and economics literature, that the ex-
pected utility derived from settlement simply outweighs the expected utility from
proceeding to trial. Fair enough. But why is the utility for settlement structured
in the manner that it is? And, relatedly, why has it come to outweigh proceeding
to trial? As a result, settlement per se cannot explain the decline in trials.
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One potential explanation for why cases no longer go to trial is proposed by
Hadfield (2004). She challenges the traditional law and economics perspective
that settlement has generated much of the decline in trial activity. She suggests
that pre-trial adjudication has had an effect on the total number of trials. These
pre-trial adjudications could be reflected in motions to dismiss (Rule 12(b)), mo-
tions for judgment on the pleadings (Rule 12(c)), or motions for summary judg-
ment (Rule 56). The insight of Hadfield’s work stems from her dataset. Hadfield
obtained a sample of cases from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER) database. PACER serves as a “national” docket for federal cases.6 Had-
field then performed a statistal audit of cases fromprevious years to compare them
to a sample of PACER cases she herself gathered. She reaches several conclusions,
including (1) past coding schemes employed by the Administrative Office for the
U.S. Courts were significantly inaccurate, and (2) making a correction to the data
she employed revealed that settlement rates did not appear to change really at
all (consistent with Eisenberg & Lanvers (2009)). Interestingly, however, Hadfield
contends that while settlement rates did not increase (though remained relatively
high by 2000 at 40.5%), there was a distinct increase in nontrial adjudications. In
other words, what could be driving the diminution in trials is not so much set-
tlement (or even, for that matter, “supply-side” concerns), but rather the usage of
pre-trial procedural devices to end claims before the trial stage.
Yeazell (2004) disagrees slightly with Hadfield’s position, though he focuses
on procedure in a similar manner. Yeazell maintains that procedural mechanisms
have had an effect on the diminishing number of trials. However, Yeazell believes
6PACER is not, in actuality, a national docket and each district mainatains its own server and
electronic case management system. For the purposes of this discussion here, however, we can
assume it operates in this manner.
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that the procedural changes have also ushered in a cost-increasing effect to liti-
gation through changes to discovery practice. Because of the increased expense
litigants must face with the discovery and disclosure process, taking a case all the
way to trial becomes cost prohibitive. Yeazell is right to point to the mix between
procedure and cost, but does not provide original quantitative evidence to support
his claims. Furthermore, he identifies, but does not answer, a significant question
for federal litigation, namely, many cases in the federal system are based upon em-
ployment or civil rights actions. These cases have fee-shifting provisions which
operate to transfer the cost of representation from the plaintiff to the defendant.
Thus, a victorious civil rights plaintiff would have their attorneys fees paid by the
civil rights violator. Galanter (2004) notes that many cases that go to trial are, in
fact, civil rights cases. As a result, Yeazell mentions, but does not answer, an im-
portant quandry in the realm of litigation studies.
So what are we tomake of the explanations for the decrease in trials? The focus
on proceduralmechanisms, such as pre-trial adjudicatorymotions, and alterations
to discovery, would seem to be a fruitful area of evaluation. I will note at this point
that I believe an answer sits at these crossroads. I detail inChapter 4my substantive
theory on howwe can reconcile these particular strands to establish an explanation
for the diminution in trials. For now, I address the final avenue of research, and one
from which my theory springs, which is the use of summary judgment to dismiss
claims.
In Chapter 4, I detail with specificity how summary judgment can be employed
by judges not only to dismiss claims prior to the trial stage, but also how this pro-
cedural device can operate to shift litigation incentive mechanisms to induce set-
tlement and discourage litigants from even attempting to resolve their disputes at
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trial. At this point, however, it is worth evaluating why the present state of re-
search on this particular procedural device is lacking and why a better theory is
required if we are to answer the question, where have all the trials gone?
There are two general strands of thought in the literaturewhen it comes to sum-
mary judgment impacting the number of cases that go to trial. The first strand of
thought is that in 1986, when the United States Supreme Court issued its “Trilogy”
of summary judgment decisions7 the Court effectively made it easier for district
court judges to kick claims out of the federal courts without ever having reached
the trial stage.8 This branch of the scholarly debate tends to focus on the doctri-
nal and legal shift alleged to have occurred vis-a-vis summary judgment use. The
second strand of scholarship suggests that the Supreme Court’s Trilogy did not
effectuate such changes. This form of analysis tends to utilize empirical investiga-
tions to buttress its claims. At the outset I will state that both strands of research,
while contributing to the larger scholarly discussion about why it is rare to see fed-
eral civil trials, are flawed and require an improved theory (which I discuss in the
next chapter).
For those who contend that summary judgment worked to reduce the number
of trials, perhaps principle amongst the contenders is the work of Professor Arthur
Miller (2003). Miller argues that the summary judgment Trilogy re-worked prior
standards for granting a motion for summary judgment (which is often a defen-
dant’s motion). In short, Miller suggests that prior to the Trilogy, the Supreme
Court had developed a doctrine of being cautious before authorizing a claim to
be dismissed, particularly in “complex cases invovling issues of motive and in-
7These are (1)Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.; (2)Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.; and (3) Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.
8For a detailed discussion of summary judgment, see Chapter 4.
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tent” (Miller, 2003, 1033). Following the Trilogy, however, Miller suggests that the
doctrine was so altered that where the motion for summary judgment was previ-
ously a relatively disfavored device, it became openly embraced. The reasons for
this change could be the fact that the Court was encouraging lower federal courts
to take control of their dockets and utilize this procedural device to induce dis-
position of cases (either through threat of usage (in which, perhaps a settlement
might take shape)), or through actual usage (meaning dismissal of the case in the
pre-trial stage). Miller believes that the Trilogy as a whole (and the Celotex deci-
sion in particular) strongly advocated the use of summary judgment “as a tool to
promote judicial efficiency” and “fundamental[ly] reconfigur[ed]” the “balance of
power between plaintiffs. . . and defendants” (2003, 1040). Miller cites to the work
of Berkowitz (1992), who (in an unpublished manuscript) found that summary
judgment grant rates increased in two federal districts (Miller, 2003, 1049 n.360;
see also Berkowitz 1992) and Gordillo (1994), who found increased grant rates for
summary judgment motions. Miller effectively concludes that a litigant’s right to
trial and their day in court is in jeopardy as a result of the Trilogy, the Trilogy’s
“improper extension and the lack of any reasoned law-fact analysis by lower fed-
eral courts. . . appear to pose the danger,” and that the “litigation crisis” rhetoric in
the public “may be encourageing district courts and courts of appeals to rely on
the trilogy to justify resorting to pretrial disposition too readily because they be-
lieve that there is a need to alleviate overcrowded dockets or because they disfavor
certain substantive claims” (Miller, 2003, 1133).
Miller’s work is impressive in terms of scope (the law review article clocks a
healthy 152 pageswith 749 footnotes). Forwhat the article contains in scope it lacks
in actually testing the hypothesis that the Trilogy did, in fact, cause the decline in
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federal civil trials. Miller offers no original data analysis, and his reliance on the
two small empirical studies confines even those findings to a few district courts in
the United States in only a few years. The rigorous requirements of the scientific
method are simply not present to determine whether, in fact, Miller demonstrates
his main contentions.
The second strand of thought on summary judgment is that it simply did not
have the effect envisioned by those like Miller. Under this rationale, while it is
conceivable that the Trilogy did make it easier for defendants to file, and the court
to grant, motions for summary judgment, the available data simply do not bear
out this claim.
LindaMullenix (2012) contends that the available record demonstrates that the
Trilogy simply did not have the effect as many in the legal academy contend. In
fact, Mullenix (rather blithely) contends that “the summary judgment trilogy had
its greatest impact on the way in which first year civil procedure professors teach
summary judgment” (562). In her study, Mullenix reviewed all published and
unpublished Circuit Court of Appeals decisions in 2010 (N=222) to determine if
courts of appeals even cited Celotex9; if they did, did the court discuss the legal
standard elaborated in that case; and did the court consciously apply the standard
to reach its conclusion in its decision (2012, 567). Mullenix concludes that much
of the time, federal courts of appeals do not even cite the Celotex case, do not ap-
pear to “acknowledge, understand, or apply” the standard correctly, and appear
to lean on “a kind-of gestalt ‘tennish match’ mode of analysis” (2012, 583-84). She
further contends that one of the other cases from the Trilogy (Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby) appears to have had negligible effects and, in “examining the entire corpus
9She did not evaluate the other two constituent cases to the Trilogy in this manner.
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of federal district court and appellate decisions over a twenty-four year span, only
three reported district court decisions cite and rely on the Anderson holding” (2012,
579). Mullenix’s findings would appear to significantly curb the notion that sum-
mary judgment has no role in the diminution in trials, but upon even a cursory
inspection her contentions suffer from fatal flaws.
The article’s contention about summary judgment stops almost before it begins
by suggesting that an evaluation of courts of appeals decisions will provide sup-
port for how the Trilogy has operated in the lower federal district courts. This is
problematic. We have no ideawhy those cases were appealed; it is entirely possible
thatmany caseswere not appealed, andwe should be evaluating the conduct of the
lower courts in taking the signal from the Supreme Court in terms of the summary
judgment process. True, lower federal district courts can look to their respective
circuit courts of appeals for instruction on the law, but if we want to evaluate why
cases do not go to trial, focusing on the intermediate courts of appeals charts our fo-
cus in an improper direction. Second, singling out a solitary year twenty-six years
after the Trilogy does not provide leverage on whether the Trilogy had an impact
on trials. Not only is this point of observation vastly removed from the time in
which we would expect lower courts (of any stripe) to begin using the “new” Tril-
ogy standard, her research design fails to account for other events that could have
occured in the over two decades since the Trilogy. Were other alterations made
to substantive law that might matter? Is there a consideration of resources for the
litigants? If we are seeking an answer as to the trends, then confining our anal-
ysis to an incorrect unit of observation and ignoring all temporal spaces around
that point ignores the fundamental question at hand, namely, whether the Trilogy
contributed to the decline in trial numbers.
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Finally, there is something immediately suspect about her claim that in a twenty-
four year period she could discover only three federal district courts that “cite and
rely” on the Anderson holding. To test whether this proposition might be true, I
searched for cases (in Westlaw) that cited to Anderson. . . in a single district (North-
ern District of Texas). . . in the last month (8/13/16—9/13/16). My results: I found
four decisions at the district court level that cite Anderson.10 In fact, a previous
analysis of citations by myself found that, by the Fall of 2015, Anderson had been
cited 197,096 times11 (this time, performed in LexisNexis). Indeed, Anderson ap-
pears possibly to be the most-cited Supreme Court case ever, with the exception
of its Trilogy companion Celotex (cited 208,546 times). Perhaps Mullinex’s word
“rely” means that the district court not merely cited, but then discussed in detail,
the Anderson case. Perhaps. But to ascertain if other cases “relied” on Anderson
this way would require a thorough review of all federal decisions without reliance
on merely a citation, which seems unlikely to have occurred given her research
design.12 In short, Mullenix falls below the requisite threshold for demonstrating
that the Trilogy worked to reduce federal civil trials.
Gelbach (2014) evaluates whether summary judgment filing rates might pro-
vide clues into whether the Trilogy has re-worked the incentive mechanisms for
certain litigants to file such motions. In short, Gelbach suggests that, for instance,
if a defendant is truly benefited by the Trilogy’s re-working of the summary judg-
10Martin v. Transport Workers Union of America, Local 556, 2016 WL 4505749, *3 (N.D. Tex.) (Aug.
29, 2016); Industrial Models, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., 2016 WL 4533321, *1 (N.D. Tex) (Aug. 29, 2016); Cooper
v. Harvey, 2016 WL 4427481, *2 (N.D. Tex.) (Aug. 21, 2016); Vianet Group PLC v. Tap Acquisition,
Inc., 2016 WL 4368302, *4 (N.D. Tex.) (Aug. 16, 2016).
11This number includes all federal court citations, irrespective of the level in the federal judicial
hierarchy.
12As Mullenix explains: “Appellate decisions were selected as the basis for study because the
LexisNexis and Westlaw databases indicated in excess of 10,000 reported and unreported district
court summary judgment decisions in 2010 alone, a database too large for the reading and parsing
every district court summary judgment disposition” (Mullenix, 2012, 567).
48
ment standard, then we should see litigant behavior associated with this fact. As
an example, Gelbach notes that if defendant selection effects exists (meaning cases
that defendants would not challenge under a demanding summary judgment bur-
den of production, but would do so under an easier burden), then a finding that
the “summary judgment disposition rate had not fallen post-trilogy could be ex-
plained only by a shift favoring defendants in summary judgment adjudication”
(Gelbach 1670-71). Gelbach draws his data from Westlaw’s database of district
court civil docket reports (the DCT database). As he notes, the “DCT database
contains essentially the same docket information as PACER.”13 He gathers data
from 2005-2011 which includes a total usable dataset of 29,673 civil rights cases
and 30,070 tort cases (Gelbach, 2014, 1678). Gelbach performs logit estimations to
predict whether a motion for summary judgment is likely to be filed, and includes
as independent variables the gender and race of the judge, as well as dummy vari-
ables for the appointing president for the judge. Gelbach finds limited influence of
the judge’s characteristics for tort cases, but does find that a judge’s demographic
traits can influence whether a motion for summary judgment is filed in civil rights
cases. He also determines that the president who appointed the judge can influ-
ence the probability of filing a motion for summary judgment.
Gelbach’s efforts are laudable for his attempt to construct a large dataset. The
problem with his analysis, however, lies within his modeling strategy. First, Gel-
bach talks of “selection effects” and their impact on summary judgment “dispo-
sition rates.” Yet, his models evaluate the probability of a motion for summary
judgment being filed, not decided. If what he contends is a focus on the decision
13Gelbach does not detail, however, what these substantive differences are between the DCT and
PACER.
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to grant or deny should be evaluated, his dependent variable is simply the wrong
variable to use.
Assuming, however, that his intent is to evaluate filing rates, as noted previ-
ously (and aswill be discussed in the next chapter), whether amotion for summary
judgment is filed or not is only part of the answer to our question about whether
the Trilogy impacted federal civil trials. If plaintiffs expect they will be bounced
from court much easier after the Trilogy, theymay choose never to do battle, either
at the summary judgment stage, or, by filing the case at all. In the latter situation,
one needs to evaluate larger trend patterns rather than single case observations to
ascertain if aggregate data demonstrate behavior coordinate with these doctrinal
changes rendered in the Trilogy.
Gelbach’s empirical estimations are problematic as well. He first finds that
essentially all of the demographic variables increase the probability of a motion
for summary judgment being filed. White judge, Hispanic judge, a judge ap-
pointed by Reagan, a judge appointed by Clinton, a judge appointed by Johnson
and both Bushes all have statistically significant positive effects on a motion for
summary judgment being filed. And, given he creates dummy variables for the
presidential appointment, the reference category is Carter. Is an increase in the
marginal effects for a summary judgment motion being filed between Carter and
Clinton interpretable in a real sense? What about Johnson to Carter (who sim-
ilarly displays the same positive marginal effects)? Another option would have
been to utilize ideology scores for the judges, which Gelbach states he did in alter-
native estimations, but “it had virtually no association with summary judgment
motion filing[s]” (2014, 1684). The fact that the ideology variable suddenly be-
comes neutered through usage of a continuous variable, rather than the dummied
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presidential appointment categories, should give pause, particularly on the issue
of interpretability. Perhaps a coding scheme which separated (through a dummy
variable) the effects of Republican-appointed judges versus Democrat-appointed
judges would capture the anticipated effects Gelbach seeks, in addition to the
added benefit of clarified interpretability.
Finally, it is almost certainly the case that there is omitted variable bias in these
estimations14 The assumption of the model is that a judge’s demographic charac-
teristics, their age (whose marginal effects are not provided), and their presiden-
tial nominator are all that determine if a motion for summary judgment is filed:
all other potential factors (such as discovery time, relative resource advantages
between parties, how long the court spent reviewing the motion, etc.) are not in-
cluded and are thrust into the error (ε) term. This is problematic, particularly for a
logistic regression, as omitted variables in such estimations can bias the coefficients
(downward) even if the omitted variables are unrelated to the independent vari-
ables included in the model (see, e.g., Mood 2009). Accordingly, failure to include
these variables (or otherwise attempt to account for them in some manner) would
seem to severely damage the reliability of Gelbach’s estimations and conclusions.
The final set of anti-Trilogy studies stem from the work of the Federal Judi-
cial Center (FJC). The FJC is the “education and research agency for the federal
court.”15 These studies have been spearheaded by Joe S. Cecil, a senior research
associate in the research division of the FJC. By far, these studies are the most-
frequently used in the argument against the effects of the summary judgment
Trilogy. While these studies are superior to any others offered on the question of
14There are also no model performance diagnostics provided either.
15See http://www.fjc.gov (last visited September 14, 2016).
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whether the Trilogy can be a cause of the diminution in trials, they too are flawed
and should not be taken as gospel on this important question.16
There are four FJC studies in particular worth discussing, each occuring over a
period of multiple decades. I discuss these studies below.
3.3.1 FJC Study #1
In 1987, the FJC issued a study evaluating the effects of summary judgment in
three district courts (Cecil & Douglas 1987). In this study, the authors examined
docket sheets randomly selected from three federal districts17 In total, the authors
obtained a sample ofN=564. The authors found that in all the usable observations,
a summary judgment motion was filed in 25% of the cases (Cecil & Douglas, 1987,
6). Summary judgment motions were granted in about one-third of the cases (Id.).
The authors reference a prior study from 1975 that suggests summary judgment
filing rateswere about the same in these two years (i.e., 1975 and 1986), and that the
likelihood of a case being terminated by virtue of summary judgment had actually
decreased in each district evaluated (19% for Eastern District of Pennsylvania; 37%
in Central District of California; 22% in the District of Maryland). The authors
conclude that while “summary judgment motions are currently filed at about the
same rate as they were in the past, it appears less likely that such motions will
dispose of a case” (Cecil & Douglas, 1987, 13).
The FJC’s study has benefits of research design beyond the studies previously
discussed. First, the use of docket sheets is important. Rather than relying on
16For a contrary view, seeMullinex (2012, 566) (“The FJC has preempted and occupied the entire
field of empirical study of summary judgment in the post-Celotex era. So complete and thorough
are these studies that it is humbling to even attempt to venture in this field.”)
17These districts were: (1) Eastern District of Pennsylvania; (2) Central District of California; and
(3) District of Maryland.
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commercial datasets (like Gelbach), or focusing on the court of appeals’ behavior
(Mullenix), FJC Study #1 looks to the actual docket entries by the federal district
courts. These docket sheets maintain the court’s official record and review of them
will determine whether a motion for summary judgment has, in fact, been filed
and whether that motion has, in fact, been granted. Measurement in this research
design is, then, superior to other studies.
That said—and this will be a frequent comment for the FJC studies (see infra)—
the focus on only three district courts is problematic. Limiting the pull of cases
to only these districts affects the generalizability of findings to other geographical
areas, and the nation at large. Additionally, the authors’ measurement of whether
a summary judgment motion is granted or not is problematic. In particular, the
authors measure whether a summary judgment motion was granted as whether
a motion for summary judgment “terminated” the case. What this coding deci-
sion means is that if a motion for summary judgment had been filed, and if that
motion were granted (in full, or in part), but did not terminate the case, it was not
considered a successful summary judgment motion. This measurement decision
is a problem. It is entirely possible for a litigant (read: defendant) to file a motion
for summary judgment on, say, three of four claims presented by a plaintiff. If
that motion is granted in full, then the fourth claim remains alive. However, that
claim may be the least harmful claim to the defendant (say, for instance a claim
where damages are capped). If the defendant were successful in having summary
judgment granted on a claimwhere damages were not capped, then the defendant
has, as a practical matter “won” by restructuring the settlement-bargaining equa-
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tion (i.e., reduced the potential cost of liability). Accordingly, failure to consider
this grant of summary judgment simply underestimates grant rates.18
3.3.2 FJC Study #2
A second study performed in 2001 also evaluated summary judgment trends
(Cecil et al. 2001). In this study, the authors drew a random sample of cases across
six district courts19 over six different years20. This time, the authors included cod-
ing for not only whether the case saw a summary judgment motion (and whether
that motion terminated the case), but importantly, whether the motion itself was
granted (either inwhole or in part). This newmeasurement of “grant” rates would
appear to correct the deficiencies of FJC Study #1 in that regard.
The authors find that in the total sample, the summary judgment motion rate
increased over time, the rate at which those motions were granted increased over
time, and the termination of cases by motion for summary judgment increased
over time (Cecil et al., 2001, 5). In slightly more than 20% of the cases was there
a motion for summary judgment filed by 2000. The grant rate stood at 12% by
2000 (2001, 3). The authors indicate that while summary judgmentmotion practice
appeared to increase over time (and indeed increased in 1988, the closest time point
in their data after the Trilogy), their “analysis so far has not been able to isolate
any effect from the Supreme Court trilogy” (2001, 6). The authors contend that
18The authors seem to acknowledge this fact, but do not operationalize this measure differently
in order to provide comparability with the previous 1975 study, which used case termination as
“success” for a summary judgment grant. See Cecil & Douglas, 1987, 10 n.18 (“A more sensitive
measure of change in summary judgment practice would examine grants of motions for summary
judgment. However, we were limited by the nature of the earlier data to comparisons of cases
terminated by grants of motions for summary judgment.”)
19These were (1) Eastern District of Pennsylvania; (2) Central District of California; (3) District
of Maryland; (4) Eastern District of Louisiana; (5) Souther District of New York; and (6) Northern
District of Illinois.
20These years were: 1975, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995, and 2000.
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the “apparent increase in summary judgment filings immediately following the
trilogy may be due to increased dispositions of asbestos cases rather than a broad
change regarding summary judgment” (2001, 2).
Ultimately, FJC Study #2 improves upon the 1987 study. In particular, the mea-
surement of grants is better and the random draw of cases is extended to six dis-
tricts (as opposed to merely three). However, there are some limitations. Again, in
the study the FJC attempted to ascertain whether there were trends over time. The
problem is the study only selects six distinct time points during a 25 year history,
so no time series analysis is actually performed to discern if “trends” actually exist.
Additionally, the authors’ conclusion that the Trilogy did not rework the summary
judgment process is a bit tenuous. Apparently, the authors feel that while there
is an increase in summary judgment motions following the Trilogy, that increase
is, ostensibly not enough. The authors indicate that the increase post-Trilogy might
be related to the asbestos litigation at that time, but they do not appear to control
for this fact in any manner.21 And, the reality is, there were increases in the sum-
mary judgment rates after the Trilogy. Notwithstanding the limitations of focusing
on only the rates at which summary judgment motions are filed (or the concomi-
tant rates at which they are granted22), the fact remains that after the Supreme
Court invited federal district courts to use summary judgment (and by implica-
21One of the districts in their study, the Eastern District for Pennsylvania, has become home
to all asbestos-related personal injury claims through Multi-District Litigation (See MDL #875).
This order, issued by the federal Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, transferred all such
cases to this district, but did not occur until 1991, however. That said, the authors appear to have
excluded such asbestos claims from their analysis (see Cecil et al., 2001, 1 n.2 (“For purposes of this
analysis we excluded...multi-district litigation cases”)). It would appear that the authors reference
to distorting effects by asbestos cases is a reference to pre-MDL asbestos claims, but given the above,
it is somewhat unclear.
22I address this research design limitation in a theoretical-sense in Chapter 4; I address the issue
empirically in Chapter 5.
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tion, lawyers in those courts), summary judgment motion practice saw an uptick
in activity, even by the FJC’s standard.
3.3.3 FJC Study #3
The main study often cited by researchers as demonstrating that the summary
judgment Trilogy did not have an effect on the number of federal civil trials is the
third study by the FJC (Cecil et al. 2007)23. The structure of the study is similar to
the 2001 study. Here, the same six district courts were reviewed with essentially
the same dataset for the same years.24 Docket sheets were reviewed (or, had al-
ready been reviewed), and for the last two years in the data PACERwas utilized to
gather the docket sheets through electronic collection.
Given the data is largely the same, the results proffered by the authors at least
with respect to summary judgment filing rates and summary judgment grant rates
is the same:
[A]fterwe controlled for differences across courts and the changingmix
of cases, we found few changes in summary judgment activity after the
Supreme Court trilogy. The appearance of higher rates of summary
judgment in generalmay be due to increased filings of civil rights cases,
which have always had a higher-than-average rate of summary judg-
ment motions and dispositions. Although increases in summary judg-
mentmay be part of the reason for the decrease in trial rates, the decline
in trials reflects far broader changes in litigation practice than simply
a response to the Supreme Court’s affirmation of summary judgment
practice.
(Cecil et al., 2007, 906)
23There is a related study also issued in 2007 that confines itself to the year 2006; I will discuss
that study last.
24In actuality, it appears the year in FJC Study #2 1985 has been converted to 1986 and the year
1990 in FJC Study #2 has been converted to 1989. It is unclear why this change was made, although
it is reasonable to postulate that the change in title of the years is simply amodification from consid-
ering when the data were gathered versus when the data were presented in the studies. Whatever
the reason, the numbers for the raw data match suggesting this is only a nomenclature issue, and
not a substantive concern.
56
Given the data are the same, the filing and grant rates are the same for FJC Study
#3 as FJC Study #2. But, the authors do more with the data this time around and
produce logistic regressions for the contributing causes for whether a motion for
summary judgment is filed and whether a motion for summary judgment is
granted (again, in whole or in part). It is here where there is cause for concern
with this study.
The logit estimations utilized by the authors (for both the filing rates and the
grant rates) include as independent variables dummied categories for each district
(with the SouthernDistrict ofNewYork as the omitted category) and the year (1986
is the omitted category). These are all the independent variables utilized. As with
Gelbach (2014), if we are to properly test a social scientific theory, failure to include
other variables will bias the estimates. In short, the models are straw men: if, in
particular, the time (dummy) variables show no statistical significance, then it is
taken that with regard to the reference category (1986, the year of the Trilogy), no
effect can be discerned. But of course, failing to include omitted variables in the
logit estimation will cause biased coefficients that are overly deflated (Mood 2009),
thereby suggesting no effect post-Trilogy. So, precisely because these are the only
independent variables included in the model is the very reason the authors can
claim to draw the conclusion that there is no post-Trilogy effect. It is a cyclical
statistical problem wrought from model misspecification at the start.25
The authors also make a questionable call in determining whether a motion
for summary judgment is granted or not. The process by which such a motion is
granted is rather simple to understand, but I will elucidate it here for further clar-
ity. When a party (read: defendant) wishes to have a claim (or claims) kicked out of
25As with Gelbach (2014), we have no model diagnostics and no notion as to whether these vari-
ables even serve as good predictors (through, for instance, a Link Test).
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federal court during the pre-trial stage, they will file a motion for summary judg-
ment, the other side will respond, the district court will review the paper record,
and a decision is then rendered by the district court judge as to whether the mo-
tion will be granted (either in whole, or in part).26 Keep in mind the processed
ordering of the motion: a summary judgment motion cannot be granted unless it
is filed. In other words, a federal district court judge cannot grant a motion for summary
judgment unless such a motion is made by a party.27 The decision to grant the motion
for summary judgment is conditional on the motion for summary judgment being
filed. Cecil et al. (2007) do not model the grant rates in this fashion, however.
While a bit lengthy, the authors (almost) complete statement for this modeling
strategy is worth evaluating:
This analysis of grant likelihood is not conditional on the presence of
a motion for summary judgment. . .We conducted the analyses in this
way for at least two reasons. First, policy discussions about changing
litigation trends in general, and summary judgment activity specifi-
cally, tend not to be couched in conditionals; rather, changes (such as
increasing or decreasing termination rates) are spoken of as individual
effects in what is understood to be a complex system. Second, we knew
that reducing the sample size for each analysis through conditionals
would limit the power of the analyses and increase the chances that
meaningful results would be masked—although we did not anticipate
substantial differences. In fact, when we did run a logistic regression
estimating the likelihood of a summary judgment grant conditional on
there being a motion for summary judgment, the results were generally
the same. As expected some districts’ previously significant coefficients
became marginally significant or nonsignificant. . .However, the sam-
ple years that possessed significant coefficients in the nonconditional
analysis also did so in the conditional analysis. . . For a discussion of the
benefits of a nonconditional analysis over a conditional analysis, see
26Recall Cecil et al. measure this “grant” as a grant in whole or in part. I have no qualms with
this measurement of a “grant,” and indeed it is the same measure I employ in the micro-analysis
portion of my research design discussed in Chapter 5.
27A district court judge could dismiss a case on their own, for intance, if a party fails to actively
engage the litigation and lets it go dormant. This situation, however, is not what is discussed in
this section.
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A.N. Pettitt & S. Low Choy, Bivariate Binary Data with Missing Values:
Analysis of a Field Experiment to Investigate Chemical Attractants of
Wild Dogs, 4 J. Agric. Biological & Envtl. Stat. 57 (1999).
(Cecil et al., 2007, 893-94 n.75 (emphasis added))
There are several problems with this econometric rationale. As to their first
contention, if the authors are truly concerned with “individual effects,” then re-
taining the conditional impact of deciding only what has been filed is the individual
effect. To put it another way, to treat, for instance, whether a motion is granted
or not as the only effect of what has happened in that particular case, but to also
create a sense of semi-aggregation to all other cases, is to diminish the individual
effects and obtain some estimate for the sample based on what other observations
have done.28
Additionally, the authors’ reliance on the work of Pettitt & Choy (1999) (eval-
uating the efficacy of certain chemical attractants for Australian dingos) to vouch
for their modeling strategy misapprehends that work. In short, Pettitt & Choy
do not recommend that one models “missing” data by simply employing a non-
conditional maximum likelihood estimation. Instead, what those authors propose
is “amodel conditioning ondingo presence/absence andhypothesizing a distribu-
tion for dingo presence/absence [through the use of] an EM29 algorithm” (Pettitt
28It is difficult to tell how the authors have even coded this scheme. It is perhaps the case that
they employed the following scheme: if a case did not have amotion for summary judgment filed, it
was coded as a zero. Additionally, by definition, that observation would receive a zero for “grant”
(because, obviously, no motion was filed and thus could not be granted). But, a case could also
have a zero for the “grant” column if a motion was filed, but the court simply did not grant the
motion. As a result, the zeros in effect have multiple meanings. Thus, rather than coding the zeros
where no motion had even been filed as “missing,” the value of zero has been conflated with its
true meaning: the motion was not granted. Without the data, it is difficult to determine if this
coding scheme is what the authors are referencing with their statement, but it seems plausible that




& Choy, 1999, 57). In other words, what the authors propose is a way to model the
probability distribution for whether a dingo even went to a site or not, and then
incorporate that distribution into the ultimate estimation for the effects of various
chemical attractants. Cecil et al.’s (2007) work ignores the hypothetical distribution
of non-filed motions that are not-granted, and condenses the data into an uncon-
ditional estimation. This is an incorrect estimation strategy.
A simple manner for dealing with this problem is to consider the non-grants
in non-filing cases as just that: missing data. The exclusion of these observations
will necessarily diminish Cecil et al.’s N (as they correctly note), but with thou-
sands of observations it would be surprising to see this N drop to levels where
the asymptotic properties of the estimator can be called into question. Another
method for dealing with this problem is to do a variant of what Pettitt & Choy
recommend which is to model a probability distribution for the choice to “opt-in”
to the system (whether a motion is filed), and then model what happens once in
that system (grant/deny of a pending motion for summary judgment). This strat-
egy could be accomplished through use of a two-stage procedure. In the Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) realm, one would use a Heckman estimation30; in a binary
choice to file, and binary choice to grant situation, an extension of the two-stage
rationale could be applied (seeGreene, 2012, 880-83 (discussing sample selection is-
sues and two-stage estimations for non-linear models)). Ultimately, while the data
gathering efforts are substantial, and Cecil et al. employ a research design more
carefully crafted than others, it still falls short of answering the ultimate question,
which is whether the Trilogy impacted summary judgment motions practice.
30Also known as a “heckit” model.
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3.3.4 FJC Study #4
The final FJC study analyzed data from 78 federal district courts (essentially
those that had fully implemented the CM/ECF reporting system) in fiscal year
2006 (Cecil & Cort 2007b).31 The general research design is the same as others ex-
cept the sample is closer to the true population of case filings: essentially all cases
that were in the PACER system were reviewed by docket entries to determine if
a motion for summary judgment was filed and granted. The study identifies ba-
sic descriptive statistics, such as the filing rates for summary judgment, and the
rates at which such motions are granted by case type. The study concludes that
“approximately 17motions for summary judgment are filed for every 100 cases ter-
minated” and that “[a]pproximately 60 percent of the summary judgmentmotions
are granted in whole or in part, with a somewhat higher rate of motions granted
in civil rights cases” (Cecil, 2007b, 2).
The problems of the past FJC studies have been remedied in part in this study.
For instance, no longer are only a few districts covered in the data gathering; this
is good. However, the analysis is confined to a single fiscal year, which can say
nothing about time trends for the summary judgment process and whether the
Trilogy impacted that process or not. To be fair, the researchers do not make such
a claim. It is worth pointing this fact out, however, given the posture of previ-
ous studies by the FJC. There is also a question as to the coding scheme utilized.
Ostensibly these codings were done by machine extrapolation. It is unclear, how-
ever, what searching criteria the researchers employed; e.g., boolean searches on
31CM/ECF is an abbreviation for “Case Management/Electronic Case Filing” system. The
CM/ECF system is the case filing system utilized by attorneys who electronically file case doc-
uments (such as pleadings and motions) with the court. Essentially, and in short order, what is
uploaded through the CM/ECF system is then routed through the PACER system for public con-
sumption of publicly available court records.
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variants of phrases or terms, review for specific reference to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that might deal with motions for summary judgment, etc. Non-
theless, the study is laudable for its data gathering and the results are interesting
to say the least. Recall that the study found a summary judgment filing rate of
17%; this is similar to past FJC studies (in actuality, a slight decline). But the grant
rates aremuch higher. The FJC suggested in its third study that grant rates were in
the ballpark of 12%; here, they are 48% higher. This is a dramatic rise, and suggests
something is at work, either in a substantial change in how the courts utilized sum-
mary judgment, or, (what I feel to be the case) something is amiss with the past
data effort. An increase that size would have been felt like a shockwave in the liti-
gation realm. It seems unreasonable to think litigants, lawyers, and judges would
have simply “missed” this rather large development. The study itself does not in-
dicate why this increase occurred, so it is difficult to postulate beyond these bare
considerations. But, if this is the grant rate, then it would call into question the
previous numbers suggested in other studies.
Another fact is somewhat buried in the report that is quite disturbing. I have
mentioned (based on the work of others, as well as my own efforts in Chapter
5), that civil rights cases tend to subject to the summary judgment process more
than other types of cases. What is particularly striking about the report is that
it provides additional insight into this effect. Recall that FJC Study #4 states that
summary judgment grant rates are, in the FJC’s words, “somewhat higher” for
civil rights cases. This statement is putting it mildly. In fact, the grant rates for the
two highest-N categories of such claims (civil rights cases involving jobs (which
include employment discrimination claims, as well as other job-related claims),
and what the Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts terms “other civil rights”
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claims (which include constitutional litigation)) have grant rates of 73% and 68%,
respectively. These rates are quite high. The filing rates for summary judgment in
these claims is higher than even suggested by past researchers, at 30% and 28%, re-
spectively (Cecil, 2007b, 6).32 In other words, the rates are high, and, much higher
than other types of cases (see Cecil & Cort, 2007b, 6-8).33 Indeed, according to FJC
Study #4, when one extracts from the dataset employment discrimination claims,
and only evaluates those types of claims, the grant rate remains steady at 73%
across all districts. Again, these numbers are staggering. Note that in FJC Study
#3, the grant rates for defendants’ summary judgment motions in civil rights cases
was just over 50% (Cecil, 2007, 887), but in FJC Study #4 the grant rates for civil
rights cases is now 70% for all civil rights claims (not breaking this category into
sub-categories; Cecil, 2007b, 6). Again, this is a substantial increase. If civil rights
cases see a summary judgment motion in nearly a third of all such claims, and if
almost three-fourths of those motions are successful, this means a great many civil
rights claims are being dismissed from federal court. Given that such claims now
comprise a large proportion of federal cases, this means the bulk of federal causes
of action are being steered through the summary judgment process.34
FJC Study #4 does much to tell us about the nature of summary judgment mo-
tions at the district court level. It does not, however, give us much insight into
whether the Trilogy impacted the usage of summary judgment motions in the fed-
eral district courts. Additionally, the study does not engage in any econometric
modeling, so we do not know what causes might influence whether a motion for
32See Eisenberg&Lanvers (2008, 16-17) (reporting summary judgment filing rates in employment
discrimination cases for the Northern District of Georgia reached just over 24%.)
33I find grant rates for civil rights cases (which includes, but is not limited to, employment dis-
crimination cases) at over 63%; see my discussion in Chapter 5.
34See Galanter, 2004, 468 (“[I]n 1962 there were only 317 civil rights dispositions; in 2002, there
were 40,881.”)
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summary judgment is filed (or not), or whether a motion for summary judgment
is granted (or not). In short, we are left without an answer to the initial research
question presented and require further investigation of the matter.
3.4 Conclusion
The picture we obtain from the basic data and literature points us in a general
direction for answering the question: Where have all the trials gone. Very clearly, the
data show that cases simply do not go to trial anymore. In this respect, we can be
confident that there is, in fact, a shortage of trials in the federal district courts. We
are less-confident, however, in the reasons for this fact. Some scholars suggest it is
a lack of available judicial resources; others contend that federal litigation practice
and procedure has increased costs, thereby diminishing incentives to litigate to
trial; other suggest the Supreme Court’s summary judgment Trilogy has caused
the decline, while others suggest it has not. And, further complicating the matter,
only a small amount of empirical work has been done on the question, and what
has been done is limited. None of the explanations heretofore present a unified
theory, drawing on one ormore of these ideas, to suggest the reason for the decline
in federal civil trials with the requisite testable hypotheses or quantative analysis
of such conjectures. In the next chapter I introduce my theory for the decline in
federal civil trials, and follow that chapterwith amulti-level research design aimed
at overcoming the shortcomings of previous work.
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4. THE PROCEDURAL THEORY OF DIMINISHING TRIALS
As we see in Chapter 3, the decrease in the number of trials in the last 50 years
is staggering, in not only the proportion of all civil cases filed, but also in total
numbers. As detailed in that chapter, several reasons have been proffered for this
trend. These explanations run the gamut from increased case settlement by par-
ties, increased resource constraint on federal judges, increased case management
by judges due to changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and increased
usage of pretrial dispositionmechanisms, such as summary judgment. What these
theories lack, however, is a sense of cohesiveness. To say, for instance, that “settle-
ment has increased” does not explain the reasons why settlement has increased.
Additionally, to suggest that summary judgment is the reason for the decrease in
trials does not fully explainwhy that procedure has caused the diminution of trials.
Indeed, if Cecil et al. (2007) are correct, summary judgment filing rates have not
increased dramatically, and thus case dispositions by summary judgment cannot,
to them (and others), be the reason for the lack of civil trials.
The explanations offered above, however, fail to consider the full context of civil
procedure as a whole. The present federal civil procedure regime acts as a unitary
system to increase pretrial costs to litigants, and the modern summary judgment
legal standards act in concert creating downward pressure on trials. These con-
cerns are not distinct forces, they are part of a larger procedural system that incen-
tivizes the non-trial result. Accordingly, to understand howwe have arrived to the
point where approximately one percent of cases end at the trial stage, we need to
consider the development of these procedural rules and the incentive mechanisms
they create to avoid trial. To do that, we need to examine the historical posture of
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these rules in the litigation realm. I begin with a discussion of the move to the
modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The litigation procedures in place prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure generally borrowed from the common law. By the fifteenth cen-
tury, England had created a civil legal systemwith twodistinct types of courts. The
first court was the jury system sounding in law which essentially confined itself to
awarding damages (Langbein 2012). The second court, the Court of Chancery,
evaluated claims in equity and employed non-jury procedures (Langbein 2012;
Langbein et al. 2009). In addressing claims in equity, the Court of Chancery could
award specific relief, in other words, order individuals to perform certain acts.
Chancery cases were decided by judges (chancellors) who would base their deci-
sion on the court file, rather than on live testimony. As Sward (2001, 88) notes, “an
equitable suit was more open-ended than a common law suit, and a petitioner in
equity had more freedom to explain the injustice she thought was being done.”
The Chancery Courts also utilized procedures that were very different from the
common law courts. As Langbein (2012, 540) notes, drawing from Roman-canon
tradition, these procedures “enabled a litigant (1) to obtain sworn responses from
an opposing litigant; (2) to require nonparty witnesses to answer interrogatories
on oath; and (3) to compel the production of relevant documents” (internal foot-
notes omitted). The two-track system created situations in which individuals who
sought damages in the common law courts had to initiate actions in the Chancery
court to obtain evidence (including documents) necessary for usage in the origi-
nal action. The fact that individuals needed to pursue their claims in two differ-
ent courts with distinct procedural systems was complex (Story, 1838, 61-62) and,
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therefore, increased litigation expense. The American system inherited this pro-
cedural duality.
The American legal system’s adoption of English concepts of “law” and “eq-
uity” meant that the dual framework similarly operated in the United States. As
Langbein (2012, 514) notes, “Dissatisfaction with the complexity and expense of
running two distinct civil justice systems led, in the nineteenth century, to efforts
to merge law and equity.” That effort to streamline procedure in the United States
began with the Field Code in 1848, a code of civil procedure that simplified litiga-
tion in the State of New York (Subrin 1988). Legal procedure had become full of
“high cost and delay” (Haramati, 2010, 188). Ultimately, the move away from the
distinct realms of law and equity became complete upon adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. A full discussion of the origins of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is beyond the scope of my inquiry, though numerous
scholars have addressed this issue (see e.g., Marcus 2010; Subrin 1987; Burbank
1982). A few points about the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are worth noting,
however.
First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically eliminated distinctions
between cases based in law and equity. Indeed, Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure specifically states, “There is one form of action—the civil action.”
With this statement, the Rules very clearly intended to eliminate the previous dis-
tinction between law and equity. The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules
stated, “Reference to actions at law or suits in equity in all statutes should now be
treated as referring to the civil action prescribed in these rules” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 2
& Committee Notes).
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Second, the Rules also aimed to expeditiously resolve lawsuits and reduce the
costs of litigation. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
rules should be “construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action and proceeding” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). Though
concernedwithmoving cases quickly through the federal courts, the Rules also ac-
knowledged an individual’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases.
Rule 38(a) states that “the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amend-
ment to the Constitution...is preserved to the parties inviolate” (Fed. R. Civ. P.
38). However, instead of assuming a jury trial would occur, the Rules specifically
required an individual to “demand” a jury trial, and that failure to timely do so
resulted in waiver of that right. In essence, then, while the jury trial as a product
of the common law court existed, the Rules made a clear move toward defaulting
against such a result. As Langbein (2012, 542) notes, “What the Federal Rules have
largely done, however, is to create conditions in which litigants have found it not
in their interests to exercise that right.” In other words, as they have developed
over time, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have incentivized litigants away
from exercising their constitutional right to a jury trial. The use of procedure to
create such conditions is not without controversy (see, e.g., Miller 2003 (arguing the
use of summary judgment has led to violations of individuals’ Seventh Amend-
ment rights to a jury trial); Thomas 2007 (contending that summary judgment is
unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the common law and therefore violates
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial)).
Third, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided for “discovery,” the abil-
ity to probe into the opposing party’s claims for strengths and weaknesses. At
the common law, the civil jury performed the task of factfinding. Recall that com-
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mon law courts did not have the authority to compel production of documents
or related discovery efforts; those endeavors would need to be performed in the
Courts of Chancery, and even then they were limited. Litigants in common law
courts needed to plead specific facts to support their case. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, however, adopted a “notice pleading” standard (seeRule 8), which
only required “a short and plain statement of the claim” in order to initiate a law-
suit.1 To counter the effect of “surprise” at trial, the Rules systematically shifted the
information-obtaining process of litigation to the pretrial stage. The Rules accom-
plished this aim through a set of pretrial discovery provisions aimed at increasing
the parties’ levels of information prior to the trial. This development held the po-
tential to shift information gathering to earlier in a civil action’s lifespan.
The Federal Rules of Procedure provide several mechanisms for obtaining in-
formation regarding the strengths and weaknesses of parties’ claims. The Rules
permit discovery to include documents, interrogatories, admissions, and deposi-
tions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits one party to demand from
the other side documents “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Rule 33(b)(3)
allows one party to submit written questions (interrogatories) to the other side
asking for answers to those questions as they relate to the parties’ claims and con-
tentions. Rule 36 provides that parties may submit requests for admissions to the
oppsition. Requests for admissions require the opposing party to admit, deny, in-
1In recent times, however, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two decisions that heightened the
pleading standard through an interpretation of Rule 8. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) (raising the pleading standard to require a complaint contain specificity of facts to
demonstrate a claim for relief is “plausible,” and not merely conceivable); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009) (extending the Twombly standard to all federal court cases). The decisions have been
criticized by many as erecting a barrier to access to the federal courts (see, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell
(2010); Miller (2010)). The decisions also appear to have caused an increase in courts granting
motions to dismiss claims before the discovery stage of litigation can begin (see, e.g., Hatamyar
(2010); Gelbach (2012)). Furthermore, the decisions appear to have disproportionately impacted
minorities in their access to courts (see Quintanilla (2011)).
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dicate they cannot answer, or object to the admissions. Failure to respond within
thirty days results in a default that the requests for admission are, in fact, admit-
ted as truth for the purposes of the litigation. Furthermore, the scope of discovery
can be daunting. In the time of common law procedure, the “truth” would come
through the trial, a trial in which evidentiary considers could be considered by the
judge. In the modern American system of discovery, however, parties need not
confine their queries to the other side to evidence that would be admissible at a
trial. In fact, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits parties to seek infor-
mation that need not be admissible at trial “if reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”
The information exchange that is supposed to occur under the rules provides
an opportunity for both sides to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of their
own contentions, as well as their opponents. As a result, the rules of discovery
generally provide for both sides to critically evaluate the value of their case. The
ability to ascertain the value of a lawsuit was principally motivated by a desire to
see cases settle. As Edson Sunderland, an original drafter of the Federal Rules and
a “founding father” of civil procedure, explicitly noted approximately five years
before enactment of the Rules, “[O]ne of the greatest uses of judicial procedure is to
bring parties to a point where they will seriously discuss settlement” (Sunderland
1933). With both sides to a civil case armed with the same general knowledge,
surprise at trial is diminished, and theoretically, settlement is more likely. This
has led one commentator to indicate that “[p]retrial civil procedure has become
nontrial civil procedure” (Langbein 2012).
There are other ramifications for the discovery regime of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. As indicated above, a great deal of information-gathering can
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occur earlier in a civil case than before the Rules went into effect. What is clear is
that the costs associated with litigation have moved closer to the point of initiation
of the litigation and have increased. Rather than spending resources developing
a case for presentation at trial, those energies and resources are now spent on the
discovery phase of litigation. This fact is particularly important given that in the
United States, the so-called “American Rule” governs litigation whereby parties
generally pay for their own costs (rather than a loser-pays-winner scenario found
in England). The requirement that parties finance their own litigation can lead to
strong considerations regarding prosecution of one’s claims and the need for set-
tlement (Langbein 2012). The ability to inflict costs on the other side, however, can
also lead to discovery abuse and efforts by litigants to spend the other side into
submission. Beckerman (2000) investigates modern discovery practices and finds
that while discovery can work relatively well in easy cases, more complex litiga-
tion and high-stakes lawsuits reveal troubling patterns of discovery abuse. As the
author notes, “Not only do these failings impede discovery in practice, increasing
litigation delay and expense; they also imperil the integrity of adjudication of com-
plex and high-stakes lawsuits and undermine public confidence in the civil justice
system” (2000, 585). As Beckerman emphasizes, because complex cases represent
approximately one-third of federal courts caseloads, there is a real concern with
cost-imposing behavior (2000, 506; see also Easterbrook 1989 (discussing the prob-
lems of discovery abuse)). Gordon Tullock goes one (or more) step(s) further on
the matter of litigation costs: “It is my opinion that the bulk of the procedural
rules used in Anglo-Saxon courts are useless or positively perverse...The purpose
of any legal rule should be to minimize the costs inflicted on society by incorrect
decisions, together with the cost of the decisions themselves” (Tullock, 1980, 5-6).
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By the 1980s, federal litigation had done what was, frankly, incentivized by the
early Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: become costly and burdensome.
According to the Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts, between 1964 and
1985 the number of civil cases filed in federal district courts increased from just
under 67,000 to just over 273,000. The influx of civil cases, combinedwith the pres-
sures associated with discovery, created calls for more intervention by judges into
the early stages of litigation. In 1983, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 was sub-
stantially changed. This Rule addressed the role that the judge would play in the
pretrial portion of a case. As one scholar notes, “While the goal of the original Rule
16 was to help the parties formulate issues for trial, the 1983 version allowed more
and earlier intervention by the trial judge in the day-to-day management of the
case” (Sward, 2001, 121; see also Shapiro 1989). This change resulted in what some
have referred to as “Managerial Judging” (Elliot 1986; Resnik 1982). Indeed, the
Notes of the Advisory Committee indicated in the 1983 Amendment that changes
to the rule were performed to meet “the challenges of modern litigation” and that
modifications were aimed to ensure cases were “disposed of by settlement or trial
more efficiently and with less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their
own devices” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 and Committee Notes).2 In other words, the
previous version of the Rules were not working and whatever benefit may have
been derived from the information-gathering process had become inefficient and
in need of supervision. Moreover, “[a]s the complexity of legal regulation ha[d]
grown, predicting the outcome of adjudication in such cases ha[d] become more
difficult” (Langbein, 2012, 558). Inadequate predictions meant settlement prob-
2Congress also passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) in 1990 that included, inter alia, re-
quirements for each federal district court to prepare expense and delay reduction plans, in addition
to streamlining casemanagement. The CJRA expired in 1997; the long-term effects of it are difficult
to discern. See Miller, 2003, 998-999.
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lems, which required in many eyes the necessity for the district court judge to be
more involved in the pretrial litigation stage. What was ultimately happening,
however, was a movement toward injecting the judge into the pretrial (and thus,
factfinding) stage earlier and creating the circumstances under which judges could
begin pushing for settlement, aggressively if need be.
Scholars concerned about the involvement of the judge in the pretrial portion of
litigation have not been silent. OwenM. Fiss, in an apty-titled piece “Against Settle-
ment,” argued that coercionwould be problematic, particularly for thosewho have
unequal access to resources to conduct litigation (Fiss 1984). Charles E. Clark, Re-
porter on the original original Rules of Procedure (and the other “founding father”
of civil procedure, with Edson Sunderland) argued against judicial intervention
being considered by the younger generation of lawyers, and stated to the Judicial
Conference’s Committee on Pretrial Procedure, “[T]he proper function of pre-trial
is not to club the parties—or one of them—into submission. Rather the function
is to see that the parties and the court are fully acquainted with the case, leaving
no room for the tactic of surprise attack or defense, and to uncover and record the
points of agreement between the parties—all to the end of shortening and sim-
plifying the eventual trial” (Clark 1961) (emphasis added). Others have pointed
to the concerns that judges can exert hostility toward parties at this early-stage,
causing consequences that move through the litigation (Resnik, 1982, 425). Albert
Alschuler argued that a judge who becomes familiar with the facts of a case dur-
ing the pretrial stage will not want to see a case move past that stage, settlement
or no settlement: “[the] judge may regard an elaborate adversarial proceeding as
unncecessary...and may attempt to ‘cut through the foliage’ in order to save the
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taxpayers, the litigants and—of course—himself the bother of a costly and largely
duplicative proceeding” (Alschuler, 1986, 1835).
Out of hand discovery and litigation expensewas clearly a problem, prompting
the Rules to reflect a concern for a “managerial judge.” This paradigm permitted
the judge to exert pressures on litigants, attempts that pruned the branches of a
litigation tree. What came next, however, surprised many and converted the scis-
sored pruning efforts into a full-fledged axe. That change came when the United
States Supreme Court fundamentally altered the legal standards for motions for
summary judgment and encouraged judges to wholesale eliminate cases with a
revitalized procedural rule.
Before detailing the watershed cases by the Supreme Court, it is necessary to
brieflydiscuss the summary judgment procedure. Summary judgment stems from
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That Rule provides that a court
shall grant a judgment as a matter of law in cases where “there is no genuine dis-
pute as to anymaterial fact” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). Thus, summary judgment permits
a judge to enter judgment against a party if a jury could not reasonably find in fa-
vor of the non-moving party. It is strongmedicine, and one that the courts initially
were wary of utilizing. Summary judgment motions are one of a few different
procedures a court can utilize for ending a party’s case during the pretrial stage
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of litigation.3 Summary judgment motions, however, are the most controversial of
these procedural devices.
The summary judgment motion is not an ancient construct. Rather, its origin
began in the 19th Century. In the 1855 Keating’s Act, the English Parliament cre-
ated a summarymotion thatwould enable a common law court to issue a judgment
based on the summary record (and thus, before trial). Essentially, these summary
devices “provided a creditor’s remedy for collecting liquidated debts arising from
bills of exchange or promissory notes” (Langbein, 2012, 566). Parliament passed
the law in response to merchants in England who were upset with the delay expe-
rienced in recovering debts through the common law courts (Bauman 1956). This
summary motion “entitled a party complaining of a debt to judgment in his fa-
vor unless the defending party filed an affidavit disputing the factual basis of the
claim” (Wood, 2011, 234). Eventually, the use of this summary motion expanded
in England and caught the eyes of two individuals who would go on to shape the
American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Edson Sunderland and Charles Clark.
Charles Clark, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee tasked with promul-
gating a draft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, had considered summary
3The other twomethods for dismissal of a case aremotions to dismiss (pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6))
and motions for judgment on the pleadings (pursuant to Rule 12(c)). A motion to dismiss has its
roots in the common law and askswhether the Complaint filed by the initiating party to the lawsuit
has stated a cognizable claim for relief. Under the notice pleading standards, these were typically
disfavored motions, though with the recent cases of Twombly and Iqbal the United States Supreme
Court hasmade it easier to grant suchmotions (see Footnote 1, supra). Motions for judgments on the
pleadings are far less common than the summary judgment motion or motion to dismiss. Motions
for judgment on the pleadings permit a party to file for judgment based on the initiating Complaint
and Answer (by the Defendant(s)). If either a motion to dismiss, or a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, contains material outside the strict pleadings consisting of the Complaint and Answer,
then the motion is automatically converted to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule
12(d). I confine my discussion in this section to motions for summary judgment as they are the
typical pretrial dispositivemotion filed and because of the rule requiring the other two less-utilized
motions to convert to a summary judgmentmotion in the event evidentiarymaterials are presented
to the court.
75
judgment in his scholarly work. Clark found the procedure useful, proclaiming
“the whole judicial process is, by this procedure, made to function more quickly
andwith less complexity than in the ordinary longdrawnout suit” (Clark&Samenow,
1929, 423). While Clark wanted to incorporate the summary judgment procedure
into the new Federal Rules, it was Sunderland who actually drafted the original
rule (Burbank, 2004, 595; see Millar 1952 (discussing the historical account behind
the creation of the summary judgment procedure)).4 Sunderland, also a professor
at the University of Michigan Law School, had drafted the State of Michigan’s pro-
cedural rule for expanded summary judgment (Burbank, 2004, 597-598) and had
come to believe the summary judgment motion, in congruence with a more open
discovery process, would diminish the waste of judicial resources and unneces-
sary delay associated with civil litigation. For Sunderland, summary judgment
was a simple procedural mechanism that, in the English experience, constituted
“nothing but a process for the prompt collection of debts” (Sunderland, 1925, 111).
For Clark, the new procedure would only address sham defenses (Haramati, 2010,
199). In other words, the procedure would amount to an expeditious result for un-
worthy cases filed in federal court. However, the lead authors were clear that the
rule should apply to both plaintiffs and defendants equally (See Haramati, 2010,
210-211), a difference from the English common law predecessor. Another differ-
ence (one ultimately adopted by the Committee) applied the new summary judg-
ment motion to all cases (not just claims for liquidated debts, as in the common
law).
4See also Hoffer, 1993, 435 (Contending that Clark gave Sunderland the summary judgment as-
signment to appease Sunderland given Clark had maneuvered to be appointed Reporter for the
new Federal Rules project. According to Hoffer, “Sunderland asked to prepare the rules for sum-
mary judgment, and Clark sweetened the pot with that concession—and $125 per week or $500 per
month—to Sunderland. Thereafter, Sunderland supported Clark consistently.”).
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There was, however, some concern expressed for the new procedural device.
The Advisory Committee, chaired by William D. Mitchell (former U.S. Attorney
General under the Herbert Hoover administration), expressed concern about the
potential for violation of individuals’ rights to a jury trial pursuant to the Seventh
Amendment (Haramati, 2010, 197). Another member worried that the rule would
devolve into a trial by affidavit, as opposed to a trial by jury (Burbank, 2004, 602).
As Haramati notes, “what is surprising about the Advisory Committee’s reaction
is their strong focus on the jury trial in summary judgment...[t]hey were interested
in preserving entrenched rights from the encroachments of new summary judg-
ment innovations” (Haramati, 2010, 198). In other words, even before Rule 56 and
summary judgment became a topic of conversation after the Supreme Court liber-
alized its usage, the drafters of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
concerned about the prospects that this new device could favor “efficiency” over
constitutional rights. Their concerns were prescient.
Ultimately, Clark and Sunderland were able to assuage the concerns of the rest
of the Advisory Committee enough to forge passage of the new Rules of Federal
Procedure, including the newly minted summary judgment rule. Though ostensi-
bly the summary judgment rule aimed to eliminate judicial waste, concerns were
raised relatively early that the new rule would, with a lack of genuine standards,
serve to exacerbate the problems already experienced in the federal district courts.
Bauman expressed that “[f]ailure to articulate intelligible standards in jurisdic-
tions where a completely unlimited summary judgment procedure is permissible
results in wasted judicial effort and added delay to litigants in settling disputes”
(Bauman, 1956, 354). As Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals explained, “The lack of intelligible standards in Rule 56 not only created the
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potential for delay in resolving motions under the rule; it also created the poten-
tial for misapplication of the rule...judges inevitably had more discretion to dis-
miss a lawsuit and...the dreaded and unconstitutional ‘trial by affidavit’ was a real
danger” (Wood, 2011, 236). In other words, given discovery rules, movement to-
ward the managerial judge, and the explicit injection of the judge into the pre-
trial factfinding portion of litigation with summary judgment, the elements were
present for Clark’s simple procedural device to morph into something else. That
moment would have to wait, however, for a time.
As Wood (2011, 237-238) notes, “For the first forty years after the adoption of
the Federal Rules, the potential problems posed by judicial discretion did not ma-
terialize.” In general, courts were reluctant to impose a standard that would make
the usage of summary judgment easy and replace the function of the jury with a
battle of affidavits and other discovery material. An early, and famous, example of
this perspective occurred in the 1946 Second Circuit Court of Appeals case of Arn-
stein v. Porter. In Arnstein, Judge Jerome Frank authored an opinion maintaining
that the usage of summary judgment should not be made easy. Frank’s opinion
held that the “slightest doubt as to the facts” should preclude granting summary
judgment (Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469-470 (citations omitted)). For Judge Frank, the
very real concern expressed by the skeptics on the Advisory Committee rung true:
summary judgment should not, in the hopes of expediency, trample on the rights
of individuals to have their proverbial day in court. Though clearly ruling in fa-
vor of a restrained view of summary judgment, the Second Circuit was divided in
the case. Vigorously fighting the majority’s position was none other than Charles
Clark (by then a federal appellate judge). Clark repeated his arguments, made
years earlier at the Advisory Committee’s meetings, that summary judgment was
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a necessary component of eliminating litigation waste and a necessarymechanism
now that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure utilized a notice pleading standard
(Arnstein at 479). As Clark pointedly contended, “The second premise—dislike of
the summary-judgment rule—I find difficult to appraise or understand...summary
judgment [is] an integral and useful part of the procedural system envisaged by
the rules...the demand is not for limitation, but for at least a small extension, of the
rule” (Arnstein at 479).
Notwithstanding Clark’s contentions, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cided otherwise. For themajority inArnstein the risk of inappropriately dismissing
a party’s claim outweighed the perceived expeditious benefits for the summary
judgment motion. The Arnstein perspective that summary judgment was a disfa-
vored motion was the general perspective of the federal bench. That view seemed
to receive reinforcement in 1962 from the United States Supreme Court in Poller
v. CBS, Inc. In Poller, the Court confronted a claim for conspiracy to engage in
antitrust behavior in violation of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff alleged that CBS
attempted to monopolize trade by canceling CBS’ affiliation with a UHF television
station. In order to prove the violation, intent to engage in the conspiracy had to be
shown. The lower courts granted summary judgment to CBS, but theUnited States
Supreme Court reversed. The Court, per Justice Tom C. Clark, wrote “summary
procedures should be used sparingly in complex anti-trust litigation where mo-
tive and intent play leading roles...trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury
which so long has been the hallmark of even handed justice” (Poller at 473 (internal
quotemarks and footnote omitted)). The Court in Poller agreed in essence with the
sentiment espoused in Arnstein—summary judgment would not be a mechanism
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for holding a paper trial. As Miller (2003, 1023) notes, Poller “had a dampening
effect on summary judgment in the federal courts.”
Eight years later in 1970, the Supreme Court again addressed the role that sum-
mary judgment would play, this time in a federal civil rights case. I will spell out
the facts of the case briefly, as I believe the case indicates the type of factual infer-
ences that were important to the Court prior to their years-later revolution in sum-
mary judgment. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., a white school teacher from New
York, who was working for the summer in Hattiesburg, Mississippi at a “Free-
dom School,” went to lunch with some of her African-American students. The
restaurant refused to serve lunch to the teacher and upon her leaving the restau-
rant shewas arrested by a local police officer on a charge of “vagrancy.” The teacher
brought suit for a violation of her constitutional rights, alleging that the restaurant
had acted in concert with the local police. The conspiracy claim here was impor-
tant, as her suit was against the restaurant and thus “state action” had to be proven
in order for there to be a colorable claim that her federal constitutional rights were
violated. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and both parties
(the teacher, and the restaurant) submitted affidavits concerning the circumstances
of the case. Noticeably absent, however, was an affidavit from the waitress in the
casewho had been the actual person to refuse the teacher service. Accordingly, the
evidence that was submitted indicated a police officer entered the restaurant be-
fore the school teacher was asked to leave, and that the same officer then arrested
the teacher after she exited the restaurant.
The SupremeCourt inAdickes ultimately found in favor of the teacher, and in so
doing addressed the requisite burden of proof that a moving party would need to
meet in order to successfully obtain a motion for summary judgment. The restau-
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rant contended that the teacher did not submit any proof during the summary
judgment phase that there was, in fact, a conspiracy between the restaurant and
the police. The Court indicated, however, that it was not the restaurant’s duty to
dispute and negate the teacher’s allegations, but the restaurant did have to demon-
strate therewere no factual questions that should be sorted out by a jury. TheCourt
found the restaurant had failed to show there were no factual issues, since an infer-
ence could be drawn either way, particularly because no party had submitted any
evidence from the waitress, the person who actually denied the teacher restaurant
service. In other words, the burden was on the moving party for summary judg-
ment to explain why there were no factual issues for a jury to resolve. Again, then,
we see that despite the existence of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permitting
the use of summary judgment, this mechanism was not a particularly favored de-
vice. This position would not change until sixteen years later in a dramatic turn
by the Court known as the Summary Judgment Trilogy.
By 1986 the federal courts were receiving record numbers of civil case filings.
This litigation explosion, coupledwith the increased call formoremanagerial judg-
ing, led the Supreme Court to dramatically alter the summary judgment land-
scape. In the three cases ((1)Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.;
(2) Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.; and (3) Celotex Corp. v. Catrett), the Supreme
Court reduced the burden on parties who move for summary judgment and in
essence shifted the burdens onto the non-mover to demonstrate the legitimacy of
their claims to a jury trial.
InMatsushita, the Court was confronted with another claim of antitrust behav-
ior. The plaintiffs (American televisionmanufacturers) alleged that the defendants
(Japanese televisionmanufacturers) had engaged in predatory pricing. The defen-
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dants hadmoved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that summary
judgment was appropriate in the case. The Court believed that “if the factual con-
text renders [the American television manufacturers’] claim implausible—if the
claim is one that simplymakes no economic sense—the [American televisionman-
ufacturers] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their
claim than would otherwise be necessary” (Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587). As one
commentator has noted, “Despite the testimony of five expert witnesses, the plain-
tiffs failed to persuade the Court that their theory was rational enough to survive
pretrial disposition” (Miller, 2003, 1030). What makes Matsushita stand out, then,
are a fewdifferent factors. First, theCourt very clearly hadmoved fromdisfavoring
summary judgment to accepting it, even in complex cases such as antitrust allega-
tions, something it was not prepared to do in Poller. Additionally, the Court openly
embraced economic theory as explaining rationality under the law. This point is
particularly instructive as we will see below. Finally, the Court determined inMat-
sushita that a nonmovant (the party who does not move for summary judgment)
“could not survive a summary judgment motion simply by advancing facts that,
standing alone, support the inferences needed for a finding in its favor. Instead, the
inferences to be drawn must be reasonable in light of the entire record, not simply
that portion of it favorable to the nonmoving party” (Miller, 2003, 1032).
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Court addressed a libel action against a pub-
lisher. The plaintiff organization (a self-described “citizens lobby”5 alleged that
the magazine had depicted it as “neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist” (An-
derson, 477 U.S. at 245). The Supreme Court held that the lower court of appeals
5Or, “the most influential right-wing extremist propaganda organization in the United States,”
according to the Anti-Defamation League (see http://archive.adl.org/holocaust/carto.html#
.VXZcA0YsPzs).
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had applied an incorrect standard for summary judgment, and thus vacated that
court’s decision and remanded for consideration of the Supreme Court’s articula-
tion of the appropriate standard. TheAndersonCourt held that the party opposing
summary judgment must put forth a sufficient evidentiary basis to defeat the mo-
tion. Importantly, the Anderson decision had a few components that would serve
to affect future lower courts’ interpretations of Rule 56. First, the Court was clear
that a nonmovant must “present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a prop-
erly supported motion for summary judgment...even where the evidence is likely
to be within the possession of the defendant” (Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257). Addi-
tionally, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge “must view
the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden,”
such that the judge must ask “whether a jury could reasonably find either that the
plaintiff proved his case...or that he did not” (Anderson, 477 U.S. 254 (emphasis in
original)). The Anderson decision unquestionably sanctioned the judge to serve as
a jury in a paper trial. Contrary to themajority’s contention that its decision “by no
means authorizes trial on affidavits,” the requirement that a judge consider what a
“reasonable jury”would do necessarily requires the judge to begin to act and think
like a jury, something that is done at trial. With nothing but a paper record before
the judge, the Court’s decision certainly risked (if not invited) lower court judges to
engage in aweighing of evidence and inferential contentions. Indeed, Justice Bren-
nan in his dissent explicitly castigated the majority for this very concern: “[T]he
Court’s opinion is also full of language which could surely be understood as an in-
vitation—if not an instruction—to trial courts to assess and weigh evidence much
as a juror would” (Anderson, 477 U.S. at 266). Justice Brennan further explained, in
what would appear to be a rather prescient passage, his concerns with how sum-
mary judgment would come to function in the lower federal courts:
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If in fact, this is what the Court would, under today’s decision, require
of district courts, then I am fearful that this new rule—for this surely
would be a brand newprocedure—will transformwhat ismeant to pro-
vide an expedited “summary” procedure into a full-blown paper trial
on the merits. It is hard for me to imagine that a responsible counsel,
aware that the judge will be assessing the “quantum” of the evidence
he is presenting, will risk either moving for or responding to a sum-
mary judgment motion without coming forth with all of the evidence
he can muster in support of his client’s case. Moreover, if the judge on
motion for summary judgment really is to weigh the evidence, then in
my view grave concerns are raised concerning the constitutional right
of civil litigants to a jury trial.
Justice Brennan’s concerns, however, were in theminority, and theCourtmoved
forward with this round of adjustments to the summary judgment standard. The
final alteration would come in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.
The Court decided theCelotex decision the same day asAnderson. InCelotex, the
plaintiff had sued a company over the death of her husband who had allegedly
been exposed to asbestos. The defendants, manufacturers of the asbestos prod-
ucts, filed summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims. One of the issues in contention
was whether the plaintiff’s husband had been exposed to the toxic materials. The
plaintiff provided documents that indicated her husband had been exposed, but
could not identify witnesses to testify that they saw her husband exposed to the
asbestos. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the asbestos manu-
facturers motion for summary judgment was defective because it did not provide
substantive evidence that supported its arguments. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a party who moves for summary judgment does not have to provide
evidence supporting its contention that the nonmovant has failed to raise a gen-
uine issue ofmaterial fact at trial. As the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, noted, “[W]e
find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support
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its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim”
(Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Note that this is a change from theAdickes decision where
the moving party had the burden of production to bring forth evidence suggest-
ing there was no basis for moving the case to trial. In Celotex, however, the Court
changed positions and strictly imposed that burden on the non-moving party. The
Court in Celotex stated that the “burden on the moving party may be discharged
by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case” (Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
Celotex also stood for the proposition that summary judgment would no longer
be viewed as a “disfavored” procedural device. Indeed, the Court went to lengths
to explicitly state that it would support a more aggressive usage of the litigation
mechanism: “Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfa-
vored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action.” (Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328 (internal quote marks omitted) (emphasis
added)). The Court appeared to support defendants as well, giving a wink and
nod to the fact that most parties who utilize the procedure are defendants, when
it stated that Rule 56 should not only be viewed through the lens of individuals
pressing claims, “but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and de-
fenses” (Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327). Celotex, it is clear, stands for the proposition that
federal courts should not be dissuaded from intervening early in cases and clearing
their dockets with summary judgment.
Combined, the Trilogy embraced the usage of summary judgment in ways the
Court never had done before. And, it is safe to say the Court felt strongly about this
change, as it took no less than three occasions in a single term to address a matter
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of procedural litigation rules; hardly a salient issue. Professor Arthur R. Miller, an
author of the leading treatise on federal procedure, summed up the meaning of
the cases well in his seminal article discussing the failings of summary judgment
(2003, 1041):
On apractical level, the three decisions collectively forge a new, stronger
role for the motion. Matsushita requires that the moving party’s evi-
dence be sufficient to render the plaintiff’s claim implausible. Anderson
allows the trial court to enter judgment if the evidence produced by
the plaintiff is not sufficient, under the applicable standard of proof, to
convince the judge that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in his
favor. And Celotex has made it easier to shift the burden of adducing
support for the nonmovant’s legal position on a Rule 56 motion and ef-
fectively obliges the plaintiff to come forward, on the defendant’s mo-
tion, with her case before trial. Stated differently, Celotex has made it
easier to make the motion, andAnderson andMatsushita have increased
the chances that it will be granted.
It is clear that the Trilogy opened the door tomore usage of summary judgment.
But importantly, by relaxing Rule 56 the Court strongly incentivized certain types
of behavior by litigants. And it is here where the narrative begins to take shape:
the alteration to the standards used in summary judgment have combined with
the open (and costly) discovery procedures, as well as the managerial role of the
modern federal judge, to create the conditions to begin dismissing cases quickly,
but not necessarily inexpensively. As Judge Diane Wood has noted, post-Trilogy
the “stakes soared for litigants, who learned quickly that they had to redouble
their investment in discovery so that they could present enough material to avert
an untimely demise of their cases” (Wood, 2011, 240). Judge Wood notes that “as
it became ever more urgent to amass, and then use, more supporting materials
either to oppose or support summary judgment, both costs and delays kept grow-
ing” (Wood, 2011, 241). And, as we would expect, the lawyers litigating in federal
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courts have picked up on the Supreme Court’s cues. As D. BrockHornby (a former
professor of law and now federal district court judge) noted in a recent article, the
American Bar Association’s Section on Litigation conducted a survey of its mem-
bers and found that “50% of plaintiffs’ lawyers, 47% of defense lawyers, and 44%
of mixed practice lawyers believe discovery is usedmore to develop evidence for sum-
mary judgment than it is to understand the other party’s claims and defenses for
trial” (Hornby, 2010, 274 (internal quote marks omitted) (emphasis in original); see
also ABA Section of Litigation Member Survey on Civil Practice (2009) for the full
report).6 This connection to discovery is critical to understandingwhere to look for
the causal mechanisms behind the diminution of trials. Langbein (2012, 567-568)
is right to point out that “[t]here is an intimate connection between the discovery
revolution and summary judgment.” This link was possible in the past. As Ed-
son Sunderland (the drafter of Rule 56) once noted, “An effective general system
of discovery would greatly increase the effectiveness of the summary judgment”
(Sunderland, 1933, 74). In the modern litigation era, it is a necessity by virtue of the
Supreme Court’s Trilogy (see Yeazell, 2004, 952 (“Discovery and expert testimony
changed [the] calculation: they not only enabled substantial, continuing pretrial
investment but in many cases required it”)).
The connection between discovery, summary judgment, and the judge’s role in
case management is critical to understanding where to look when evaluating the
question ofwhy the number of trials is consistently decreasing in theUnited States.
Studies in the literature have heretofore engaged in a debate about whether sum-
6The trend away from trials, while slightly muted in state courts, is also clear, partic-
ularly as states embrace the usage of summary judgment. As one Texas attorney con-
fessed in an article on the matter, “We write motions for summary judgment today for
our corporate clients that we would have laughed at only a few years ago” (Curriden
2013). Found at http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20130622- number-of-civil-
jury-trials-declines-to-new-lows-in-texas.ece.
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mary judgment filing and grant rates have increased (see, e.g.,Cecil et al. 2007 (find-
ing summary judgment filing rates increased moderately pre-Trilogy, and grant
rates increased to 47% post-Trilogy); Cecil et al. 2007b (finding filing rates were
steady at around 17%; grant rates at around 60%, a slight movement upward);
Eisenberg & Lanvers 2008 (finding filing rates increased, but at a statistically in-
significant amount; finding grant rates for civil rights cases increased dramati-
cally); Berkowitz 1992 (finding grant rates increased in two district courts post-
Trilogy); Burbank 2004 (arguing summary judgment filing rates have increased,
but still do not represent a large portion of non-trial litigation results); Hadfield
2004 (finding non-trial adjudications (which include summary judgment) have in-
creased over time), Eisenberg 2015 (finding civil rights claims face a tougher path to
trial than other types of claims). Chapter Three discussed these, and other, pieces
of the literature in detail. Suffice it to say, most scholarship has focused on trying to
demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s Trilogy impacted filing and/or grant rates
as a means for demonstrating reasons for the decrease in trials.
The scholarship on summary judgment has been laudable. Endeavoring to find
answers to the above questions is difficult, particularly for litigation data. The data,
unlike some subfields of political science, can be problematic. Litigation data is
even more so. The discordant and discombobulated system of maintaining liti-
gation records has led to very incremental, and tenuous, propositions for empir-
ical conclusions (see Farhang & Spencer, 2014, 251 (“[T]he work of the American
court system, and the maintenance of its records, are massively decentralized. Ac-
cordingly, the vast majority of scholarship on adjudicatory activity in America has
been based on the study of activity within particular states, cities, judicial districts,
and even legal services providers.”). These limitations are, in some circumstances,
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quite severe (see, e.g., Hadfield 2004 (discussing the problems with the Adminis-
trative Office for U.S. Courts coding system)). Nonetheless, we must properly test
our hypotheses that best conform to theory. And it is here where I suggest we can
do more. Namely, the question of whether summary judgment filing rates have
increased post-Trilogy is not the precise question we should be asking. Rather, the
question should be: has the Trilogy worked to reduce civil trials.
I want to be clear that determining whether summary judgment filing and/or
grant rates have increased is a part of answering the central theoretical question
above. If filing rates have increased (which they appear they have) and if grant
rates have increased (which they appear they have), then those findings are evi-
dence that lower federal courts have been receptive to the Supreme Court’s invita-
tion to treat summary judgment motions not as a “disfavored” procedural device,
but rather as a useful tool to evacuate claims from the federal system. However,
the debate thus far has been have the filing/grant rates increased, decreased, etc.
This debate, while important, does not strike at the central theoretical concern. The
reason this argument fails is because whether the filing/grant rates have increased
misses the ultimate effect the summary judgment Trilogy has had on litigation, in
conjunctionwith other facets to federal procedure. In other words, if the summary
judgment Trilogy has had a negative effect on federal civil trials, that effect would
logically extend to all phases of the litigation. For instance, if a plaintiff knows
they will now have a harder time making it past summary judgment, they might
bemore apt to settle. Given the costs associatedwith a summary judgmentmotion
(particularly in light of the discussion above regarding discovery), then that plain-
tiff may very well settle early without enduring the increased costs of litigation. If
such a settlement occurs, the defendant will not even have made a summary judg-
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ment motion. According to the past studies, because the defendant did not file a
motion for summary judgment, it would not factor into the summary judgment
rate, and thus, would not appear that the Trilogy had an effect. But, it is clear that
under such a set of circumstances, the plaintiff would very clearly have factored
that determination into their calculation of risk and cost, and thus, the Trilogy,
while not directly observed in a motion for summary judgment, would, in fact,
have had an impact on that case not going to trial. In other words, just because
one cannot “see” the Trilogy at work with a summary judgment motion does not
mean it has not had an “effect” on that case.
Law and economics literature supports this reasoning and suggests we need
to expand our view of measuring the Trilogy’s “effect.” The law and economics
academy has long considered the role cost and information have on rational par-
ties in the litigation process (see, e.g., Landes 1971; Gould 1973; Posner 1973; Shavell
1982; Priest & Klein 1984; Cooter & Rubinfeld 1989; Polinsky & Shavell 1998). Re-
viewing the principles of this literature demonstrates that in order to evaluate the
effects of the Trilogy, we cannot theoretically confine our analysis to the summary
judgment filing/grant rates. As I will discuss in the next chapter, we can aggregate
our data and look for distinctive regimes of behavior that, if consistent withmy hy-
pothesis that the Trilogy has had an effect on civil trial rates, will reflect change on
or nearly after the date of these Supreme Court decisions. A review of the basic
economic analysis regarding litigation now, however, will demonstrate we need to
expand our considerations beyond past litigation studies.
The formal models for whether a litigant chooses to settle their case or go to
trial have been formulated in various ways. I utilize the most basic of these to
demonstrate the effect of summary judgment on litigation. At its core, the litigation
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model presumes that if the expected value of a plaintiff’s case in proceeding to trial
is positive, minus their costs, the individual will litigate.7 Moving a step further,
borrowing Posner’s notation (1973), a trial will occur over settlement when:
PpJ−Cp+Sp︸ ︷︷ ︸> (1−Pd)J+Cd−Sd︸ ︷︷ ︸
A B
Here, Pp is plaintiff’s subjective probability of prevailing, Pd is the defendant’s
subjective probability of prevailing8, Cp the plaintiff’s litigation costs, Cd the de-
fendant’s litigation costs, and J the stakes of the case. Thus, in the above equation,
the plaintiff’s minimum settlement offer exceeds the defendant’s maximum offer,
so no settlement occurs (and thus the case results in litigation/trial).
We can now consider the impact of the summary judgment Trilogy on the lit-
igation equation above. It is clear if summary judgment became an easier tool
to utilize after the Supreme Court’s decision in Celotex, Matsushita, and Anderson
(which it did), then the value of Pp will diminish (and, concordantly, the defen-
dant’s probability of prevailing Pd will increase). Additionally, a plaintiff’s maxi-
mum settlement offer includes their litigation costs,Cp. As I detailed earlier in the
chapter, the move toward greater discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, coupled with the summary judgment process, has greatly increased the
7Farhang frames the calculation in the following manner: EV = EB(p)−EC, where EV is the
plaintiff’s expected monetary value, EB is the expected monetary benefit if the plaintiff prevails, p
is the probability the plaintiff will win if they go to trial, and EC are the expected costs of litigating
the claim (Farhang, 2008, 822).
8Priest & Klein (1984, 11) construct the samemodel, though express the probability of the plain-
tiff winning to simply Pd , and not (1−Pd). This change is simply notational, as Priest & Klein and
Posner (1973) both define this value as the defendant’s estimate of their probability of winning. I
adopt Posner’s notation, but point out this notational difference for clarity’s sake.
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costs associated with a plaintiff’s claim. As a result, pretrial litigation costs have
increased, thereby increasing the value ofCp. Even assuming the defendant’s costs
have remained steady (a heroic assumption), the formula dictates that the inequal-
ity cannot hold, causing a further reduction in the likelihood of a trial. With these
prospects in mind, the only way the left side of the inequality can be greater than
the right (i.e., A > B) is if the settlement costs, Sp, were to outpace the plaintiff’s
litigation costs, Cp. As a practical matter, this will not generally occur, as the costs
of discovery associated with litigation will greatly outweigh the costs associated
with settlement (which could include, for instance, a paidmediation session, or the
costs of attending a settlement conference for a day, etc.). What we see, then, is that
with the post-Trilogy summary judgment regime, there should be a diminution in
cases that go to trial.
There is more, however. Issacharoff and Loewenstein (1990), in an excellent ar-
ticle, utilize game theoretic methods to demonstrate that the summary judgment
Trilogy has drastic consequences for the litigationmodel. In particular, the authors
find that the Trilogy alters litigation incentives in such a manner as to potentially
render certain types of settlement more difficult. Additionally, because of the en-
hanced opportunity for summary judgment, there is a fundamental change to the
balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants which disproportionately im-
pacts plaintiffs. The authors construct a simple game involving a onemillion dollar
claim in which the plaintiff has an 80% chance of winning and the parties agree on
that success rate. Additionally, the plaintiff has litigation expenses of $75,000 and
defendant’s litigation costs are $50,000. Finally, the authors assume that settlement
prior to trial or the filing of a summary judgment motion is cost-free.9
9This assumption is probably not a fair assumption in reality, though it is not so far removed
as to render the model useless. Clearly, the costs of a defendant filing summary judgment are not
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Issacharoff and Loewenstein demonstrate that with summary judgment, the
litigation process separates into two distinct epochs of negotiation. In the no sum-
mary judgment universe, settlement follows the standard litigation model given
above. But, with summary judgment, the zone of agreement in which the parties
can reach settlement can actually shrink, which would run counter to the logic of
expanding summary judgment in the Trilogy (i.e., increasing settlement).10 The
authors note that without a more refined model, it is not clear what the aggregate
effectswill be on settlement versus trial, though they speculate that summary judg-
ment would “decrease the aggregate likelihood of going to trial” and “increase
expected legal expenses” (Issacharoff & Lowenstein, 1990, 102).
Additionally, as the authors note, “perhaps the most striking and unambigu-
ous impact of the trilogy is a transfer of wealth from plaintiffs to defendants” (Is-
sacharoff & Loewenstein, 1990, 103; see also Bronsteen, 2007, 547 (“Because sum-
mary judgment entices judges to end cases before trial and makes it harder for
zero, but neither are they extravagantly great, particularly given the Celotex Court’s requirement
that the moving party for summary judgment merely “show” that no dispute of material facts exist
to preclude granting the motion.
10Issacharoff and Loewenstein note that if a plaintiff defeats a motion for summary judgment,
they are less inclined to settle. In essence, aftermaking it through to the second stage of negotiation,
the plaintiff has a “pedal to the metal” mentality, seeking to recoup greater litigation costs (post-
summary judgment). Some scholars might find fault with this fact, given in traditional economic
considerations, a rational actor should ignore sunk costs when evaluating whether to continue
expending resources for, in this case, litigation gain. See, e.g., Dickson and Shepsle (2001, 301)
(“It is a central tenet of rational choice theory that individuals honor neither sunk costs nor sunk
benefits in deciding on future courses of action.”). Here, however, the authors posit that the costs
are potentially recoverable at trial. Moreover, this phenomenon makes sense when considering
the standard litigation inequality discussed above. As Posner (1973, 419) notes, taking the first
derivative of the left-side of the inequality with respect to J (the stakes of the case) yields (Pp+Pd−
1). Accordingly, if the parties’ collective subjective expectations of a plaintiff victory exceed one
(which is not a totally unreasonable belief after a plaintiff successfully makes it past the summary
judgment stage), (Pp+Pd − 1) will always be greater than zero and thus an increase in the stakes
of the case will always increase the likilihood of trial (i.e., non-settlement). Of course, outside of
the game theoretic universe, individuals may not be so rational, and even if there are sunk costs
involved, they will push forward, seeking to capture losses that will not be recouped (See, e.g.,
Murnighan 1992). Regardless, because these costs are recoverable in Issacharoff and Loewenstein’s
model, the issue is not present here.
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any plaintiff to extract an early settlement, it helps all defendants”). The authors
note that the greatest impact on the size of the wealth transfer is “the probability
that the defendant will prevail on summary judgment” (Issacharoff & Lowenstein,
1990, 104). In their example of the hypothetical case, Issacharoff and Loewenstein
find that the settlement zone would run between $710,000 to $760,000 if the de-
fendant’s probability of prevailing at summary judgment were a mere 5%. If the
defendant’s probability of prevailingwere 20%, the settlement rangewould extend
from $590,000 to $640,000 (1990, 104). The authors’modelmay, in fact, significantly
underestimate the stated effect, as Cecil and Cort (2007b) found in their study of
seventy-eight federal district courts in 2006 that grant rates were approximately
60% on the whole, and a staggering 73% in employment discrimination cases. In
other words, the summary judgment process serves to deflate a plaintiff’s claim
and devalue it significantly.
Taken as a whole, what we can learn from the law and economics literature
is that summary judgment serves to affect litigants’ rational decisions not just at
the point of the summary judgment motion, but also early in the civil case. And
it is here where past scholarly endeavors have missed the mark. In order to eval-
uate whether the Trilogy has served to diminish the number of trials we have to
incorporate an assessment of cases that terminate not only because of summary
judgment, but also are affected in such a way as to remove the case before the trial
begins. As Hadfield (2004) and Eisenberg and Lanvers (2009) demonstrate, most
cases are either settled or disposed of by pretrial adjudication (such as summary
judgment, or motions to dismiss). Past research has focused too extensively on the
filing/grant rate issue, and not on the larger, and in some sense easier, question
of whether there have been episodic changes to the trial rate. The question is, can
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we observe the seemingly unobservable? The answer is, yes. Instead of casting off
the aggregate data, contemporary time series analysis can sort through the data
thicket to ascertain if, in fact, we have seen trial rates diminish in conjunction with
the Summary Judgment Trilogy. Additionally, past research efforts have made no
substantive inquiry into the political determinants of summary judgment, which
is needed to evaluate the larger social implications of summary judgment. Having
established the theoretical motivation for this study, I detail in the next chapter my
research design and findings, with the aim of answering the question: Is there a
rush to justice?
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR CAUSES AND CONSQUENCES OF
DIMINISHING TRIALS
5.1 Introduction
The question ofwhether the SupremeCourt’s Summary Judgment Trilogy caused
substantive changes to the federal courts system requires a multi-faceted research
design. As discussed in Chapter 3, the collapse of trials in this country is pro-
found. However, as noted, previous research has only scraped the empirical sur-
face in answering this question. In order to empirically ascertain (1) whether we
see the Summary Judgment Trilogy reduced the number of trials, (2) the causes of
summary judgment usage in the federal courts system, and (3) the policy impact
of the reduction in trials, a multifaceted research design is necessary. To answer
each question, I employ three distinct research designs. First, I utilize macro-level
data with advanced time series techniques to evaluate the theoretical predictions
in Chapter 4 that the Trilogy worked to reduce the number of civil trials in the
United States. Second, I employ a micro-level data analysis to discover the deter-
minants of why a summary judgment motion is filed and why such a motion is
granted. Finally, I utilize policy-specific data to determine the policy impact of the
diminution of civil trials in the area of employment discrimination cases. Each re-
search design utilizes different data and statistical modeling techniques to provide
leverage in answering these distinct, but related, queries.
5.2 Macro-Level Analysis
InChapter 4, I posed the question ofwhether “we canwe observe the seemingly
unobservable?” The question is in reference to determining if the Trilogy actually
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worked to disincentivize the use of trials in civil litigation. My theory (expounded
in Chapter 4) and others’ formalized work (e.g., Issacharoff & Lowentstein 1990)
suggests the Trilogy certainly should have re-worked the incentive mechanisms of
litigation. One way to know whether these changes caused litigants and lawyers
to modify their utility calculations would simply be to ask them with survey re-
search. This research design, however, is fraught with difficulties. Aside from no
systematic data existing in this vein, there is also the added difficulty of actually
getting lawyers to answer questions about their strategic calculations given their
strict need to adhere to attorney-client privilege. In other words, knowing what
is “in the heads” of litigants and lawyers is a near-impenetrable boundary to ac-
tually understanding how the Trilogy works to affect the strategic calculations of
individuals in the throes of civil litigation.
It would seem this boundary represents a dead end for our inquiry, but it does
not. Indeed, I contend we arrive at an answer to the motivating question and see
the “unseen” through the usage of time series analysis on aggregated data. This
research design has the benefit of ascertaining national trends which can reveal if
individuals, in the aggregate, have altered their behavior consistent with our the-
oretical predictions over time. This methodological technique cannot be under-
stated. If our question is whether X (here, the Trilogy) caused a change in Y (civil
trials), then by definitionwe are asking if distinct types of behavior can be observed
before and after the Supreme Court’s intervention. Accordingly, in answering this
large question of litigant and lawyer behavior, application of time series analysis
is in fact the appropriate methodology. The innovation here is that past public law
research has entirely eschewed time series analysis on this question. The only em-
pirical studies on this question heretofore have been severely limited and flawed
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in answering the question of trends, and, have in no way employed any time se-
ries analysis. Accordingly, I utilize multiple time series techniques to answer the
question of whether the Trilogy worked to impact litigant behavior and find that
no matter which technique is employed, the answer is the same: the Trilogy re-
worked incentives as predicted to diminish the usage of trials in the United States.
Recall that I posed the question of whether X (the Trilogy) caused a change in
Y (civil trials). In time series analysis, this question is really asking if the interven-
tion of the Supreme Court’s modification to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure manifested the reduction in federal civil trials. Fortunately, there are
multiple statistical techniques in time series analysis to determine if an intervening
event impacted our phenomenon of interest (trials). All of these techniques (which
I discuss below) have the advantage of identifying if there are distinct “regimes”
or “epochs” of behavior. My theory predicts that we should see such changes in
behavior after the Court’s Trilogy. Notice too, however, that this research design
carries an added benefit: with such modeling strategies we are stating a priori our
expectation for behavior-switches (at some point in time, t). If the results do not
find these switches coordinate in time with our intervening event (here, the Tril-
ogy), then we cannot say there is evidence to support our hypothesis. On the other
hand, if we state in advance when we expect to see the switch in behavior, and our
models precisely identify those points in time as indeed the point atwhich a switch
occurs, then we have strong evidence for our theory.1
1A potential pitfall of this approach is if two or more events occur at the same time as potential
interventions. In that case, parsing the effect of one intervention from another can be difficult. The-
ory, of course, can drive an argument for why one intervention is preferred to another as the causal
explanation for observed behavior changes. Here, we have the theory of the Trilogy’s reworking
of litigation incentives in Chapter 4. Additionally, and more importantly from a statistical model-
ing perspective, there are no coordinate events at the same time, t, as the Trilogy that would have
had the re-working of litigation practices as the Trilogy. Furthermore, because these are aggregate
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In order to assess whether there are structrual breaks consistent with the Tril-
ogy, I employ a multifaceted approach which includes a variety of quantitative
endeavors, including Bai-Perron regression, Bayesian Changepoint analysis, and
Markov-switching models. Additionally, I employ differing model specifications
to guard against spurious results. The data are all national aggregate time series.
5.2.1 Bai-Perron Models
The first method I utilize is that of Bai-Perron regression (Bai and Perron 2003;
Bai and Perron 1998). The Bai-Perron method detects m structural breaks (and,
thus, m+ 1 regimes) by minimizing the residual sum of squares in a regression
context. Accordingly, the model is specfied such that:
yt = x′tβ + z
′
tδ j+ut , t = Tj−1+1, ...Tj
for j = 1,...,m+ 1. In the model, yt is the observed dependent variable at time
t; xt and zt are vectors of covariates and β and δ j are the corresponding vectors of
coefficients; ut is the disturbance at time t. Importantly, the effects of xt are not time-
varying, while the effects of zt do depend on the structral breaks. The indices for
the breakpoints are T1, ...,Tm and define when the changepoints occur. The timing
of the structural breaks are assumed unknown and are estimated.
The regression principle of least squares is used for estimation. For each par-
tition of the sample into T1, ...,Tm (meaning a split of the sample into the m+ 1
regimes), minimize:
data, doctrinal shifts in the federal courts in one area of the law or another would not be expected









[yt− x′tβ − z′tδi]2
The estimator will then select the optimal split of the sample into the estimated
breakpoints that minimizes the sum of squared residuals.
For the Bai-Perron regressions my dependent variable is the number of trials
per year. Independent variables include the number of cases filed per year accord-
ing to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, as well as the judicial ideology
of the U.S. Circuit Courts of appeals (measured as themean ideology of the federal
circuits per Giles-Hettinger-Peppers (GHP) scores (Giles et al. 2001)). I estimated
the models utilizing the R package strucchange for the years 1964-2009.
In Figure 5.1, we see the graphical results of the Bai-Perron regression. The
black line is the actual dependent variable. The green line is the Bai-Perron regres-
sion line. The Red line is theOLS estimation for comparison purposes. The vertical
dotted lines represent time points where the Bai-Perron model finds a structural
break. Clearly the Bai-Perron model does an excellent job of tracking the depen-
dent variable, much better than the OLS estimations. Additionally, the Bai-Perron
model finds three breakpoints. Most importantly for my hypothesis that the Tril-
ogy had an impact on trials, however, is the first breakpoint situated in the year
19892, a period of time near the implementation period by lower federal district
courts of the new summary judgment standards, and also clearly after the Trilogy.
Contrary to prevous scholars’ work suggesting summary judgment trends began
to rise before the Trilogy and thus discounting the change in procedural law, these
2The other breakpoints are associated with 1999 and 2005. There is no theoretical reason to
suspect these breaks are associated with the Trilogy per se.
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Figure 5.1: Bai-Perron Breakpoints
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results suggest the change happened after the Trilogy, and indeed, as a result of
the Trilogy.
Table 5.1: Bai-Perron Results
Variable Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4
Constant 5366 10650 8572 64030
(687.9) (5291) (7080) (13820)
Cases Filed .03 -.02 -.008 -.30
(.003) (.02) (.03) (.06)
Ideology -2927 14980 -31730 184100
(4059) (18760) (15170) (101500)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; N=46.; Adjusted R2=0.99
The Bai-Perron models also provide point estimates. In Table 5.1, I provide the
Bai-Perron regression results. Each variable is listed according to which segment
they fall into (up to m+ 1, or here, 4). Of note is the Cases Filed variable. As the
table demonstrates, the effect of the number of cases filed switches from positively
impacting the number of trials to negatively impacting trials. This result provides
some explanation for the conundrum: why don’t increased case filings meanmore
trials? The answer: increased cases negatively affect the number of trials, at the
limit. In other words, increased case filings will certainly increase the number of
trials, but up to a point. Eventually, the judicial pipes become too clogged, and as
a result, the stream of cases backflows out of the pipe. An escape valve is neces-
sary to reduce the pressure in the judicial pipes, and that mechanism is summary
judgment.
When dealing with time series, there is always the threat of spurious regres-
sions when variables contain a unit root (Granger & Newbold 1974). In order
to combat against this effect, especially given Bai-Perron regressions utilize least
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squares principles, I differenced the variables in order to ensure the serieswere sta-
tionary. In Figure 5.2 we see the breakpoint results from the differenced models.
Again, consistent with the breakpoints identified in Figure 5.1, we see a break-
point associated within the time period we would expect implementation of the
SupremeCourt’s Trilogy on summary judgment. In Figure 5.2, we see a breakpoint
in 1988.
The results from the Bai-Perron regressions certainly suggest that the Trilogy
did indeed have an effect on the number of trials. In both regressions, whether
accounting for stationarity concerns or not, the models indicate that something
happened just after the Supreme Court decided its summary judgment Trilogy.
These results suggest past efforts to account for the effect of summary judgment on
trials are misguided, and that the theory that shifts in litigation costs did provide
a substantive reworking of civil cases is correct.
In order to further test my hypothesis that the Trilogy substantively altered
litigation realities, I also performed two further tests for structural breaks utilizing
different methods. These efforts are robustness checks against the odd chance that
the Bai-Perron models happened to “get it right.”
5.2.2 Bayesian Changepoint Models
The second type of structural break models I ran are Bayesian changepoint
models. Bayesian statistics provide for updating of information, something that
Frequentist statistics cannot do. Moreover, concerns associated with the sample of
data can be mitigated by the large sampling that can be performed with Bayesian
statistics, including the usage of Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithms. Rather
than looking to pure point estimates from fixed probability densities, Bayesian es-
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Figure 5.2: Bai-Perron Breakpoints - Differenced Model
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timations can utilize probabilistic information to find themost likely sets of regime
classications for the changepoints.
Chib (1998) proposes a changepoint model that improves previous Bayesian
efforts by reparameterizing such models as a particular type of Markov mixture
model.3
In these models, there are constraints imposed on the transition probabilities
across the potential regimes in theMarkovprocess. Accordingly, Chib’s innovation
is to suggest there are latent states of existence (st) that govern the data generating
process. If st is the latent state of existence for each distinct regime, we can write




















p11 p12 0 · · · 0
0 p22 p23 · · · 0
... ... ... ... ...
· · · ... 0 pmm pm,m+1
0 0 · · · 0 1

3For fuller discussions of these models and sampling techniques, including for limited depen-
dent variables, see, e.g., Chib 1996; Park 2010; Frühwirth-Schnatter 2001, 2006; Brandt 2011, 2012.
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Here pi j=Pr(st = j|st−1= k). Accordingly, StP gives the evolution of the change-
point probabilities for yt .
The goal is to estimate the posterior density, including regression parameters
(Θ) such that:






Utilizing these models, it is possible to determine whether there are structural
breaks consistent with the implementation of the changes to summary judgment
law. Again, I utilize data for the years 1964-2009. Two models were run. Model 1
has as the dependent variable the number of trials by year, with independent vari-
ables again consisting of total cases filed and the circuit courts’ ideology. Model
2 adds to the list of independent variables a dummy variable for pre- and post-
Trilogy. Again, different specifications were utilized to test the consistency of the
estimations in finding changepoints. As a part of the sampling process, I utilized
10,000 burn-ins and 10,000 separate regressions to compute the posterior proba-
bility density. Estimations were performed in R utilizing the Gibbs sampler in the
MCMCPack package.4
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the changepoint results for Model 1 and Model 2,
respectively. The figures indicate the probability of a time point existing in a par-
ticular regime. For instance, at the very first time point (t = 0), we see that in both
models the probabilities of being in the first latent state (st) is 100%. The red line
at the bottom of the graph is at p = 0, and the black line at the top of the graph
is at p = 1.0. What we are looking for is movement in the lines where they begin
to converge. At the point of convergence, the lines will cross, and we will enter a
4Increasing the number of regressions beyond this level did not make a difference. I ran one
model with 1,000,000 regressions and obtained the same results.
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Figure 5.3: Changepoints: Model #1
new latent state of existence. The dashed line provides a reference point for when
the Supreme Court issued its Trilogy of summary judgment decisions. If my pro-
cedural hypothesis is correct, we should see an inflection point between the lines
(and thus, a cross-over into a new latent state) after the Supreme Court’s Trilogy,
but within a period of implementation by lower courts of the new legal standard.
In both models, we see precisely that. The point of convergence, and thus change-
point, occurs around 1990. This result is consistent with the Bai-Perron models.
Notice as well that in Model 1, and without the trilogy dummy variable to “assist”
the model in finding the changepoint, we see a sharp movement and acceleration
begin right as the Court decides the Trilogy. When we include a dummy variable
for the pre- and post-Trilogy world, that acceleration is even sharper.
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Figure 5.4: Changepoints: Model #2
In substantive terms, however, what can we say about the differences between
these two latent states of existence? The changepoint models will compute the
mean levels of the dependent variable (here, trials) for each latent state. I have
termed these two states a High Trials State, the state of existence prior to imple-
mentation of the Trilogy, and a Low Trials State, the latent state after Trilogy imple-
mentation. What is clear is that the average number of trials before the summary
judgment paradigm shift was much higher. In fact, the changepoint models in-
dicate that after implementation of the new summary judgment standards, the
number of trials decreased approximately 34%. Moreover, included within these
estimations is the 2007 year with the outlier spike in the number of trials, which
only serves to artificially dampen the decrease in total numbers. In all, the Bayesian
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changepoint estimations indicate results consistentwith the Bai-Perron regression,
namely, that the implementation of the Trilogy served to significantly diminish the
total number of trials in federal courts.
Table 5.2: Regime-specific Mean Levels
Regime Mean
High Trials State 9484
Low Trials State 6277
5.2.3 Markov-switching Models
As a final attempt at evaluating whether there was a structural break post-
Trilogy, I utilize Markov-switching models. Markov-switching models are similar




p11 p12 p1h−1 p1h
p21 p22 · · · p2h
... ... . . . ...
ph1 ph2 · · · phh

Aswe can see, the transitionmatrix is not confined to serialmovement, as in the
changepoint models. In other words, the probability of existing in one latent state
does not require a movement forward; reversion is possible. Stated differently,
latent states can move from Latent State 1 to Latent State 2, back to Latent State 1,
forward to Latent State 3, and so on. If there is concern that there could be reversion
of the latent states, Markov-switching models are preferable to the changepoint
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Figure 5.5: Markov-switching Model
models, which can only move forward through latent states of existence. For the
Markov-switching models, I again use the same data. I include a dummy variable
for pre- and post-Trilogy in these estimations.5 Estimations were performed in R
using the MSwM package.6
5Estimations performed without the dummy variable yielded similar results.
6These estimations employ a Frequentist approach, rather than Bayesian, utilizing an Expecta-
tion Maximization (EM) algorithm.
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Figure 5.5 details the Markov-switching model results. The graphs show the
probability of existing in either Regime 1 (the Low Trials State) and Regime 2 (the
High Trials State). We see in these estimations two switches. The first occurs when,
consistent with the procedural hypothesis, the Low Trials Statemoves into existence
in 1987; again, right after the issuance of the summary judgment Trilogy. That
state of existence persists until a switch occurs leading into the 2007 year of outlier
data. Clearly, that year with its massive increase in trials is causing the reversion
to the previous High Trials State. But, note the power of the Markov-switching
estimations in that, despite themassive increase in trials, we see a quick diminution
and movement toward the Low Trials State. Regardless of the impact of the outlier
year, there is no question that consistent with the previous estimations, we find
a structural break during the period of lower courts’ implementation of the new
summary judgment standards. In fact, in this model, the structural break occurs
at 1987.
Like the Bai-Perron regressions, we can obtain point estimates on the variables.
These results are contained in the table below. Again, we see that in the Low Trials
State, the number of cases filed actually has a statistically significant negative effect
on the number of trials.
In total, the structural break results are very consistent across estimations,model
specification, and methodology. All the models indicate a structural break consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the Summary Judgment Trilogy worked to reduce
the number of trials. The results further support the theoretical proposition that
motivated this empirical endeavor, namely, that cost adjustments to the litigation
calculus wrought from the Trilogy should manifest a decreasing number of trials.
Finally, the results suggest that the little empirical work that has heretofore been
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Table 5.3: Markov-switching Results
Variable Regime 1 Regime 2
Constant 32516 5493
(7542) (298)






Note: Standard errors in parentheses; N=46.
done is not correct when its authors contend that summary judgment did not have
an impact on the number of federal civil cases that go to trial. Simply put, the evi-
dence suggests national trends consistent with the Trilogy’s impact, an impact that
manifested in a large reduction of civil trials.
5.3 Micro-Level Analysis
Having identified that the Summary Judgment Trilogy has worked to reduce
the number of trials in the United States is an important empirical step in my anal-
ysis of effects of trial procedure on litigation incentive mechanisms. While the ag-
gregate time series analyses go far in supporting the theoretical expectations from
Chapter 4, there are limitations. Importantly, while we can see national trends at
work in the previous section, we do not yet know the precise factors that cause
litigants either to file summary judgment motions or the determinants of district
courts to grant such motions. Understanding that the hypothesized utility func-
tions have been altered, thereby evidencing that those alterations have caused na-
tional movement away from trials, certainly demonstrates the strong impact of the
Trilogy. But we need to understand with greater clarity just what the impact is
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of those trend changes. In other words, further investigation is required to un-
derstand the ramifications for a district court’s ability to set policy through the
usage of summary judgment. Are certain types of cases treated differently under
this procedural device? Are certain social policy aims affected by this procedural
mechanism? In order to answer those questions we need to delvemore deeply into
smaller units of analysis.
To determinewhich factors affect the usage of summary judgment, and the pol-
icy implications for such usage, I have constructed a research designwhich focuses
on individual cases, or a micro-level analysis. In general, this type of research de-
signwithin public law scholarship is incredibly difficult to perform. Some datasets
already exist that utilize the individual case as the unit of analysis and fromwhich
we can derive very general considerations of the factors that influence a case’s his-
tory. For instance, the Federal Court Cases Integrated Database Series (maintained by
the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)) holds
information on all cases filed in the federal district courts for all years going back
to 1970. The database is a rich resevoir of information on case trends. But there
are notable problems with the database. While providing information on all cases,
there are important pieces of information (and thus, variables) not included. The
database does not contain political variables, such as the ideology of the district
court judge presiding over the case. Judicial politics scholars have long demon-
strated the effect that ideology has on the decision-making processes of federal
judges (see, e.g., Pritchett 1948; Segal & Cover 1989; Giles, Hettinger & Peppers
2001; Martin & Quinn 2002; Segal & Spaeth 2002; Epstein et al. 2007). Not in-
cluding this variable in the dataset therefore leaves a clear gap in analyses that
utilize this dataset. Moreover, the “public” version of the dataset accessible af-
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ter obtaining “restricted access” to it does not include the judge’s name to whom
the case was assigned, thereby rendering after-the-fact imputation of ideological
scores impossible. Moreover, the coding employed by the dataset is problematic
facilitating significant “cleaning” issues to the data were it even to be utilized due
to changes in codes over time by the Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts (See,
e.g., Eisenberg 2015).
Another problemwith the database (and other available databases), is that they
fail to include even systematic procedural variables, such as the amount of time
that discovery was conducted in the observed case. This is true with the ICPSR
database, as well as other databases which use the data from the Administrative
Office for the U.S. Courts. If, as Chapter 4 proposes, there should be a relation-
ship between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery and the litigation
incentive mechanisms tied to the summary judgment rules, failing to account for
this fact in any model will subject such estimations to clear omitted variable bias.
Indeed, Cecil et al.’s 2007 study, which is one of the very few attempts to economet-
rically model the summary judgment phenomenon (referenced in Chapter 4), in-
cludes as independent variables (in the logistic regression) only the district where
the case was heard. This approach leads to another problem: random sampling.
The empirical studies heretofore on summary judgment rates have problem-
atically only evaluated data from certain districts. For instance, Cecil et al. (2007)
evaluate summary judgment practices in six district courts in six different years7
(through a review of the docket sheets). Eisenberg & Lanvers (2008) also limit
themselves to certain districts. The reasons for these strategies are quite obvious:
7Another problem with this particular study are the over-time conclusions rendered by the au-
thors; six years of data with gaps in the data cannot provide a foundation upon which to make
such time serial/trend statements.
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given there is no “national” case filing system8, compiling a randomly drawn sub-
set of cases is incredibly difficult and extremely time-consuming. But cordoning
off observations from the rest of the nation sacrifices a great deal of generalizabil-
ity. If we are interested in the national effects of the Trilogy, we ought to look to
the nation as the data population.
Faced with the prospects of either utilizing an incomplete dataset, or, to re-
perform a non-random study that pulls cases from only some districts, I have
opted for a different course. I have constructed a database of randomly drawn
cases filed between the years of 2000-2013 from the national population of federal
civil cases and coded them with legal, procedural, political, and where possible,
demographic data. The result is a dataset that is unlike any other presently avail-
able.
Before discussing the merits of the new dataset, I should point out what this
dataset will not provide. First, the data (and related estimations) in no way con-
tend anything about the summary judgment trends before and after the Trilogy.
The years covered are limited to an entire time period after the Trilogy. This re-
sult is not problematic because, as I contend in the macro-analysis section of this
chapter, we can derive what we need to know from the aggregated data and time
series analysis concerning the national trends in summary judgment practice (and,
importantly, test the theory from Chapter 4). That said, it is important to note that
the new dataset will not test structural breaks associated with the Trilogy: it is dis-
tinctly limited to ascertain what the post-Trilogy litigation environment looks like
to litigants.
8Each electronic case filing system is maintained by each federal district court in the federal
system, which is then transmitted for aggregation to the Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts.
Accordingly, one cannot easily pull a list of cases in numerical order, randomly draw a number,
and code the case. I discuss a workaround to this problem in a moment.
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Second, the dataset is appropriately limited in scope given the amount of time
it takes to “hand-code” each case. While Cecil et al. (2007) reviewed docket sheets,
my efforts went a step further in this regard. In addition to a review of the actual
docket sheets for each case, I also reviewed individual pleadings associated with
the case that permitted the accumulation of additional variables that could not
have been obtained (or, that would have been significantly limited) were I only
to look at the docket sheets. Much information about a case can be gleaned by
actually reviewing the litigant pleadings, the court’s rulings, and court orders from
a case. Of course, this process meant that for many observations the amount of
time to code a single case was quite high. As a result, the sample size N is smaller
than a machine-coded review of docket sheet text. However, as I will demonstrate
below, what is lost on sample size is made up for in variable depth.
In order to draw the random sample of cases, I utilized the Public Access to
Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. PACER is the electronic system that
permits viewing of case documents filed by lawyers and litigants in federal cases.9
PACER began in 1988, though with limited availability to the public. As technol-
ogy advanced, by the early 2000s, most district courts had adopted the PACER
filing system for use by litigants, and eventually moved to required usage.10
PACERprovides access to court records in a convenientmanner. Without PACER
past research of docket sheets and case filings would have required researchers to
9Lawyers will utilize the CM/ECF (short for Case Management/Electronic Case Files) system,
which then transfers the documents (in PDF) to the PACER party/case index server located in San
Antonio, Texas.
10Byway of example, in 2003 in the Southern District of Indiana, documents could be filed either
by CM/ECF or in hard copy format. If filed in hard copy format, the documents would be scanned
and transferred into the electronic case management system, and then kicked to the PACER system
for public records. It is now required that unless due to some excepted inability, case filings be
made through the CM/ECF system (see L.R. 5-2 (S.D. Ind.)). As a note, this requirement has been
adopted by districts throughout the federal courts system.
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first obtain a random sample of cases, then travel to where those documents were
located (often in storage facilities maintained by the federal government) and then
coding could only occur after retrieval of the actual hard copy case file from the
warehouse. A national random sample was financially and logistically impossi-
ble and would have required researchers to travel the country from warehouse to
warehouse for perhaps as little as a single case (not tomentionwhether the case file
could be found, and if so, whether it contained useful information to fill a coding
sheet). For years, this is why studies of this sort were simply impossible.11 PACER
provides an avenue for moving beyond these research design constraints.
While PACER provides a unique avenue for obtaining court records that were
in the past virtually impossible to review, it has limitations. First is cost. Each
“page view” in PACER costs 10 cents, with amaximumper document cost of $3.00.
A “page view” could consist of simply a printing of the case docket sheet, a sin-
gle page from a motion filed by an attorney, etc. As a result, there is a financial
limitation involved.12 Additionally, PACER does not list each case filed in the fed-
eral courts system in sequential order. For instance, the typical civil case has a
case number of this sort: 1:13-cv-XXXX, where “1” is the division within the ac-
tual district (most districts have multiple divisions or courthouses), “13” is year
(here, 2013), “cv” (which stands for civil case), and XXXX (which is some numer-
11To give some perspective on this difficulty, see Farhang & Spencer, 2014, 251, where he notes
“Our decision to limit the study to two districts, with records housed in a single storage facility,
was a simple function of resource limitations: the litigation files had to be reviewed onsite at the
NARA facility where they are maintained in storage. We acknowledge that we cannot make infer-
ences about the nation as a whole. Nevertheless, we highlight that virtually all studies of litigation
are similarly limited because the work of the American court system, and the maintenance of its
records, are massively decentralized. Accordingly, the vast majority of scholarship on adjudica-
tory activity in America has been based upon the study of activity within particular states, cities,
judicial districts, and even legal services providers.”)
12The cost issue was held at bay through usage of a generous Vision 2020 Dissertation Enhance-
ment Grant from the College of Liberal Arts, Texas A&M University.
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ical value as the case number). The problem is, when one searches PACER for
cases, were they to type in the above case identifier, they might have multiple such
cases returned. The reason: that identifier can be used in multiple districts. As a
result, you might have, for instance, a case returned from the Eastern District of
Texas, Southern District of Indiana, and Western Division of Pennsylvania simul-
taneously. And here is where a workaround is needed.
To navigate this research design difficulty I utilized PACER’s ability to find
cases by filing date. I generated a list of all dates between January 1, 2000 and De-
cember 31, 2013. From this list I assigned each date a randomly generated number
in STATA. From there, I tookmy now randomly sorted list and looked up all federal
civil cases filed on a given date. Once I had that information, I then used STATA
to randomly draw a number from the total number of cases filed on a date. For
instance, if there were 936 cases filed on December 5, 2008, I randomly drew a
number between 1 and 936. From there, I moved to that case number for the date
in question, performed a docket review, and reviewed related pleadings and court
orders as necessary to complete coding. This workaround provides a manner for
directly using PACER, with randomness in sampling built into the date and case
pull, to provide a national random sample of cases that could not have been per-
formed in the past.
Some cases drawn, for instance, were unusable. If those cases were unusable,
I re-ran that day’s random draw and pulled another case. Cases were unusable
for a variety of reasons. First, it was possible that the case had not yet concluded
(through any means, e.g., trial, settlement, summary judgment, etc.). If a case had
not concluded, it was not used. Additionally, some types of cases were automati-
cally excluded. For instance, student loan caseswere automatically discardedwere
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they drawn (these cases have notoriously high rates of default judgments and gov-
ernmental victories). Additionally, social security disability appeals13 were not
included as summary judgment is required for such cases (thus biasing any sum-
mary judgment findings). Moreover, some prisoner cases were automatically ex-
cluded. Often, prisoners who file civil complaints are required to go throughwhat
is known as a “pre-screening” process where a “screening attorney” at a district
court will determine whether the complaint is at all viable and can proceed to be-
ing actually docketed with the court. Such cases that were pre-screened out of the
civil dockets were not utilized.14 Additionally, habeas corpus cases were not used as
they are docketed as “civil cases,” but are actually reviews of criminal convictions
(and thus subject to different procedural considerations than typical civil cases).
Finally, I did not use cases which dealt with attorney bar admission or discipline.
These cases (usually styled as “In re [person’s name]” can be docketed on the civil
side, but are clearly not contested cases between parties and rather are simply court
pronouncements granting an attorney to practice before the court (or, in the more
unfortunate situations, disciplining the attorney for malfeasance).
In total the research design produced 384 usable cases. With each docket and
document review, I was able to obtain a plethora of variables previously uncoded
with a research design such as this one. The variables utilized in the subsequent
analyses will be detailed below. Two different types of analyses were performed:
an analysis of the determinants of summary judgment motions being filed (SJ
Filed), and the determinants of a summary judgment motion being granted (SJ
Granted). Each of these dependent variables were dichotomous (0 or 1). In the
13These cases are first reviewed by a federal Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and then can be
appealed to a local district court.
14Prisoner cases that did make it past the screening process, however, were used.
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first set of analyses, if a summary judgment motion were filed (by either party),
it was coded as a 1, 0 otherwise. For summary judgment grants, the variable was
coded as a 1 if a motion for summary judgment were granted (either in whole, or
in part), and a 0 otherwise. Before discussing the independent variables utilized,
I will detail the summary statistics, which themselves provide an interesting view
of summary judgment practices post-Trilogy.
5.3.1 Summary Judgment Filings and Grant Rates
The traditional empirical evaluation of summary judgment effects on litigation
strategies centers on the raw filing rate. Table 5.4 contains the filing rates for sum-
mary judgment motions in my dataset.
Table 5.4: SJ Filing Rates
SJ Filed? Percent
SJ Not Filed 69.27
SJ Filed 30.73
N=384
The percent of cases in which a motion for summary judgment was filed oc-
curred in approximately 31% of all cases, nearly a third. This number is much
higher than others, such as Cecil et al. (2007), report. In their study, those authors
report a filing rate of approximately 19%. My results suggest a filing rate approx-
imately 63% higher than initially thought. This is substantial increase, and what
Chapter 4’s theory would suggest. Simply put, the Trilogy has incentivized liti-
gants to file motions for summary judgment to devalue cases and attempt to kick
claims from the federal courts system.
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It is perhaps possible that the filing rates have so dramatically increased be-
cause plaintiffs (those initiating a lawsuit) are using these motions at an increased
rate, and have thus caught up to their defendant counterparts. But this result is
not the case.
In civil cases where a summary judgment motion was filed, defendants filed
such a motion in approximately 84% of the cases. In cases where a motion was
filed, plaintiffs only filed in less than 30% of the cases.15 The endgame is clear:
as Issacharoff & Lowenstein (1990) predicted, motions for summary judgment are
most certainly a defendant’s motion and weapon of choice in the litigation envi-
ronment.
The evidence thus far suggests thatmotions for summary judgment are utilized
at a much higher rate than previously thought. But what about their grant rates?
If the grant rates are low, then the increased usage of the motion can be mollified
and potential policy consequences of the procedural device muted. The statistics
for grant rates are found in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: SJ Grant Rates
SJ Granted Percent
SJ Not Granted 42.20
SJ Granted 57.80
N=109
The results are staggering in a sense, and certainly call into question previously-
held beliefs about summary judgment motions. Motions for summary judgment
15Note that these numbers can exceed 100% because it is possible that in a given case both the
plaintiff and the defendant filedmotions for summary judgment (known as cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment).
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are granted at approximately a 58% rate. For perspective, Cecil et al. (2007) report
that in 2000, the summary judgment grant rate was the highest in their study at
49%. Thus, not only have summary judgment motions become more prevalent
post-Trilogy, but they have also become more deadly to plaintiffs’ claims. Again,
with the relaxed standards for granting the motion encouraged by the Supreme
Court in the Trilogy, this result is expected (though even these rates reveal a level
beyond past empirical work).
One of the areas of law where past scholarship has suggested summary judg-
ment rates is particularly deadly are civil rights cases. I utilized a dummy variable
for whether the case was a civil rights case (either coded as such on the docket
sheet or after review of the case type determined it to be of this nature). As Cecil
et al. (2007) (and others) note, the federal courts dockets have become increasingly
comprised of civil rights claims. In my dataset, civil rights cases account for ap-
proximately 43% of all cases. These studies also suggest that summary judgment
grant rates are higher in civil rights cases; my data indicate this assertion to be
correct. Table 5.6 shows the grant rates for summary judgment in civil rights cases
where a motion for summary judgment was filed.
Table 5.6: SJ Grant Rates: Civil Rights Cases
SJ Granted Percent
SJ Not Granted 36.54
SJ Granted 63.46
N=52
In civil rights cases, the motion for summary judgment is granted in almost
two-thirds of all cases where a motion is filed. As with the overall filing rates, this
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number is quite large. In many of these civil rights cases (by type of civil rights
case), Congress has specifically created litigation incentive mechanisms for civil
rights claims to be litigated (see Farhang 2010). If, however, contrary to these ex-
pectations that claims be litigated, they are instead dismissed from court through
the usage of subterranean procedure, then it is distinctly possible social policy
aims by the federal legislative branch are hindered by the un-elected members of
the federal judiciary.16
The raw data thus far certainly suggest a plaintiff’s passage over the litigation
landscape is fraught with difficulty. In addition to the summary judgment mine-
field posed above, the data hold that trials (either jury or bench) only occurred in
just over 3% of the total 384 cases. This number is relatively consistent with the
1-2% rate identified by the Administrative Office for the United States Courts.17 In
short, my dataset suggests litigants do not go to trial, summary judgment motions
are frequently used, and those motions are granted at levels unseen in previous
research.
While the raw data certainly reveal interesting features to the present state of
federal court litigation, the real value of the dataset lies in the additional variables
previously unused in a dataset of this nature. It is important not only to under-
stand howmuch summary judgment is utilized, but also thewhat factors affect the
filing and granting of thesemotions. In order to obtain purchase on these inquiries
I performmultivariablemodeling of the determinants ofwhether a summary judg-
ment motion is filed and whether a summary judgment motion is granted.
16I discuss the potential policy consequences of this phenomenon in the next section on employ-
ment discrimination trials.
17My data indicate settlements occurred in 64.58% of cases; this number is slightly higher than
Hadfield’s (2004) number of 54.1% from a random sample of cases in the year 2000.
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5.3.2 Determinants of SJ Filings
The factors that influence whether a motion for summary judgment is filed are
both simultaneously obvious and non-obvious. The independent variables uti-
lized for the summary judgment filing models are discussed below.
Judicial Ideology.
Theory certainly suggests, for instance, that civil rights cases would see greater
filing rates than non-civil rights cases, for instance. Additionally, given previous
ideology studies on court decision-making, it is conceivable that “conservative”
judgeswould disfavor some types of claims (civil rights/liberties) than others, con-
sequently appearing to invite defendants to file motions for summary judgment in
these cases. Accordingly, I coded an ideology score for each judge for which such
a score was available. The ideology scores are based on Christina Boyd’s district
court ideology dataset (Boyd 2015).18
Discovery.
Unlike the traditional attitudinal explanation of ideology, there are perhaps
less-obvious bases for whether a motion for summary judgment might be filed.
For instance, whether relaxing the summary judgment standard or not, the Tril-
ogy’s interpretation of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is exactly
that: a legal interpretation of what it means for a claim to be in dispute. Recall that
Rule 56 specifically states that summary judgment should not be granted if there
are genuine issues of material facts in dispute. While the Trilogy certainly placed
a particular gloss on this rule, the fundamental precept behind even a “reinter-
preted” Rule 56 is clear: factual disputes should preclude summary judgment be-
18Boyd’s scores are themselves derived fromGHP Scores (Giles et al. 2001) and Judicial Common
Space scores (Epstein et al. 2007).
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ing granted. One way to obtain purchase on this matter is through ameasurement
of discovery.
As previously noted, the changes over time to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure have engaged the free flow of discovery of litigants’ claims and defenses
from one party to another. This discovery device, however, has become imbued
with elements of “papering a party to death.” In other words, if delay assists one
side, or if increasing the cost of litigation to one party creates leverage for another,
then we might expect to see increased discovery times. Moreover, as Chapter 4’s
theoretical discussion notes, it is clear that whatever resources were once devoted
to marshalling evidence for trial have been shifted earlier in a case’s lifetime and
compressed into the stages of discovery for the (what somemight call) “inevitable”
showdown at summary judgment (whether in posturing for settlement purposes,
or, in actual filing of the motions). As a result, I expect that as discovery increases
in a case, it is more likely that a summary judgment motion will be filed. This hy-
pothesis is, again, consistent with the discussion in the previous chapter that the
Trilogy’s reworking of the summary judgment standard has served to motivate
litigant resources to the front-side of a case. As a part of this dataset, therefore, I
have operationalized discovery as the total time discovery was open in a case by
days. A brief note on this coding scheme is worth mentioning.
How much time is spent in a given case on discovery can vary from case to
case, not only because of different rulings by different judges, but also because it is
difficult to conceptualize a start date for when the “discovery clock” begins to run.
Litigants are supposed to provide what are known as Initial Disclosures (which in-
clude basic information about witnesses and evidence that might have bearing on
claims in a particular case) automatically (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)). These initial
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disclosures are to occur within fourteen (14) days of the Rule 26(f) conference. But
what is supposed to occur, does not always actually occur. Often times, litigants
or lawyers will agree to proceed in a different manner, or, the strict interpretation
of Rule 26(a)(1) drops by the wayside due to other reasons. However, Rule 16(b)
does require a scheduling order to be issued by the judge (after consultation by the
parties) about the general trajectory of the case.19 This scheduling order will detail
how much discovery is needed, deadlines for discovery, deadlines for dispositive
motions (such as summary judgment motions), when expert witness report need
to be submitted, etc. It is here where we can obtain a “starting” time for our dis-
covery clock. The cases in the micro-level analysis dataset were checked for these
scheduling orders to ascertain when discovery was initiated (the clock began on
the date of the issuance of this scheduling order). Sometimes a quick perusal of
the case’s docket sheet would reveal this information as an entry by the judge;
sometimes a full read was required of the actual scheduling order. To determine
when the clock ended, I coded how much time had elapsed by the end of the dis-
covery period entered in the scheduling order, or, case termination (should some
dispositive event occur prior to the end of discovery; a settlement, for example),
or, an end-date provided by court order.20 Again, the time spent coding this value
for each case could be lengthy, but given theory suggests discovery and summary
judgment motions are intricately related to one another, it was obtained along the
operationalization discussed above.
19As a practical matter, local rules often times require parties to decide on whether they wish to
proceed on a “fast track” (if the case can be addressed quickly with little discovery and/or delay),
or another type of longer “track.”
20For instance, it is not uncommon for parties, as an example, to jointly agree to an extra thirty




Judicial decision-making onmotions in civil rights cases by federal district court
judges has been shown to be influenced by a judge’s gender and race (see, e.g.,
Christina Boyd’s recent work (2016)). Accordingly, I have included the judge’s race
and gender as dichotomous variables (for race: 1 for non-white, 0 for white; for
gender: 1 for female, 0 for male). Data for the judge demographic variables came
from a variety of web sources, including the newly releasedCourt Listener database
of judicial officers in the United States.21
Litigant Specific Variables.
In order to parse the effects of particular litigants, I include two dummy vari-
ables for whether the plaintiff in the case was an individual and whether a gov-
ernmental actor was a defendant. As noted in Chapter 4’s discussion of the impact
of summary judgment on litigant resources, it is expected that individuals (who
typically bear a steep cost compared to other deeper-pocketed entities) will face
an increased usage of summary judgments filed against them. Accordingly, I use
a dummy variable for whether an individual plaintiff (or, plaintiffs if there is more
than one plaintiff22) is involved in the case (1 for individual plaintiff; 0 otherwise).
Additionally, I include a dummy variable for whether the government is a de-
fendant in the case. Again, because resource-allocation is a concern with the sum-
mary judgment universe post-Trilogy, I attempt to parse the effects of when the
government (which typically has substantial litigation resources relative to other
21Accessible at https://www.courtlistener.com/api/bulk-info/#judge-data (Last visited
August 30, 2016).
22This does not include class actions where there are named plaintiffs litigating for the benefit of
many individual plaintiffs.
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parties) is involved. As with the individual plaintiff variable, I code a 1 for gov-
ernmental defendant, and a 0 for a non-governmental defendant.23
Attorney Firm Size
The final set of variables utilized are the size of the law firms that represent the
parties in a given case. As with the previous variables, there is a concern that a
model of whether a summary judgment motion is filed or not would not be ap-
propriate without some conceptualization of litigant “firepower,” to use a collo-
quial phrase. In short, the more lawyers working for a litigant, the more resources
those lawyers can devote to a particular case. Additionally, if summary judgment
practice has become a scenario in which litigants attempt to expend considerable
resources in the discovery stage, the more attorneys who can assist in that pro-
cess, the more likely discovery will be protracted and expensive. As noted ear-
lier, increased discovery should cause increased summary judgment motion fil-
ings. Relatedly, the larger the law firms serving the combatants to a case, the more
likely it will be that a summary judgment motion is presented to the district court.
This variable is treated as continuous ranging from 0 (meaning the litigant had no
23There are occasions in the dataset when I have coded an individually named defendant as a
governmental defendant due to the fact that the individual named is supported and defended by
the government or government-hired lawyers. The classic example of this event occuring is in civil
rights litigation against police officers (for instance, a claim for excessive force). In these cases, the
officer is typically represented by either a government attorney (for instance, a city’s corporation
counsel), a private attorney (contracted by the insurance companywho issued the insurance policy
to the state or local governmental entity to cover such claims), or a private attorney retained by
the police officer’s union (who acts in concert with the city attorney for liability purposes). Addi-
tionally, given the usage of insurance by many state and local entities for such claims and/or the
requirements that officers be indemnified for damages incurred for liability (either by state statute,
local ordinance, or collectively bargained agreement between the police union and local govern-
ment), I have coded such scenarios as a “government defendant.” I acknowledge that some might
take issue with this coding approach as the officer is “technically” (in my example) the named de-
fendant. However, given the theoretical concerns with relative distribution of litigation resources,
and the fact in the example the officer would not pay the damages (indeed, the city would, or,
the insurance company with a potential related hike in premiums later to the governmental entity
transferred through taxation to the taxpayers), I have operationalized this variable to reflect such
scenarios as involving governmental defendants.
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lawyer (i.e., was pro se)) to the total number of lawyers associated with the firm
involved in the case.24 Data for firmsize was obtained from websites associated
with the respective firms, or, in some cases other online sources (advertisements,
etc.). The determination of who was “lead counsel” was ascertained by either the
docket sheet (if lead attorney was clearly specified) or through a review of the case
pleadings to determine who drafted, composed, and filed the documents on be-
half of a litigant. It is worth noting that efforts were made to obtain firm sizes as
close temporally to the date of the case to reflect the resources of the law firm at the
time of case activity. It was often not possible, however, to obtain such numbers.
In those cases, the data were gathered from sources that were available at the time
of the actual data gathering. Ideally, the data would have been culled contempo-
raneously with the litigation itself. In many cases, however, it was not possible
to do so given the elapsed time between case conclusion and data gathering. The
operationalization of data contained here is the best attempt to include a variable
heretofore not included in previous datasets.25
Summary Statistics
Table 5.7 reports the summary statistics for the continuous independent vari-
ables and Table 5.8 reports the summary statistics for the dichotomous indepen-
dent variables.
24If there was more than one firm representing a party, the larger of the total number of lawyers
from a given firm was utilized. This situation can occur with multiple defendants, or, as is often
the case, a local attorney is considered the counsel of record while an attorney who is licensed
in another jurisidiction is granted pro hac vice status to practice on a limited basis for a particular
case in a given court. In the latter situation, the outside attorney with the larger law firm is clearly
handling the litigation, while the local counsel is there to satisfy the requirements of, perhaps, local
rules of temporary bar admission for co-counsel.
25The firm size variables were also transformed by taking the square root of each variable. The
transformations were appropriate to address extreme skew associated with the large outliers for
firm sizes. Thus, given the spread of the data and extreme outliers for these variables (see discussion
of summary statistics, infra), the data were transformed.
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Table 5.7: Summary Statistics: Continuous Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Ideology 334 .10 .37 -.59 .64
Pl. Firm Size 365 61.70 263.96 0 3800√
Pl.FirmSize 365 3.90 6.83 0 61.64
Def. Firm Size 285 217.02 453.19 0 3800√
De f .FirmSize 285 9.80 11.022 0 61.64
Discovery Length 378 164.72 208.13 0 1901
Table 5.8: Summary Statistics: Dichotomous Variables
Variable % “0” % “1”
Civil Rights Cas 57.03 42.97
(219) (165)
Judge Race 82.42 17.58
(300) (64)
Judge Gender 75.80 24.20
(285) (91)
Ind. Pl. 26.04 73.96
(100) (284)
Govt. Def. 72.66 27.34
(279) (105)
Note: N in parentheses.
In whole, the summary statistics tell an interesting story. Judicial ideology is
relatively dispersed with a mean close to the equivalent of a perfectly moderate
judge. The disparity in attorney “firepower” is quite pronounced: Themean plain-
tiff firm size is three times less than the mean defendant firm size.26 The mean
value for discovery time is approximately 5.5 months, though the maximum value
in the dataset is over 1,900 days; the equivalent of over five yearsworth of discovery.
26Themedian values for these variables indicates an evenmore pronounceddisparity in litigation
resources with a 13:1 ratio in firmsizes for defendants versus plaintiffs.
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The dichotomous variables are less surprising and tell a relatively familiar tale
from federal court litigation: civil rights are the a great deal of the cases (thoughnot
the majority), federal district court judges tend to be white and male, and federal
civil caseswill usually involve an individual plaintiff litigantwhile the government
is involved often, but not typically.
Estimations
To model the determinants of whether a summary judgment motion is filed I
utilized a probit estimation on the dichotomous dependent variable (motion filed,
or not) with the aforementioned independent variables. Results from these esti-
mations are reported in Table 5.9.
As Table 5.9 indicates, some, but not all, of our variables serve as statstically sig-
nificant predictors of whether a motion for summary judgment is filed in a given
case. Of note, and as expected, the longer discovery time period, the more likely
one can expect a motion for summary judgment. Additionally, if a governmental
defendant is involved in a case, that case sees a statistically significant increase in
the probability that a summary judgment motion will be filed (and, because it is a
defendants’ motion, that the government will be the litigant making the motion).
Finally, if the case involves civil rights claims, there is a statistically significant and
negative effect on the probability that amotion for summary judgmentwill be filed.
This result was unexpected. Given that summary judgment motions appear more
prevalent in civil rights cases than non-civil rights cases, one might expect this co-
efficient to be positive. However, it must be kept inmind that the effects of the civil
rights case modulates through the interaction between judicial ideology and the
existence of civil rights claims. Theoretically, and consistent with the judicial ide-
ology literature, we would expect that conservatives treat civil rights claims with
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Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses; N=234.
***=p< .01; **=p< .05; *=p< .10.
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Figure 5.6: Probability SJ Filed
greater hostility and might welcome such motions. The evidence suggests, how-
ever, that this line of reasoning might be more nuanced than originally thought.
Figure 5.6 plots the point estimates of the predicted probabilities for observing
a motion for summary judgment based on whether the case is a civil rights case
or a non-civil rights case along the ideological scale for district court judges (from
the most liberal to most conservative in the dataset). All remaining independent
variables were held at their means or modes.
We see in Figure 5.6 that, under the constraints above, a motion for summary
judgmentwould appear to be filedwith greater probability in non-civil rights cases
than in civil rights cases. This result, however, must be tempered by the fact that
the independent variables have been defined in such a manner that might not ac-
curately reflect a “true” civil rights case versus a “true” non-civil rights case. Non-
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theless, the discrepancy when all independent variables are held to their means
and modes is a finding that suggests a different result from previous studies.
More interesting, however, is the dramatic difference between whether a sum-
mary judgmentmotion is filedwhen litigants appear before a liberal versus conser-
vative district court judge. When a liberal judge is assigned to a case, a summary
judgment motion is less likely to occur. However, what is particularly interesting
is the rather large discrepancy between when such a motion is filed in civil rights
versus non-civil rights cases. Figure 5.6 suggests that in a civil rights case with a
liberal district court judge, litigants will not file motions for summary judgment.
However, as the judge becomes more conservative, the likelihood that a summary
judgment motionwill be filed is approximately the same between civil rights cases
and non-civil rights cases.
The above result is fascinating because it reveals insight into how the lawyers
in cases consider the utility of suchmotions. Given that we knowmost motions for
summary judgment are filed by defendants, it suggests that defendants’ counsel
are strategically altering their behavior not based on the law, but on the ideological
dispositions of the sitting judge. In other words, lawyers factor into their consid-
eration for litigation maneuvers political factors. The results suggest a defendant’s
lawyer will recognize in civil rights cases that they are appearing before a liberal
judge and consider the cost of the motion greater than the benefit they expect to
derive from filing the procedural device. Contrarily, when the defendant’s coun-
sel observes a conservative judge sitting on the case, they believe it worth taking
a shot at kicking the case out at the summary judgment stage and will file such a
motion at a 20% increase in probability.
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Figure 5.7: Conditional Marginal Effects: SJ Filed & Civil Rights Cases
Recall that our model included an interaction term between the existence of a
civil rights case and judicial ideology. Given that we want to see the effects of the
civil rights variable and the concomitant increase in the probability of observing
a motion for summary judgment, we need to calculate the marginal effects of this
dichotomous variable. Indeed, the predicted probabilities in 5.6 are useful, but
they are averaged effects across the observations. In order to ascertain the true
effect of a single variable for a binary outcome, marginal effectsmust be computed.
Figure 5.7 displays the conditional marginal effects of the civil rights variable.
The results suggest that for all liberal judge values and into the moderate conser-
vative judge values the effect of being in a civil rights case produces a statistically
significant from zero decrease in the probability of a summary judgment motion
being filed. Notice, though, that as the district court judge becomesmore conserva-
tive, there is an increase in the probability of a summary judgment motion being
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filed in civil rights cases. In other words, while the predicted probability graph
suggested it is less likely to see a summary judgment motion in a civil rights case
(with remaining independent variables held at their means and modes), the real-
ity is that litigants (i.e., defendants) are more likly to file these summary judgment
motions when they appear before conservative judges. Again, this result suggests
strategic activity on the part of litigants and lawyers.
Overall, themodel performsmoderatelywell. Though it holds amodest pseudo
R2 value of .14, it does correctly predict over 73% of the dependent variable out-
comes correctly. The percent reduction in error (PRE) is similarly a modest 9%.
Diagnostics suggest the model is moderately strong, but could be improved
upon. For instance, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem. Because
the regression is probit and not OLS, I utilized the collin STATA ado command to
calculate the Condition Index Number (CIN) for the independent variables. Here,
the CIN is is 6.34; less than a value of 10 which might suggest potential collinear-
ity concerns. Additionally, I performed a Link Test on the model to determine if
there were specification issues. STATA utilizes the link test specification proposed
by Pregibon (1979). In this test, if the model is properly specified, additional pre-
dictors should not be statistically significant except by chance. The link test pro-
posed by Pregibon obtains the linear predicted value (hat) and linear predicted
value squared (hatsq). The hat variable should be statistically significant (indi-
cating our predictors provide solid explanatory power), while the hatsq variable
should not be statistically significant. If the latter is statistically significant, it sug-
gests there could be a missing variable or variables that contribute to the model’s
problems. Performing this test indicates the p-values found in Table 5.10 for these
variables.
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The link test suggests that the model could be missing a variable or variables
that are important to my theory. It is possible the model simply fails to include
a variable, such as the calculated probability of success by each litigant, which
would offer additional insight into the litigant’s determination to file a motion for
summary judgment. Theoretically, this piece of information (and related opera-
tionalization in the form of a variable) would be an important component to the
litigation equation discussed in Chapter 4 (see Posner 1973; Priest & Klein 1984).
Such a variable, however, does not exist as it would require survey information
from lawyers and litigations, the perils of which have previously been discussed.
It might be the case that the discovery variable does not properly work in the
model and therefore while statistically significant, fails to provide much leverage
in the analysis and therefore is possibly amisspecification. Recall that this variable
has heretofore not been utilized in previous scholarship, and it is possible the op-
erationalization employed in my data collection efforts is inappropriate, not only
as a matter of theory, but also statistically speaking. These conclusions, however,
appear not to be the case. Figure 5.8 displays the Receiver Operator Characteristic
(ROC) Plot.27 In my estimation, the ROC plot quantifies the accuracy of the pro-
bit model in its discrimination between two states, here, the filing of a summary
judgment motion or not. The “sensitivity” referenced in the graph is the fraction
27The ROC plot can be generated in STATA with the roc command. See STATA 14 manual for a
discussion of this test (found at http://www.stata.com/manuals14/rroc.pdf).
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of “positive” cases that are correctly classified by the diagnostic test, while the
specificity represents the fraction of negative cases accurately identified. We can
compare ROC plots between nested models to ascertain if variable(s) add to the
model and contribute to its explanatory power in a statistically significant man-
ner. In Figure 5.8, the gray triangles represent the predictive power of the sum-
mary judgment filing model without the inclusion of the discovery variable. The
black line represents the predictive capacity of the model with the discovery vari-
able. The dashed line represents “chance” prediction. In other words, if the ROC
curve runs along (or below) the dashed line, the estimated model(s) are no better
than “chance” at predicting the binary outcomes for the dependent variable. Here,
both lines are above the dashed line and thus do better than “chance.” Addition-
ally, the model which includes the discovery variable encompasses a total area of
.78 of the full area possible (which would be 1.00). The model which excludes dis-
covery only covers .64 of the area. We can compare these sensitivity and specificity
calculations to determine if they are statistically different from one another. If so,
then it suggests inclusion of the discovery variable is an important contributor to
our model. And, in fact, there is a statistically significant difference between the
two models. The p-value for the comparison statistic is p = .00, thereby rejecting
the null hypothesis that the area under the two curves is the same (and thus, that
the models are no different from one another). In short, utilizing the discovery
variable is not only consistent with theoretical expectations, but also is a strong
contributor to the predictive power of the summary judgment filing model.
Overall, themicro-analysismodel for summary judgment provides new insight
into the contributors of whether a summary judgment motion is filed. First, the
model suggests that there are in fact differences between civil rights and non-civil
138
Figure 5.8: ROC Plot: SJ Filed
rights cases when it comes to the decision to file summary judgment. Addition-
ally, that decision to file a motion for summary judgment is related to political
(and not legal) calculations which suggest lawyers and litigants engage in sophis-
ticated strategic considerations about the judge before whom they appear. Finally,
the model suggests the new dataset importantly contributes to our understand-
ing of the summary judgment process through validation of newly created, and
previously non-operationalized, variables.
5.3.3 Determinants of SJ Grants
In the previous section I discussed the factors that determine when a motion
for summary judgment can be expected. The logical next inquiry is to determine
the reasons for why a summary judgment motion might be granted.
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The decision to grant a motion for summary judgment should follow many of
the same theoretical expectations for the filing determination. For instance, as de-
tailed above, gender or race might play a role in the decision, whether the case is
one involving civil rights claims or not, and the ideololgical moorings of a review-
ing judge could impact the decision to grant summary judgment. There is one
variable in particular, however, that will add necessary texture to our analysis that
needs to be addressed before discussing the results for the summary judgment
grant model.
Factual Disputation.
Recall that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a summary judg-
ment motion should be granted if there are no genuine disputes of material facts.
In other words, if the case does not require a jury to resolve factual discrepancies
before a jury, the judge may render a decision as a matter of law as to whether the
claims in the case are valid or not. One way to test whether “the law” matters in
the decision to grant a motion for summary judgment (in addition to other polit-
ical explanations) would be to include a measure of disputation. In other words,
if a case involves a series of facts that are material to the underlying claims of the
case, and those facts are truly in dispute, then the “legal model” would predict
that the motion will be denied. The difficulty, however, lies in knowing whether a
case is truly in dispute. Could we rely on the statements of the parties to help us
determine if such disputation actually exists? I contend, no, we cannot.
The problem of disputation is readily apparent when one considers the basic
nature of a lawsuit. One party sues another and seeks damages for a perceived in-
jury. The non-suing party literally “defends” (they are named defendants) against
the claims of liability. By definition, then, the parties feel there is a disputation of
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facts, and the parties’ attorneys will vigorously contend the disputation. Accord-
ingly, simply surveying the parties’ contentions will not reveal much in the way
of measuring disputation. As a result, reliance on the pleadings is also suspect.
What seems a disputed material fact to one party, may be nothing of the kind to the
judge. An (extreme) example is illustrative here.
In Jones et al. v. UPS, et al., the district court confronted motions for summary
judgment filed by the defendants. In order to demonstrate that there were dis-
puted material facts in the case, counsel for plaintiff filed a rather large brief in
opposition to the motions for summary judgment. I will let the district court’s
narrative on this matter take over from here:
Plaintiffs’Memorandum inOpposition toDefendants’Motions for Sum-
mary Judgment...totals 480 pages. Plaintiff’s brief bombards the Court
with information that is largely irrelevant and inadmissible. Upon a
review of the document, it is almost incomprehensible that it could
at once be so utterly oppressive by means of its shear size, while at
the same time remain so completely pedestrian and underwhelming in
its execution...Plaintiffs set forth a 948 paragraph Statement of Contro-
verted Fact (“Fact Statement”) which spans 168 pages...Following the
gargantuan Fact Statement, Plaintiffs set forth their Responses to the
defendants various statements of uncontroverted facts (“Responses”),
which totals 179 pages...As with the Plaintiffs’ Fact Statement, their Re-
sponses are not only largely unsupported by the record, but also are
set forth in [a] manner completely inconsistent with the Local Rules
of this Court. Finally, Plaintiffs conclude their titanic document with
132 pages of argument in opposition to summary judgment...As glar-
ingly inept as many of the representations in the Fact Statement are,
Plaintiffs’ Responses are even more incredible. Most of Plaintiffs’ at-
tempts at controversion are either unsupported by record or blatantly
non-responsive to the facts presented by the Defendants. These poor
attempts to controvert the Defendants’ factual statements are not only
clumsy and unprofessional, but are most certainly noncompliant with
the Local Rules...As such, this Court can only conclude that they were
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created for the sole purpose of causing unnecessary delay and a need-
less increase in the cost of litigation.28
Clearly, reliance on the pleadings in the above casewould provide little in terms
of a measure of “disputation.” Though an extreme example, the point remains:
reliance on what is disputed by the parties themselves will not provide an appro-
priate measure of disputation.
Measuring disputation based on the judge’s conduct provides a better avenue
for operationalization of this variable. One might suggest looking to the court’s
order on the motion for summary judgment to find what is disputed, and what is
not. The problem with this approach, however, is that all we have are the orders
themselves in which clear decisions on the factual discrepancies (or lack thereof)
are rendered. Such a measurement provides no accounting for how difficult the
disputation determination is and whether the court wrestled with any factual dis-
putes. In short, the orders will almost always read as an assertive declaration of
what is, or is not, disputed and offer no sense of how much the facts were truly in
dispute.
I propose a way forward through this measurement thicket which provides a
sense of how disputed the facts were when presented at the summary judgment
stage. I operationalize disputation as ameasure of the amount of time (in days) the
district court spent reviewing the summary judgmentmotion. A little background
here on the mechanics of the summary judgment pleading process is useful.
When aparty files amotion for summary judgment, the opposing (non-moving)
party will then file a response to that motion (commonly called a Brief in Oppo-
28Jones v. UPS, 03-cv-0288 (W.D. Mo. 2005) [Docket #506]. The district court judge ultimately
sanctioned the lawyer in this case to the tune of $10,000 per defendant. This sanction was upheld
on appeal. See Jones v. UPS, 460 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2007).
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sition to Summary Judgment). Thereafter, the moving party will have the oppor-
tunity to have the last word and file a response to that response (commonly called
a Reply Brief). Sometimes, for instance if new evidence is included in the Reply
Brief, the non-moving party will be permitted to file a Surreply Brief. This briefing
process takes time, and, relatedly, it takes time for the Court to process thematerial
and render a decision. If a case is truly one where the facts are not in dispute, it is
to be expected that the court will render a quick decision (granting the summary
judgment motion). If, on the other hand, the material facts are heavily in dispute,
and the judge (or, their law clerk) has to spend time cross-referencing factual as-
sertions to determine if a true dispute exists, then those endeavors will increase
the amount of time during which the motion is under court review. As a result,
operationalizing disputation as a function of the time a motion for summary judg-
ment spends under review sidesteps the problems of measurement noted above
and provides a more accurate sense of the disputed nature of the case.
This measurement is not perfect. Unquestionably, delay by the court in ren-
dering a decision on pending motions for summary judgment can be influenced
by other factors. Was the judge’s law clerk out ill for an extended period of time,
thereby causing work to pile up in the judge’s chambers. Were there other, more
pressing, matters that diverted the judge’s attention from the pending motion for
summary judgment. These considerations, and others, are admittedly a part of the
overall concept of delay that is infused within the federal courts system. However,
operationalizing court review as proxy for disputation does have theoretical and
practical advantages. The theoretical I have discussed above. The practical is that
with some effort, this information can be gleaned from the district court’s docket
sheets and orders. Accordingly, I have constructed a variable that calculates the
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time, in days, that a motion for summary judgment was under court review. This
clock begins when the final summary judgment brief has been submitted, through
to the time that the district court renders its decision. As with the discovery vari-
able, the court review variable has not been previously utilized in the study of
summary judgment motions.
Estimations.
Table 5.11 contains the estimations for the summary judgment grant model.
Again, I have employed a probit estimation for the dichotomous variable for grant
(“1”) or deny (“0”).
The results provide support for several of the hypotheses. Ideology is statis-
tically significant (p < .05) and suggests a liberal judge is more likely to grant
a summary judgment motion than a conservative judge. Additionally, the civil
rights dummy variable is statistically significant at the p < .10 level and suggests
that a motion for summary judgment is more likely to be granted in a civil rights
case. As with the summary judgment filings model, these variables are interacted
(marginal effects are discussed infra).
Interestingly, one of the judge demographic variables finds statistical signifi-
cance. Non-white judges are less likely to grant a summary judgmentmotion. This
result is consistent with Boyd’s (2016) research suggesting that minority judges
tend to behavemore favorably toward towardplaintiffs in race discrimination cases.
Given the large number of civil rights caseswithin the federal court system, this ef-
fect is an important find, suggesting additional research into the causal pathway is
needed. Like Boyd, however, the judge’s gender appears not to have a statistically
significant effect at the motion stage.
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Table 5.11: Summary Judgment Granted
Variable Coefficient






Ideology x Civil Rights .20
(1.19)










De f .FirmSize -.05**
(.02)











Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses; N=61.
***=p< .01; **=p< .05; *=p< .10.
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The type of litigant appears not to have a strong effect on whether a motion
for summary judgment is granted or not. The individual plaintiff and govern-
mental defendant dummy variables are not statistically significant, suggesting that
whether amotion for summary judgment is granted or not is driven not by the type
of litigants as much as other factors, such as the newly created variables from my
dataset addressing the case complexity and attorney “firepower.”
Turning to the attorneys, we can see that as both the plaintiff’s attorney firm
size and the defendant’s attorney firm size increases, there is a decrease in the
probability that a motion for summary judgment will be granted. The results for
the plaintiff’s firm size has intuitive appeal. Given that most summary judgment
motions are filed by defendants, the bigger the firm supporting the plaintiff, and
one would think the greater the attorney’s resources, the less likely the summary
judgment motion will be granted. Simply put, for a plaintiff, lawyering up in a
big way makes good sense if the litigant wishes to keep the case alive past the
summary judgment stage. The size of the defendant’s law firm also matters, but
in an unanticipated manner. Here, as the size of the defendant’s firm increases,
the probability that the summary judgment motion is granted actually decreases.
It is unclear why this might be the case.
The discovery and summary judgment review time by the court, however, are
statistically significant. Interestingly, the time that the summary judgment motion
is under review actually causes an increase in the probability that a motion for
summary judgment will be granted. This result was not expected. One would
think that if the case truly held disputed material facts, the probability that a mo-
tion for summary judgment would be granted would decrease. But, under the
operationalization of disputation employed here, the opposite is true. This result
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suggests a couple interesting ramifications. First, the model suggests that increas-
ing delay in the case through submission of lengthy and burdensome briefs is actu-
ally awinning strategy for defendants. Additionally, it also suggests that courts are
not being faithful to requirements for when summary judgment motions should
be granted (as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56), but are being faith-
ful to the Supreme Court’s Trilogy in utilizing the summary judgment process as
a docket-cleansing mechanism, even if the facts would appear to be in dispute.
It is true that this finding can be tempered by the reality that perhaps the opera-
tionalization of the disputation variable is not the best. One way to obtain a better
sense of whether the courts are truly embracing the Trilogy over the text of Rule
56 would be to independently read the pleadings in a case to determine if, upon
expert review, the facts could be considered “in dispute.” However, reliance on the
pleadings can be problematic (as noted above), and accordingly the operational-
ization employed here makes a contribution to the study of court usage of proce-
dural mechanisms. The effects of this variable, however, must also be considered
in light of the interaction term between time of court review and the discovery
variable (discussed infra).
Turning to the discovery variable, it is statistically significant and in the ex-
pected direction. The more time spent in the discovery process gathering evi-
dence, the more likely the motion for summary judgment will be granted. The
result suggests a few interesting insights. First, it supports previous theories that
the discovery process has been incentivized to be lengthy and drawn out. “Paper-
ing” an opposing party and extending the discovery process in both time and cost
is a strategically advantageous course of conduct by litigants, and in particular,
defendants. Additionally, prodding a party for weaknesses in their case through
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discovery can provide the litigant who files for summary judgment strong ammu-
nition at this stage of a case. And, if courts are apt to use summary judgment with
a relaxed standard consistent with the Trilogy, it means plaintiffs find themselves
facing a true uphill battle.
The interaction term between discovery length and the time a motion for sum-
mary judgment is under review is also statistically significant, but is negatively
signed. This result is actually expected and returns us to the discussion of dis-
putation. If the case involves lengthy discovery, and the court is required to pour
through summary judgment pleadings in a heightened manner, then the interac-
tion term suggests a diminished probability of summary judgment being granted.
It is here where the concept of disputation takes shape. Independently, these vari-
ables operate in a manner to increase the probability of a summary judgment mo-
tion being granted. Interacted, however, the variables suggest that long cases with
a great deal of discovery that requires a judge to analyze what would appear to
be heavily debated facts causes the court to pass the case through the summary
judgment stage and set up a showdown for trial where a jury determines the facts.
Accordingly, while the variables independently suggest courts do skew toward
the more relaxed version of summary judgment considerations put forth by the
Supreme Court in its Trilogy, it also suggests that in cases where there are truly
disputed facts with a great deal of discovery and the necessity for extended court
review, then the case will pass the Rule 56 hurdle (as it should). The interpretation
of these variables, then provides a nuanced account for judicial decision-making
at the district court level and provides new insight into the summary judgment
process heretofore unexplored.
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Figure 5.9: Predicted Probabilities: SJ Granted
As with the summary judgment filings model, I provide the point estimates of
the predicted probabilities associated with whether a summary judgment motion
is granted or not between civil rights cases. Recall that much ink has been spilled
determining if there is a distinct difference in treatment between civil rights cases
and non-civil rights cases at the summary judgment stage. The predicted proba-
bilities sugggest this is, in fact, the case.
Figure 5.9 displays the predicted probabilities for a grant of summary judgment
for both civil rights and non-civil rights cases across judicial ideology, which is
set to the minimum and maximum values in the dataset. Additionally, all other
independent variables were held at their means or modes.
The predicted probabilities make it clear: civil rights cases face a far greater
risk of being dismissed on summary judgment than non-civil rights cases. For in-
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stance, for a moderate judge nearly at the middle of the ideology spectrum (.068),
the probability that summary judgment will be granted in a non-civil rights case is
about 36%. Merely converting that case to a civil rights case increases the probabil-
ity that summary judgment will be granted to an astounding 81%; an increase of
45% in the likelihood that summary judgment will be granted. Simply put, there is
a strong difference between summary judgment grant rates for civil rights versus
non-civil rights cases. I will discuss in the next section a potential policy impact of
increased summary judgment usage in the context of employment discrimination.
However, it bears stating here that if civil rights cases are susceptible to summary
judgment at such high rates, significant policy consequences can exist. Previous
scholarship suggests there is something simply different between civil rights cases
and non-civil rights cases when it comes to the summary judgment procedural de-
vice. The results in Figure 5.9 agree with this conclusion, and indeed suggest the
situation is potentially more dire for civil rights plaintiffs than initially thought.
Figure 5.10 displays the conditional marginal effects of the civil rights variable
on the probability that summary judgment will be granted plotted along the same
judicial ideology measure in the last graph. Again, the independent variables not
in the graph are held to their mean or modes.
The results suggest an interesting (and expected phenomenon): as the case ap-
pears before an increasingly conservative judge, the effect of that variable in a civil
rights case produces an increasing effect on whether summary judgment will be
granted. The confidence intervals for very liberal judicial ideology are not sta-
tistically significant from zero (as the intervals cross the zero-line), suggesting it
is possible extremely liberal judges could cause either an increase or decrease on
the granting of summary judgment (though the point estimates clearly suggest
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Figure 5.10: Conditional Marginal Effects: SJ Granted & Civil Rights Cases
a diminished effect on granting summary judgment before a very liberal judge).
However, moving from amoderately liberal judge to themost conservative judicial
ideology in the dataset displays marginal effects that are statistically different from
zero, and cause an increase in the grant of summary judgment. While the confi-
dence intervals are somewhat large (a function of the low N associated with the
summary judgment grant model), the point estimates suggest themove toward in-
creasingly conservative judges in civil rights cases and related effect on summary
judgment being granted is quite large. Indeed, at the nearly perfectly-moderate
judge level (.068), the marginal effect estimate is nearly a 45% increase in summary
judgment being granted for a civil rights case. Again, this result comports with the
predicted probability figure above and suggests again that civil rights cases face a
tough barrier to proceeding past the summary judgment stage and to trial.
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Figure 5.11: Predicted Probabilities: SJ Granted (Effect of Discovery and Court
Review Time)
In addition to the effects of civil rights cases, it also worth investigating the ef-
fects of the newly operationalized discovery and time for court review variables.
Figure 5.11 contains the predicted probabilities. Here, the probability of a sum-
mary judgment motion being granted is plotted along varying levels of discovery
time (two, four, and six months), with court review time spanning a single month
through six months. All other independent variables were held at their mean and
modes.
As we can see from the figure, increased discovery time and increased time for
court review leads to an overall increase in the probability that summary judg-
ment will be granted. The figure also sheds light on the interaction between these
two variables on the overall probability that a motion for summary judgment will
be granted. Notice the inflection point at about 140 days of court review. At this
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point in court review, the trends switchwith a case under court review for only two
months passing the case under court review for six months in terms of the prob-
ability that summary judgment will be granted. In other words, cases that have a
great deal of discovery, and a great deal of court review, are now being granted at
a lower rate than cases with a small amount of discovery time (though the effect
is still positive at all levels). What this result suggests is the interaction term kick-
ing in, colloquially speaking. At this point of lengthy discovery and lengthy court
review, disputation would appear to exist, thereby mollifying the probability that
summary judgment will be granted, relative to the other levels of discovery dis-
played in the figure. Overall, the figure displays the nuance mentioned above for
the newly-created variables, and also suggests that while disputation can be a fac-
tor, it simply does not outpace the coefficients for the discovery and court review
variables individually, thereby leading to the increase in probability that summary
judgment will be granted as both variables increase (albeit, at differing pace given
the difference in slope between each respective probability plot).
Finally, it worth investigating what a plaintiff can do to give themselves a better
chance in a civil rights case at moving past the summary judgment stage. One
variable that is new with the dataset is firm size. We know that if a plaintiff’s firm
size increases, there is a relateddecrease in the probability that summary judgment
will be granted. In order to obtain purchase on this effect, I plot the predicted
probability point estimates for this variable over a range of firm sizes. Recall that
the variable has been transformed to the square root of the raw data. Accordingly,
the values plotted for plaintiff’s firm size range from 0 (meaning, the plaintiff did
not have an attorney) to 11 (meaning the plaintiff was represented by a firm with
121 attorneys). Because we are evaluating a “typical” civil rights case, I have set
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Figure 5.12: Predicted Probabilities: SJ Granted (Effect of Plaintiff Firm Size)
the variable for governmental defendant to zero (meaning, the plaintiff has sued a
private defendant) and the individual plaintiff variable to 1 (meaning the plaintiff
was a person, not a corporation or governmental entity). Finally, all other variables
were set to their mean or mode. Of note, given that we want to evluate parity, the
defendant’s firm size has been set to the mean of 13.40, meaning a firm size of just
over a 179 attorneys with the firm. Figure 5.12 contains the results.
The results suggesting a few interesting insights. First, the old adage “he who
represents himself has a fool for a client” is true, at least when it comes to summary
judgment. Individuals who proceed in a federal civil rights case pro se have about
an 85%probability that summary judgmentwill be granted in their case. Not good
odds, to say the least. What is also interesting, however, is that a plaintiff who ob-
tains attorney “firepower” can mollify the effects of a summary judgment motion
being granted. The trend is clear: the more attorneys in the firm the plaintiff hires,
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the better their chances at getting past the summary judgment stage. But there is
an interesting wrinkle here: a plaintiff must hire a law firm with approximately
121 attorneys before they can even have a better than 50-50 shot at getting past
summary judgment. In other words, retaining a big firm does help, but the sum-
mary judgment process is so difficult for plaintiffs that hiring even a large law firm
by any reasonable standard will still only give that plaintiff a probability of getting
past a motion for summary judgment at slightly better than even odds. Again, this
suggests a rather steep climb for individuals in civil rights cases.
Finally, as with the summary judgment filingsmodel, it worth evaluating some
of the model’s diagnostics. First, the model has a better Pseudo R2 (.25) value than
the summary judgment filings model. Additionally, the model correctly predicts
approximately 69% of the dependent variable outcomes, and provides a robust
36.7 percent reduction in error (PRE). Overall, the model has relatively succesful
predictive power.
Diagnostics suggest the model is strong. For instance, multicollinearity does
not appear to be a problem. As with the filings model, given the regression is pro-
bit I again utilized the collin STATA ado command to calculate theCondition Index
Number (CIN) for the independent variables. Here, the CIN is is 9.71; less than a
value of 10 which might suggest potential weak collinearity concerns. Addition-
ally, I performed a Link Test on the model to determine if there were specification
issues. As noted supra, STATA utilizes the link test specification proposed by Pregi-
bon (1979). Again, if the model is properly specified, additional predictors should
not be statistically significant except by chance. As stated above, the test obtains
the linear predicted value (hat) and linear predicted value squared (hatsq). The
hat variable should be statistically significant (indicating our predictors provide
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solid explanatory power), while the hatsq variable should not be statistically sig-
nificant. The latter squared term should not be statistically significant; if its, it sug-
gests there could be a missing variable or variables that contribute to the model’s
problems. Performing this test on the summary judgment granted model returns
the p-values found in Table 5.12 for these variables.




The link test suggests that the model not only has good predictors, but also
is not missing other variables that would improve model performance. Accord-
ingly, the model appears to be stronger in both predictive performance and model
specification than the summary judgment filings model.
Taking a step back, we can put together the macro and micro analyses. The
macro analyses suggest the Trilogy did rework litigation incentives to cause the
diminution in trials. Themicro analyses reveal there are important constituent fac-
tors that influence whether a party will file a motion for summary judgment, and
whether that motion will be granted. Both of these levels of analysis provide new
insight into the capacity of alterations to legal procedure to impact the likelihood
that a case goes to trial. This project began with the expectation that these alter-
ations will have a forceful decrease in getting a case to trial, and indeed the results
support this contention. Thus far, the question has centered on whether summary
judgment has significantly restrained cases from reaching the trial stage. I now
156
turn to investigate the potential policy ramifications for claims not going to trial in
an analysis of employment discrimination cases.
5.4 Policy Impact of Diminishing Trials
As noted above, knowing that the summary judgment Trilogy has caused a
diminution in trials is an important first step in understanding how procedural
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can cause substantive changes to
the legal system. However, we can do more. The next step is to understand not
only that procedure can cause substantive changes, but also, what specific public
policy outputs aremodified? If, for instance, proceduralmodifications to the Rules
of Civil Procedure have policy consequences that run counter to the policy aims of
the elected branches, it calls into question not only the actual policy changes, but
also the related concern of counter-majoritarianism. In other words, if the political
branches of our government seek to obtain certain societal results through legisla-
tion that is thwarted by these judicially-motivated procedural alterations, wemust
question the efficaciouness of those political endeavors.
In order to assess these concerns I turn to the issue of income inequality. In-
come inequality is an area that has generated much scholarly interest recently. See,
e.g., Kelly 2009; Enns et al. 2014; Volscho & Kelly 2012; Kelly & Witko 2012; Kelly
& Enns 2010; Bartels 2008. While the literature in general has focused on causes
of income inequality, it has not substantively addressed whether efforts to combat
income inequality through changes to legal rules have been successful. An area
of the law where legal rules are specifically designed to counter income inequal-
ity is in employment discrimination law. Employment discrimination claims are
designed to protect individuals from disparate treatment in employment condi-
157
tions. Such conditions of employment typically relate to matters of pay or income.
For instance, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits individuals from be-
ing paid differently on the basis of their race for equal work (as does, for instance,
42 U.S.C. §1981). Gender discrimination is similarly proscribed by Title VII (as
well as the Equal Pay Act). Accordingly, with employment discrimination law we
have a collection of legal rules explicitly designed to reduce employment (and con-
comitantly, income) inequality. If employment discrimination claims, however, are
kicked out of court due to summary judgment, or, if they are devalued because of
the changes to summary judgment, then it is distinctly possible the related inability
to get to trial will cause anti-discrimination efforts to be muted. Thus, the ques-
tion is whether the alterations to the summary judgment process, and diminishing
employment discrimination trials, has a negative effect on income equality.
In order to assess this question, I model income equality as a function of em-
ployment discrimination trials (with appropriate control variables). If employ-
ment discrimination trials are a statistically significant predictor of income equality
after controlling for structural, political, and economic variables, it suggests that
reducing the number of trials through procedural changes can have deletrious ef-
fects on public policy goals.
In Figures 5.13 and 5.14, I plot income equality between men and women, as
well as between blacks andwhites. The data come from theU.S. Census and are the
median household income ratios between comparator groups. Aswe can see, there
is general upward movement over this time, though the disparity between men
and women, as well as blacks and whites, still exist. During the time in question
(1981-2013), women gained about 18 cents on the dollar, while blacks only gained
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Figure 5.13: Female-Male Income Ratio
Figure 5.14: Black-White Income Ratio
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Figure 5.15: Employment Discrimination Trials
approximately 7 cents on the dollar. In both cases, the comparator groups (men
and whites, respectively) continue to outpace in income.
Figure 5.15 details the number of federal employment discrimination trials in
the United States. Data comes from the Administrative Office for the United States
Courts. We can see that after such trials began in the U.S., there was a sharp de-
cline, and then a leveling off in the total number of trials over time. In terms of raw
numbers, we have about as many employment discrimination trials in contempo-
rary times as we did in the early 1980s.
In order to assess the effects of employment discrimination on income ratios, I
perform Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations where the dependent variable
is the above income ratios. I control for a variety of structural, political, social, and
economic factors, in addition to themain independent variable of interest (employ-
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ment discrimination trials). In terms of structural variables, I control for relevant
epochs for employment discrimination law. I control for the pre-Trilogy time pe-
riod with a dummy variable (1 for pre-Trilogy, 0 otherwise) as well as the time
period between the Trilogy and enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Amendment
(1 if in this period, 0 otherwise). The 1991 Civil Rights Amendment altered some
of the incentive mechanisms for individuals to litigate discriminiation cases by,
for instance, permitting damages for emotional distress (something that was not
permitted prior to 1991). In order to control for these changes, I utilize the above
dummy variable.
In terms of social factors, socio-economic status theory has long held that ed-
ucation is a large determinant of income earning potential. Accordingly, I control
for the ratio of individuals aged 25 years old or older with 4 years of college be-
tween the comparator groups. This data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau. I
also control for the public “Mood,” a measure of how liberal or conservative the
nation is at any given moment based on Stimson’s (1998) work.
For economic factors, I control for the unemployment rate and the strength of
the economy, heremeasured asGDP (see, e.g., Kelly &Witko 2012). The unemploy-
ment rate data come from the Current Population Survey; GDPdata come from the
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Accounts. Finally, for political fac-
tors, I control for the party of the president (1 if Democrat, 0 if not), and whether
the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (1 if so, 0 if not).
Before moving to the estimations, a word about the time series nature of these
variables is appropriate. First, it is clear that many of these variables trend in a par-
ticular direction and exhibit signs of having a unit root. As Granger & Newbold
(1974) first discussed, regressions based on time serial data with unit roots can re-
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sult in spurious regressions. In order to combat the unit root effects, data must be
transformed and made stationary before running estimations, often through dif-
ferencing the data or detrending the data (Enders 2010). Figure 5.13 displaying
the Female-Male Income Ratio is a good example of such data. From the figure, it
is clear that there is a trend in the time series. Performing an OLS estimation with
such a trend could result in incorrect estimates and the high potential for a spuri-
ous regression. On the other hand, typical unit root tests, such as the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test, with a low N (as we have here), can also be biased and have
low power (see De Boef & Granato 2000). Dickey-Fuller tests in such situations
can be biased toward a finding of unit roots. Given the data and low-N, I have
decided to operationalize the model cautiously. Accordingly, I performed Aug-
mentedDickey-Fuller tests on all variables in both income inequalitymodels. With
the exception of employment discrimination trials and the ratio of Black-White
college education, all other variables indicated stationarity concerns. I therefore
detrended the following variables: Female-Male income ratio and Black-White in-
come ratio. I differenced the following variables: Female-Male college education,
unemployment, andMood. Finally, I logged the GDP variable. After each of these
transformations, the time series were all stationary and we can have confidence
that our results are not the product of spurious regressions.29
Turning to the Female-Male income model, the results are contained in Table
5.13.
The results are clear; employment discrimination trials have a statistically sig-
nificant positive effect on income equality between men and women even after
29I also ran the models with a Beta regression utilizing a Beta distribution, given the untrans-
formed dependent variables are percentage ratios. The results for these estimations were substan-
tively the same for our main independent variable of interest (employment discrimination trials).
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Table 5.13: Female-Male Income Model
Variable Coefficient






















Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *=p< .01; **=p< .05
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factoring in a host of structural, political, social, and economic variables.30 Ad-
ditionally, the structural variables indicate that income equality declined due to
the post-Trilogy time period before enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Amend-
ment. The only additional variable to obtain statistical significance is the Presi-
dential variable, which indicates that Democratic presidents have a negative effect
on income equality; this was an unexpected result. In order to obtain purchase on
the impact of the employment discrimination trials variable, I plot in Figure 5.16
the predicted values associated with these trials, with affiliated 95% confidence
intervals. The Figure moves from approximately the lowest number of trials con-
tained in the dataset (approximately 100) to the greatest number of trials in the
dataset (approximately 1400).
The graphical results in Figure 5.16 are clear: as the number of employment dis-
crimination trials increase, income equality increases.31 Essentially, moving from
the lowest level of employment discrimination trials in the dataset to the highest
number results in approximately a 4 cent increase on the dollar for women com-
pared to men. This change is not insubstantial. Note that during the entirety of
the Female-Male income ratio series (see Figure 5.13), the total amount of change
between 1981 and 2013 for women was approximately 18 cents. Moving from the
smallest to greatest number of employment discrimination trials can account for
nearly a quarter of this change.
In order to assess the effect of employment discrimination trials on the income
ratio between blacks and whites, I similarly perform an OLS estimation. The only
30A Breusch-Pagan test of the residuals indicated there was no problem with heteroskedasticity
in the model. Additionally, a Durbin-Watson test found no problem with serial correlation in the
residuals.
31Recall that the dependent variable is the detrended income ratio between females and males.
This detrended variable, however, does not alter the original scale, so unit changes still reflect the
“cents on the dollar” analysis as in the non-detrended variable.
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Figure 5.16: Effect of Empl. Disc. Trials on Income Equality (Female-Male)
change in the model is the dependent variable, which is switched to reflect income
ratios between blacks and whites, and the education variable, which is modified
to reflect the ratio in college education between blacks and whites. The results of
this estimation are contained in Figure 5.14.
The graphical results in Figure 5.17 are again clear: as the number of employ-
ment discrimination trials increase, income equality increases between blacks and
whites.32 Moving from the lowest level of employment discrimination trials in the
dataset to the highest number results in approximately a 5.5 cent increase on the
dollar for blacks compared to whites. This change is meaningful. Note that dur-
32A Breusch-Pagan test of the residuals indicated there was no problem with heteroskedasticity
in the model. Additionally, a Durbin-Watson test found no problem with serial correlation in the
residuals.
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Table 5.14: Black-White Income Model
Variable Coefficient






















Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *=p< .01; **=p< .05
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Figure 5.17: Effect of Empl. Disc. Trials on Income Equality (Black-White)
ing the entirety of the Black-White income ratio series (see Figure 5.14), the total
amount of change between 1981 and 2013 for women was approximately 7 cents.
Moving from the smallest to greatest number of employment discrimination tri-
als can account for approximately three-quarters of this change. In other words,
if employment discrimination trials decline, the income ratio between blacks and
whites is substantively reduced.
5.5 Discussion & Conclusion
The results from the macro-level estimations support the procedural hypothe-
sis that the summary judgment Trilogy had a negative impact on the total number
of cases that go to trial. When the U.S. Supreme Court issued its Trilogy, the de-
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cisions had the effect of re-working the parties’ litigation calculus. Simply put,
post-Trilogy, federal civil cases became devalued and plaintiffs (and their attor-
neys) were fully aware of the consequences for pushing claims. The downward
effects of summary judgment simply do not render it worthwhile to go to trial, or
risk going to trial.
Additionally, the micro-level results indicate that political variables impact the
decision of whether a litigant files a motion for summary judgment. We saw quite
clearly that lawyers behave strategically in deciding to file a motion for summary
judgment by considering the ideology of the judge before whom they appear, as
well as how the discovery process (a central feature of Chapter 4’s theoretical dis-
cussion) can cause increased likelihood that a motion for summary judgment is
filed. Moreover, the results for whether a summary judgment motion is granted
are profound. Very clearly, civil rights cases face a steep hill in the climb for a
trial. Additionally, newly operationalized variables that are unique to this study
also indicate they have an impact on whether a motion for summary judgment is
granted, including the size of the law firms representing the parties, the length
of time a case is subject to the discovery process, and the duration of time under
which a motion for summary judgment is under review by the court.
Finally, the alterations to the summary judgment process had profound effects
on income inequality, not only in effect, but also in the theory behind encourag-
ing individuals to litigate. It has long been thought that an efficient manner to
revitalize individuals’ claims and to allow for the “rights revolution” is to incen-
tivize litigation. Scholars in political science have discussed the impact that litiga-
tion incentives have played in motivating individuals and their attorneys to bring
claims which seek, in the aggregate, to accomplish public policy objectives. For
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instance, Farhang (2010; see also 2008; Silverstein 2009; Kagan 2003) discusses the
manner in which policy makers seek to incentivize litigation in order to accom-
plish their policy goals, namely, the filing of lawsuits to achieve these policy aims.
What is missing from this analysis, however, is whether policy makers are cor-
rect in their assessment when they ignore underlying procedural devices that can
work against their goals (but see Staszak 2015). I have challenged these scholars’
ideas by suggesting that, whatever the aims of policy makers, failure to incorpo-
rate procedural aspects of litigation ignores the reality of policy implementation-
through-litigation, and can result in policy consequences unintended by the policy
makers. In other words, procedure becomes substance. Simply put, whatever the in-
centive mechanisms created by legislation, alterations to the underlying incentive
structure contained within the actual litigation cannot be ignored. In the realm of
civil rights litigation, changes to the law which encourage individuals to litigate
will certainly bring about more lawsuits, but that is not where our inquiry should
end. Just because more lawsuits are filed does not say whether those lawsuits are
successful in implementing the policy aims of political actors. If cases are sum-
marily dismissed from the litigation pipeline, the increase in case filings will have
amuted effect. This phenomenon is preciselywhatwe see in the realmof summary
judgment and income equality. Future endeavors to achieve policy goals through
litigation incentivization should pay heed not only to the ultimate end sought to
be achieved, but also the subterranean machinations through which those cases
must ultimately move in order to assess their viability.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS OF FINDINGS
6.1 Introduction
This project has attempted to provide an answer to the fundamental question
for why we no longer have civil trials. The evidence is clear that cases no longer
go to trial, and theory suggests the reason for this is the re-working of a procedu-
ral device whose effects spill throughout the litigation process, namely, summary
judgment. Through a multi-level research design, I have demonstrated that not
only do shifts in trial trends occur coordinate in time with the alterations to the
summary judgment process by the United States SupremeCourt’s Trilogy, but also
that this re-working has consequences. With a micro-level analysis consisting of
a unique dataset with measured variables previously unused, the results suggest
that litigants’ resources, the time spent on charting a course through the litigation
process, and the type of case impact whether amotion for summary judgment will
be filed, and relatedly, whether a motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Finally, the impact of the diminution in trials is examined with respect to an area
that generates a great deal of public attention, namely, employment discrimina-
tion. Here, the results suggest that decreases in the number of trials for this sub-
ject area have effects which spill into the larger society. Specifically, a decline in
employment discrimination trials is related to an increase in income inequality be-
tween segments of the American population. At this point, it is worth taking a step
back and considering the larger implications of this project.
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6.2 Ramifications
For years, the observable fact of a decline in trials was unquestioned. We knew
that civil cases no longer went to trial, but we did not know why cases no longer
went to trial. The unified theory I present, focusing on alterations to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, presents solid theoretical ground upon which we can
moor our conclusions on this matter. The evidence very clearly suggests that sub-
terranean features to the American legal system have shifted the paths of many
cases. The fact that procedural devices (such as summary judgment) work on such
a subterreanean level is to suggest the difficulty past researchers have had in ad-
dressing this question. And yet, it is preciselywithin this difficult-to-discern realm
where the action is, to put it colloquially.
A decade ago, Margo Schlanger suggested that if we really want to understand
American trial trends, we need to do more than rely on review of cases and doc-
trinal discussion (Schlanger 2006). She suggested that “reported opinions are sim-
ply beside the point. . . [r]ather, research will primarily need to use statistical in-
formation about case outcomes [and] docket and pleadings research” (2006, 38).1
This project has taken heed of this call and has utilized quantitative modeling of
theoretically-driven principles focused on procedure to arrive at the conclusions
presented. The previous chapters can thus now provide an answer to the why-
question.
Understanding that summary judgment has, in fact, caused a massive alter-
ation to litigation strategies, and that this re-working has impacted discrete policy
1See Coleman 2012 (suggesting we need to dig more deeply into the causes and consequences of
summary judgment to go beyond our present knowledge on the subject matter); see also Clermont
& Eisenberg (2002) (discussing the need for theoretically-driven quantitative efforts to discern the
impact of settlement).
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areas, such as employment discrimination and income equality is important. But,
backing out from these results, what can we say about larger theoretical concerns
for the administration of justice in the United States? I offer here a few tentative
(as they must be) conclusions on this matter.
Gordon Silverstein has proposed that the modern litigation state is a system
of “juridification” (Silverstein 2009). Juridification means “efforts to legalize, for-
malize, and proceduralize; efforts to strip out the ambiguity of politics and the U.S.
Constitution and replace it with unambiguous rules and automated default proce-
dures” (Id., 2). The rise of the litigation state, that system inwhich the “rights revo-
lution” has occurred, is one nowwhere litigants have an “extensive reliance on the
courts to address questions of politics and policy” (Staszak, 2011, 78). As Robert
Kagan (2001) notes, we have entered a period of “adversarial legalism,” where
litigants employ private suits to create or enforce public policy. People (whether
actual, or corporate), in addition to governmental actors, are now a moving force
behind charting a course for the establishment of rights and responsibilities (see
also Epp 2009).
The area of individual rights, not only in the constitutional sense, but also in
the statutory, is where there are severe implications for my findings. In The Lit-
igation State, Farhang (2010) points to the movement over time of assigning en-
forcement of individuals’ civil rights to the individuals themselves. Ours is a le-
gal system of “private enforcement regimes,” one where Congress has, through
“legislative choice” determined that priviate litigation should be the moving force
behind statutory implementation. Farhang (2010) details the reasons for this de-
velopment and concludes the battle between Congress and the Executive over bu-
reaucratic enforcement of statutory rights has encouraged Congress to mobilize
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individuals to enforce the law. The incentivization of attorneys fees awards, for
instance, is a mechanism through which Congress has attempted to encourage in-
dividuals to press their individual claims to establish concrete national policy in
the area of employment discrimination. And, as Farhang notes—and I agree—the
resort to the courts for this policy output is entirely democratic. As he explains,
“[t]he institutional organ of government that produced the litigation-dominated
civil rights enforcement framework that prevails in the United States was not only
legislative, but was, over and over, a robustly democratic example of the legislative
process. . . [i]t was. . .most certainly democracy at work” (Farhang, 2010, 234).
Public law scholarship suggests, then, that the mobilization of private lawsuits
is democratic, the purposes behind it were to protect policy choice implementation
“from erosion from future congresses or resistant bureaucrats” (Staszak, 2011, 82),
and can serve important ends particularly in the realm of civil rights. But here is
where there is a significant problem for the results of my study. If, as my analy-
sis shows, procedural devices such as summary judgment have been modified to
counteract particular policy results, then the litigation state has no teeth.
Legal procedure is the ultimate backstage pass. If you file a federal civil law-
suit involving a car crash; legal procedure steers the case. If you file a lawsuit for
excessive force against a police officer; legal procedure steers the case. If you file
an employment discrimination claim, a claim for violation of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA), a claim under theNational Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), a contract claim, a tort claim, a property claim, etc., if you are in federal
court, youwill use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. And if you use those rules,
you are subject to procedural devices like summary judgment. In other words, no
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matter the incentivization scheme employed to encourage private litigants to ef-
fectuate national policy, federal legal procedure is involved every step of the way.
In theory, if legal procedure is applied the sameway for all types of claims, then
no problem exists in terms of disproportionality. If, for instance, contract cases are
kicked from court under the summary judgment process on balance as employ-
ment discrimination claims, then the procedure is just the procedure; no more,
no less. We can debate whether the procedure should be more plaintiff-friendly,
for instance, or pro-defendant, but the outcome is distributionally uniform. But
that world is not the world in which we live. As we have seen, civil rights cases
face a much tougher road at the summary judgment stage, either in terms of mo-
tions being filed, or in terms of the motion being granted. Differential treatments
with procedure cause differential policy outputs. And it is here where there is real
concern for the present state of summary judgment practice.
The Supreme Court’s Trilogy was not only a significant re-ordering of boring
legal procedure, itwas a re-making of the rights revolution and theAmerican “Liti-
gation State.” Pummelled byDemocratic congresses that institutionalized enforce-
ment regimes within the mass public, the Court very clearly took the opportunity
to scale back these policy designs. In a recent study, Burbank & Farhang (2015,
1561) found that interpretations of “procedural law. . . afford[s] courts greater lat-
itude to frustrate or subvert congressional preferences through interpreting that
law.” In other words, courts—including the Supreme Court—have turned to con-
siderations of procedure to alter or amend policy substance.
The endeavors by political actors to pull at the roots of private enforcement
regimes has been given the name “retrenchment” by public law scholars. Rather
than “entrenching” the enforcement scheme to the private litigant, it is now be-
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ing retrenched and removed. As Staszak (2015, 30) notes in her excellent book No
Day in Court: Access to Justice and the Politics of Judicial Retrenchment, “rules of ad-
judication can make it more difficult for a potential plaintiff to initiate a claim in
court, build a case, or succesfully navigate the legal process through to a trial.” As
I have demonstrated in this project, this result is precisely the case with respect to
summary judgment practice.
Staszak (2015, 210) expounds on the above point by noting:
[C]ourts and judges can have no role to play in the enforcement of
rights and the implementation of policy unless the relevant plaintiffs
canmake it through the courthouse door to beginwith. Thus, the rights
revolution was not just about the passage of landmark legislation like
the Civil Rights Act, but was also necessarily fueled by a dramatic ex-
pansion of procedural mechanisms, causes of action, and a deep sup-
port structure to enable disadvantaged groups to get their day in court.
But what procedure can add, it can also take away. Thus, “[t]argeting proce-
dural mechanisms can be an attractive way to disguise reform efforts laced with
political motivations” (Staszak, 2015, 220). The summary judgment Trilogy can be
viewed in this manner. The alterations instituted to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in a series of cases that are hardly on the list of most-momentous
Supreme Court decisions went miles toward facilitating the retrenchment of pub-
lic policy, and in particular, federal civil rights policy. And, the effects of that
re-working of summary judgment standards not only impacted the actual policy
results (for instance, income inequality), it also served to render endangered the
sacred institution of the trial.
Future work is surely necessary to assess whether other procedural mecha-
nisms have impacted public policy preferences by the elected branches of the gov-
ernment. This study is not an all-encompassing investigation of procedural devices
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writ large. But the results here do suggest a fruitful avenue for future research.
And, the findings suggest that in the future, if policymakers wish to entrench their
policy preferences through private enforcement, they cannot discount the proce-
dural devices those litigants will face when they initiate the lawsuit. For now, we
can confine our conclusion to what we know and state that modifications to the
summary judgment process have potentially dire consequences for civil rights in
the United States, and that courts are very clearly engaged in a rush to justice.
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